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Technology founded in quantum phenomena is set to revolutionise computation, sensing and
communication. With an entirely different method of manipulating information, quantum com-
puters in particular are able to offer significant advances when compared to their classical
counterparts. Unrelenting research throughout the world implies that such machines are set
to be the demise of public-key cryptography that is critical to modern society.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a method to securely distribute randomness be-
tween distant parties using the fundamental nature of the universe. Protocols do not depend
on assumed hard problems and so the security of the key does not decrease as computing
power increases. However, QKD systems have been susceptible to information leakage or
hacks which compromises their security at the time of key exchange. As research demon-
strations evolve into commercial systems, the security of a physical implementations must
be addressed.
Device-independent protocols have since been introduced to relieve the possibility of se-
cret information falling into the hands of an adversary. Using correlations between random
events, the physical system does not contain any information about the key. Therefore, it is
not susceptible to attacks or able to reveal the secret key. This simplifies the task of charac-
terising a system to guarantee a secure key exchange.
Before QKD can be widely adopted, a cost-effective and scalable platform must be de-
veloped. In the last decade, photonic integration has been refined to facilitate circuit com-
plexity simply not possible with bulk alternatives. The inherent robustness and phase-stability
make it an excellent candidate for future quantum-secured networks.
This thesis will explore how integrated photonics can be deployed in device-independent
QKD protocols to both ensure practical security and enhance network accessibility. We will
show how integrated components can be used to generate quantum states with high fidel-
ity and demonstrate quantum interference. The complexity of photonic integration will be ex-
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The second quantum revolution is steadily progressing with no immediate sense of slowing.
The prospect of a large scale quantum computing a no longer a pipe dream with small quan-
tum computers available publicly online. The current scale of research focused on the field
suggests that the question should not be if but rather when.
The promised benefits of quantum computing seem immeasurable, partly because the
benefits have not been fully explored beyond a few applications. However, one well-known
example threatens the future of modern secure communication [1]. With large scale quantum
computing forthcoming [2], we must explore new methods of secure communication before
such quantum algorithms become a reality.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one such attempt to securely distribute randomness
which exploits quantum phenomena to create a secure key exchange based on nature [3, 4].
There are no assumptions of mathematically-hard problems meaning the security of the key
doesn’t decrease after the exchange. While there has been rapid progress from initial demon-
strations into commercial systems, QKD has not been widely adopted. Cost aside, there are
two factors that limit the progression of ubiquitous QKD systems: practical security andmass-
manufacturability.
Recently, the claims of QKD security have come under pressure from the quantum hacking
community. While the security is not based off mathematical assumptions, it is important
that the physical system matches the performance that is predicted by the theory. It has been
demonstrated that physical systems do not necessarily meet this requirement [5].
In an effort to reduce the characterisation required for the security of a key exchange,
device-independent protocolswere developed [6]. This has since inspired newprotocolswhich
are more practical with current technology. For example, measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) removes all possible attacks against the detections system [7].
Following many successful demonstrations of quantum phenomena in laboratories, in-
terest turned from fundamental science to quantum engineering. Robust platforms were re-
quired to scale the potential technologies for application outside the lab. Pioneering work
in photonic integration has allowed a drastic increase in the level of complexity in quantum
photonic experiments [8]. These platforms allow for entire QKD systems to be created from
monolithic devices [9].
This thesis will explore the extension of the integrated photonic platform into new proto-
cols which will simultaneously increase security and facilitate wide-scale quantum-secured
networks. We will show how fine precision of integrated light sources allows for high-fidelity
quantum interference. Potential security flaws in previous QKD demonstrations will be ad-




The outline of the remainder of this thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2 will introduce the general concepts required for the rest of the thesis. Crypto-
graphywill be put in context with advances that have beenmade over the last 4000 years
whichwill endwith the current state ofmodern protocols. Quantum informationwill be in-
troduced starting with the foundations of quantum mechanics. The notion of quantum
bits is discussed as well as key aspects that will be relevant for secure key exchange.
Several different QKD protocols will be presented and the practical security of them dis-
cussed. Finally, the field of integrated photonics will be introduced and the essential
building blocks will be described. Information encoding through quantum photonics will
be reviewed and the different platforms for photonics integration will be compared.
• Chapter 3 presents the fundamental Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference effect and
how it can be performed with integrated devices. The photonic chips will be introduced
and their operation discussed. We will show how interference between independent
devices can be achieved at 431MHz. Finally, we will show how active-phase random-
isation is achieved, which will be crucial for QKD devices.
• Chapter 4 builds on the HOM interference by demonstrating MDI-QKD which removes all
potentially information leaks from the detection system. We will see how entirely integ-
rated components can generate 250MHz-clocked quantum states and distribute 1 kbps
of key at 100 km. The security of the transmitters will be reviewed as well as the security
trade-off for cost-effective electronics. Finally, we will see how developments in silicon
photonics could enable a fully-integrated QKD system to further reduce cost and enable
multi-user, metropolitan, quantum-secured networks.
• Chapter 5 explores new photonic integrated circuits (PICs) for QKD by using the ever-
advancing integrated photonics platform. New methods of generating quantum states
will be discussed. We will also introduce new integrated circuits that will simplify the
electronics required for operation. We will show how photonic chips become devices
through optical and electrical connections, as well as discussing the challenges.
• Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of the presented work. The importance
of HOM interference and its place in QKD will be discussed. The importance of ensuring
security in any key exchange system will be reviewed and how closing loopholes will
be vital to the success of QKD. The integrated photonics platform, and the new devices








2.1. CAST OF CHARACTERS
2.1 Cast of Characters
Before we begin, we will need to introduce the cast of characters that will each have parts to
play throughout this thesis. While the exact reasons behind each persons’ role is unclear, we
can be sure that they will follow their roles without question.
Alice, for reasons that we will not discuss here, would like to send a message to Bob. The
particular message is unknown publicly and she would like it to remain as such. While she has
never met Bob, she wants to make sure that the message is actually being sent to Bob. Often
she will require to know that the message has reached Bob but will rarely seek any further
response.
Bobwants to receive and also read themessage fromAlice, whomhe has nevermet, whilst
also being sure that the message is, in fact, from Alice. He also wants to ensure that the mes-
sage he received is a faithful representation of the one Alice sent and has not been modified
along the way. Bob is not very talkative and doesn’t often respond to messages from Alice.
Charlie is amutual acquaintance of Alice and Bob (despite having nevermet either of them)
who volunteers to act as a mediator for their communication. His specific role will depend
on exactly how Alice and Bob are communicating and he is often not required beyond moral
support. While he is not actively trying to sabotage Alice and Bob’s communication, neither is
he actively protecting them.
Eve is a very nosey individual who listens to all public communication between Alice and
Bob. She is intent on reading themessage sent byAlice butwhile very persistent, she is not very
inventive so will not put very much effort into deciphering the message. Eve is often mistaken
as Mallory, as they have similar intents.
Mallory would also like to know what Alice has sent to Bob, but will go to more extreme
measures to discover their secrets. She is particularly fortunate in having unlimited resources
available (confined only by the laws of physics) and will use all possible methods within her
power to expose the hidden message. Her motivations are unknown.
The reader is encouraged to picture their own cast of characters in their mind’s eye to
bring this thesis to life. Any likeness of characters to any persons, real or imaginary, is purely
coincidental.
2.2 Cryptography
Elements of cryptography date back almost 4000 years to Ancient Egyptian times where un-
usual hieroglyphs were found to have been added to potential shroud mystery over the mean-
ing [10]. While generally not considered a serious attempt at hiding any secret message (and




It has been argued that cryptography was known to the Ancient Greeks. To incite a revolt
against the Persians around 440 BC, Histiæus was said to shave the head of his most trusted
slaves so that a tattooed message would be hidden by his regrown hair [11]. References were
also made centuries later to a long stick called a scytale around the 3rd century BC [12]. Parch-
ment was wound around the scytale and, in effect, created a transposition of the message
which was then used in the Spartan military. While these were revolutionary for their time, they
are not considered cryptographic as the message is merely hidden rather than encrypted.
To better define whether a system can be classified a cryptography, and truly distinguish-
able from steganography, we must fast-forward to the 19th century. Systems designed at hid-
ing messages, but not necessarily encrypting them, were commonplace. Auguste Kerckhoffs
presented a set of six principles that any cryptographic system should satisfy [13]. While tech-
nological advances have superseded some of the list, Kerckhoffs’ principle remains. It is suc-
cinctly summarised as
“The enemy knows the system” - Claude Shannon [14]
Any cryptographic system should remain secure without requiring secrecy of the underly-
ing protocol. Alice and Bob should assume that Eve and Mallory have a copy of their system
when considering its security. Only the key will remain secret to Alice and Bob. Of course, we
will see that the definition of “secure” will change depending on the context tomean practically
or mathematically indecipherable.
This section will introduce some of the important advances in cryptographic history. We
will discuss how the modest origins of classical cryptography will become a crucial part of
society and how cryptography may have even altered the course of history.
2.2.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptography
The first algorithms used for cryptography were so called symmetric-key algorithms. Alice and
Bob initially decide on a shared key. Historically, these keys would have been shared in person,
although technological advances have allowed these keys to be shared from a distance. The
shared key can be used by Alice and Bob to both encrypt and decrypt the message, but the
exact transformation for encryption or decryption may differ.
2.2.1.1 Monoalphabetic Ciphers
The most basic ciphers are those that are simple permutations of the alphabet. These are
known as monoalphabetic ciphers. The symmetric key in these ciphers is the permutation
used, that can be as simple as a single number. Here, we will introduce a couple of simple




One well-known example of cryptography in history was used by the Romans and is now re-
ferred to as the Caesar cipher. According to Seutonius, Julius Caesar used this simple cipher
to communicate important messages to his generals [15].
Each letter of the alphabet is assigned a numeric value i.e. ‘a’ = 0, ‘b’ = 1, etc. and Alice and
Bob agree a key k ∈ Z26 which they keep secret. When Alice wants to send a message, sheconverts her message into a number and systematically ‘adds’ the secret key, k, to each of the
letters, modulo 26. Caesar was reported to use k = 3, which would give the encoding
Plain: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Cipher: D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
where the Alice finds the letter of her plain text in the top row and substitutes it with the cipher
text in the bottom row. Eve and Mallory would not be able to make out the works without the
secret key.
Once Bob receives the message from Alice, he can decipher the message by ‘subtracting’
k from the message i.e. moving from the bottom row of the table above to the top row. This
allows him to read the message.
In an era where most people would have been illiterate, the cipher was likely to be secure.
However, with only 25 possible combinations to try, guessing each permutation is rather trivial.
Once a single word has been uncovered the entire message would be forfeit.
Affine Cipher
A slightly more complex monoalphabetic permutation comes from the affine cipher, although
it seems to be confined more for academic interest than real world use. The cipher is still a
simple permutation of the alphabet but Alice and Bob now share two numbers. They agree on
two integers k, λ ∈ Z26 such that λ is coprime to k i.e. they have no common factors greaterthan 1. For each letter, x, we can encrypt using the mapping
x→ λ · x+ k (mod 26) (2.1)
where the decryption requires the inverse of λ. For example, using k = 3 and λ = 7, we get the
mapping
Plain: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Cipher: D K R Y F M T A H O V C J Q X E L S Z G N U B I P W
which seemsmore ‘random’ than the Caesar cipher. However, the cipher still only relies on two
numbers to encrypt and decrypt. Eve or Mallory may just guess two of the mappings which
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Figure 2.1: A histogram of the relative letter frequency in the English language which can beused to break monoalphabetic ciphers.
allows them to decipher the entire message. Alternatively, as the cipher contains only 12 · 26
possible combinations, Mallory could easily perform a brute force attack.
Frequency Analysis
With ciphers being commonly used, interest turned to analysing cipher text. In the case of a
monoalphabetic cipher, Mallory can consider the relative frequency of the letters. Figure 2.1
shows a histogram of the letters used in the English language. One finds that the letter ‘e‘ is
the most common, while letter such as ‘j’, ‘q’, ‘x’ and ‘z‘ are rarely used.
IfMallory knows that the cipher being used is amonoalphabetic one (whichwewill assume
from Kerckhoffs’ principle) then they can calculate the letter frequency of the message. By
matching the most used letters in the cipher text to the letter frequency, they may be able to
decode the message.
In more complex analysis, one can even consider the frequency of letters at the beginning
or ends of words, and also the frequency of two or three letter fragments. Once parts of the
cipher text have been decrypted, it will usually be sufficient to recover the rest.
2.2.1.2 Polyalphabetic Ciphers
Since the invention of the Caesar cipher in Roman times, there were not many advances in
encryption until the 15th century. Up until this point, encryptionmethods generally used simple
substitutions or permutations. The next evolutionwas to develop polyalphabetic cipherswhere
each letter was encrypted (and decrypted) using a different permutation of the alphabet. Es-




This cipher was originally developed by Giovan Battista Bellaso in 1553 [16] but is attributed
to Blaise de Vigenère [17]. The cipher was believed for a long time to be unbreakable as it
was not initially clear how frequency analysis techniques could be adjusted for the multiple
permutations.
The cipher introduces a word or phrase shared by Alice and Bob which is used as the key.
The keyword is repeated to match the length of the message and each letter represents its
own Caesar cipher. For example, Alice and Bob may choose to share the keyword ‘photon’ in




where decryption is the reverse and each letter is ‘subtracted’ from the message.
If the message is long enough, then the problem can be reduced to analysing k individual
Caesar ciphers, where k is the length of the keyword. However, this requires Eve or Mallory to
know the length of the keyword. Therefore, they need a method of calculating k.
Amethod introduced byWilliam F. Friedman considered the comparing the cipher text with
a shifted version of itself. To understand how thismightwork, consider compare twopassages
of text with one shifted relative to the other. How often would we expect the letters between




where the second message has been shifted by four letters. The letters that match between
the two texts are highlighted above in red. In this example, we found 4 out of 63 letters match
(6.3%). How often should we expect this to happen?
Considering the frequencies of each letters, as shown in figure 2.1, we can calculate the
probability as
P (id) = p2‘a’ + p2‘b’ + · · ·+ p2‘z’ ≈ 0.0655 (2.2)
where the ‘id’ refers to the fact that the messages were both written with the same alphabet.
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Suppose we were to instead compare two messages which had a different encoding, for
example the plain text message with a monoalphabetic cipher text. Let us denote a monoal-





pi · pπ(i) (2.3)
In general, the probability of coincidence will always be less when comparing two different
encodings. For any non-trivial permutation π,





















2 > 0 (2.6)
On average, we would expect a match probability of around 1/26 ≈3.85%. To apply this to
the Vigenère cipher, one simply needs to compare the cipher text with a shifted version of it-
self. The probability of coincidence will be maximised when the text is shifted by a multiple
of the keyword length. Once the length of the keyword has been discovered, the problem re-
duces to analysing multiple Caesar ciphers. Frequency analysis can be applied to break each
individually and recover the plain text from the cipher text.
One-Time Pad
The one-time pad (OTP) is a polyalphabetic cipher where the key is made as long as the mes-
sage and every message is encrypted with a unique and random key. It was initial described
in 1882 by Frank Miller [18] but it wasn’t widely recognised until 1919 when a Gilbert Vernam
patented a method to combine the message and key on punched-tape [19]. In the patent, the
tape that stored the key was reused after a full cycle. It was later realised that if the key was
completely random and not reused then “the messages are rendered entirely secret” [20].
Typically, the OTP is concerned with bit level operations where encrypting and decrypting
are both performed with addition modulo 2. Consider that the message, m, can be represen-
ted as a bit string m1m2 . . .mk , and similarly for the key and cipher text, then encrypting themessage is simply
ci = mi + ki (mod 2) (2.7)
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where ki are the bits that represent the key which is of the same length as the message and
ci is the cipher text bit. Equivalently, decryption is
mi = ci + ki (mod 2) (2.8)
Since each letter is encrypted with a random monoalphabetic cipher, there is no way to
perform frequency analysis. Likewise, the general cryptanalysis used for the Vigenère cipher
will provide no information as there is no repetition in the key.
Providing that the key is chosen randomly and not reused, the OTP can be proven to be
information-theoretic secure [14]. That is to say that even Mallory, with her unlimited power,
would not be able to comprise the message without the secret key. Intuitively, as the key is
completely random, each decryption is equally likely so there is no way to reveal the true mes-
sage.
While the protocol itself provides a ‘perfect’ method of encryption, this doesn’t exclude
physical vulnerabilities in the system. Informationmay be leaked through side-channels in spe-
cific system implementations. Alice and Bob also have to overcome the problem of securely
distributing the keys.
2.2.1.3 Block Ciphers
Despite the inherent security provided by the OTP, it is rarely used in practice. Challenges
with key exchange render it impractical as Alice and Bob must have keys that are as long as
the message itself. Methods to exchange these keys remain slow meaning that, typically, the
theoretical security of a system is relaxed in favour of practicality.
Themost used encryption methods in modern communication are block ciphers that were
introduced by Horst Feistel [21]. Instead of considering the message as individual letters (or
binary bits), a block cipher will consider the message in blocks of a certain length. These
blocks are the passed through a deterministic algorithm that encrypts the message with a
short key. The exact length of the block will depend on the cipher being used, but is always
shorter than the message meaning the security is weakened when compared with the OTP.
However, as the data is encoded in vectors encryption and decryption can be performed by
matrix multiplication which is computationally efficient.
The message block is split into two equal parts v and w which are encoded in the first
round using
v′ = w and w′ = v + F (w, k) (2.9)
where F is a vector-valued function and k is the key. The key is then modified to generate a
subkey in which the process above is repeated with v, w and k replaced by v′, w′ and k′. The
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function F and the method of generating the subkeys is depending on the block cipher being
used. This process is easily reverse by
w = v′ and v = w′ + F (v′, k) (2.10)
The first widely used block cipher was data encryption standard (DES) introduced in 1977
[22] and was based mostly on Feistel’s idea. The algorithm uses a key length of 56 bits and
separates the data into 64 bit blockswhich are divided into two vectors, v andw, each of length
32 bits. The vector-valued function for DES is described in algorithm 2.1 which is repeated for
16 rounds.
Algorithm 2.1: Data Encryption Standard
1. w is expanded from 32 bits to 48 bits by repeating certain bits.
2. The key, k, is divided into two separate 28-bit keys.
3. In each successive round, the two keys are shifted by one or two bits
depending on the round.
4. 24 bits from each key are selected to create a 48-bit subkey which is
added to the expanded vector, w.
5. Each block is separated into eight six-bit sections which are substituted
with four-bit outputs from a lookup table. This transformation is non-
linear.
6. Finally, the 32 outputs are permuted by a fixed mapping.
Immediately following the release of DES, there was scrutiny concerning the involvement
of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the short length of the key. It was suggested that
a machine could be built at the cost of only $20 million which could break DES in a day [23].
Despite these concerns, DES remained a standard until 2001. At which point, a number of
brute-force attacks had been demonstrated, notably by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
DESwas replaced by advanced encryption standard (AES) in 2001 [24] whichwas based on
the same block cipher structure. The message is now split into 128 bit messages and secret
keys of length 128, 192, or 256 bits available to prevent brute-force attacks. Block ciphers are
not information-theoretic secure, as each bit of key is expanded and used to encrypted more
than one bit of the message. It is believed that AES remains computationally secure. That is





We have alluded to the challenges of distributing keys between Alice and Bob for use in a
symmetric key algorithm. The obvious solution is for Alice and Bob to meet in person prior to
their secret communication. However, it might not always be possible for them to meet and it
certainly is not practical.
In order to exchange secret messages over insecure communication channels, public-key
cryptography algorithms were developed. Alice and Bob act asymmetrically basing security
from number theory problems are assumed hard. There has yet to be an algorithm that can
claim with certainty to be even computationally secure.
Such problems employ trapdoors: functions that are easy to compute one way, but challen-
ging to invert without secret information. Alice will use the function to encrypt, but only Bob
has the secret information to decrypt the message. As the name suggests, Bob will publicly
announce certain information which Alice (or anyone else for that matter) can use to encrypt
a message. However, he keeps a private key which will allow him to decrypt the messages.
This section will introduce two public-key algorithms that are widely used. While the al-
gorithms can be used as a method to send messages, the computational intensity of encryp-
tion and decryption means that they are typically used to distribute keys. These keys are then
used in a symmetric key algorithm such as AES.
Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
The first public-key cryptography algorithm was proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hell-
man in 1976 [25]. It was later revealed that researchers at the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) had previously demonstrated that such a protocol was possible [26,27].
The security of the protocol is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
The problem is to find k = loga(b) given a prime number, p, and integers 1 < a < p and b, suchthat
ak = b (mod p) (2.11)
There is no publicly known classical algorithm that can efficiently compute the discrete
logarithm. However, an algorithm was presented by Peter Shor in 1994 that uses a quantum
algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm in polynomial time [1].
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is not used to send a message between Alice and Bob, but
instead is used to establish a key between them. This key can then be used in a symmetric
key algorithm. The protocol is presented in algorithm 2.2.
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Algorithm 2.2: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
1. Alice and Bob agree on a large prime number, p, and a primitive root, a.
These numbers can be publicly available.
2. They both also secretly choose integers dA and dB ∈ N.
3. Alice sends her public key, qA = adA , to Bob, and Bob send his public key,
qB = a
dB to Alice.





5. Alice and Bob now share the secret key k.
The information that is available to Eve orMallory are the numbers p, a, qA and qB . However,without being able to solve the discrete logarithm, they are unable to compute dA or dB . Hence,they cannot efficiently compute the secret key k.
Now that Alice and Bob share a secret key k, they can choose a symmetric key algorithm,
such as AES, to send encrypted messages.
RSA Algorithm
Two years later, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithmwould be releasedpublicly, named
after its inventors [28]. As with the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, it was later discovered that the
RSA method had been known by Clifford Cocks during his time at GCHQ [29].
Unlike the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, the RSA algorithm allows Alice to send a predeter-
minedmessage to Bob. Its security relies on the hardness of factoring semi-primes: a number
that is the product of two prime numbers. The RSA algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 2.3: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Key Exchange
1. Bob needs to first choose a secret key. He selects two large prime num-
bers, p and q, and calculates n = p× q.
2. He then chooses some d < (p−1)(q−1) which is coprime to (p−1)(q−1).
3. Finally, Bob calculates the inverse, e, of d modulo (p − 1)(q − 1) and
publishes the public key N and e whilst keeping p, q and d private.
4. Alice breaks her message into integers m < N and encrypts as c =
18
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md (mod N). The ciphertext c can now be sent to Bob.
5. To decrypt Alice’s message, Bob computes cd and the communication
is complete.
To prove that the decoded message is equivalent to the original message, we note that
b ≡ cd ≡ md·e (mod N) (2.12)
and as e is the inverse of dmodulo (p− 1)(q − 1), we have
d · e = t · (p− 1)(q − 1) + 1 (2.13)
for t ∈ Z. Ifm and p are coprime, then Fermat’s little theorem states that
mp−1 ≡ 1 (mod p) (2.14)
from which, we find
b ≡ mt·(p−1)(q−1)+1 ≡ m · (mp−1)t·(q−1) ≡ m (mod p) (2.15)
If p is not coprime to m, then p divides m and also b. Therefore, b ≡ m (mod p) which
can be equivalently reasoned for q. Since b and m were taken modulo N , we must have that
b ≡ m (mod N ).
Generating keys for the RSA algorithm uses computationally efficient algorithm to check
for primality and fast modular exponentiation. However, there is no method at the present to
break the cipher without factoring N .
Interestingly, while this outlines the underlying concepts, the algorithm as it stands is not
secure. As the algorithm is deterministic, Mallory can produce the cipher text of any plain text
message. They can compare these to the cipher text of the message being sent from Alice to
Bob. To protect against this attack, Alice introduces some random bits into the message, m,
through a method called padding [30].
2.2.3 Authentication
We have described how Alice can send a message to Bob without having ever met to share a
secret key by using public-key cryptography. How can she be sure that the public key that she
is using to encrypt her message was actually Bob’s public key? Without being sure, they can
fall foul to a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack.
As Mallory is aware of the protocol that Alice and Bob are using (again referring to Ker-
ckhoffs’ principle) she can appear to Bob to Alice and, likewise, appear as Alice to Bob. By
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providing a public key to Alice and using Bob’s public key to establish a secure communica-
tion, Mallory can take full control of the protocol.
Alice will encrypt a message, that is intended for Bob, with Mallory’s public key who is able
to decrypt the message into plain text. Mallory can then re-encrypt the message using Bob’s
public key and send it to him. Without authentication neither Alice or Bob will know that their
message was compromised.
For Bob to verify that the message came from Alice, they will use an authentication pro-
tocol. This is typically achieved using a pre-shared key between Alice and Bob from which
then can create an authentication tag to send alongside their message. Specific authentica-
tion protocols are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, we will note that their importance
in modern communication is paramount and remains a prevalent discussion for the future of
cryptography.
2.2.4 Post-Quantum Cryptography
In light of recent advances in quantum computing architectures [2], it is becoming more real-
istic that current public-key cryptography will become vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm [1] in the
near future. To counter these advances, post-quantum algorithms have been suggested as
alternatives that will remain secure even against quantum computers. These algorithms use
the same classical computers and networks, but are based on different problems. These al-
gorithms are part of quantum-safe cryptography.
SinceNovember 2017, TheNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been
developing a new public standard for post-quantum algorithms. The process invited protocols
to be submitted for assessment. In total 82 candidates were submitted, of which 69 were
accepted as the first round candidates [31]. Finalists are expected to be selected in 2020.
Proving the security of an algorithm remains challenging, particularly against quantum
computers. A recent algorithm, Soliloquy, was a lattice-based algorithm created by research-
ers at GCHQ. After a brief development between 2010 and 2013, a quantum algorithm was dis-
covered that would efficiently break the cipher. The storywas published as a cautionary tale for
future algorithms. A paper from Peter Shor that claimed to efficiently break lattice-based cryp-
tography was quickly withdrawn following a mistake [32]. Such developments demonstrate
the rapidly changing landscape of cryptography.
2.2.5 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis aims to test the integrity of a cryptographic system and find weaknesses. This
may be to analyse the mathematical problems which form the basis of the security of an
algorithm or it may be testing the physical implementation. Successful cryptanalysis has been
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performed throughout history, mainly motivated through war, and may have even changed the
course of history.
A notable example of cryptanalysis was during WWI in the form of the Zimmermann tele-
gram [33]. The message, intended to form an alliance between Germany and Mexico, was
intercepted and deciphered by British intelligence. The United States, who were neutral at the
time, joined the war three months later.
The most well known example of cryptanalysis was in Bletchley Park during the second
world war. Hut 8 was specifically designated to analysis the enigma machine that was being
used by the Axis powers [34]. The team used cribs, plain text that was suspected to be in a
cipher text, with great success to break enigma codes. Such messages included “nothing to
report” and physical intervention was even used to force the German Navy to send cribs [34].
This work eventually led to Turning developing the first computer from the Polish Bombes.
2.3 Quantum Information
From a thorough understanding of quantum mechanics came the new field of quantum infor-
mation. Using fundamental particles, it was suggested that information could be encoded in
a completely new way [35,36]. This section will give a brief introduction to quantum mechan-
ics theory and how it can be used to encode information. Some fundamental aspects will be
discussed including a brief digression into quantum computing.
2.3.1 Quantum Mechanics
The postulates of quantum mechanics are not quite axiomatic, but rather guidelines for de-
veloping a more comprehensive framework for a particular system. The postulates are what
connects the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics to physical systems.
Postulate 1: The State Space
The first postulate concerns the state of the system. Any closed quantum system exists in a
Hilbert space,H, which is known as the state space of the system. The system is described by
a vector of unit length within H. Any vectors that differ by a global factor represent the same
state.
Of course, the postulate doesn’t tell us which Hilbert space to choose for our particular
quantum system. Nor does it give the vector associated with our quantum state. To answer
such questions, one must consult theories such as quantum electrodynamics. The simplest
spaces and states are those found in quantum information which is restricted to two-level
systems. These states are called qubits and take the general form
21
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
|ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 (2.16)
where |0〉 and |1〉 form an orthonormal basis with the Hilbert space and are called the compu-
tational basis. α and β are complex numbers which satisfy |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 so that the state
has unit length.
Postulate 2: Quantum State Evolution
Evolution of a closed quantum system is described by the second postulate. It states that
quantum states evolve through unitary transformations. The state at some time t2 is relatedto the state at an earlier time t1 by a unitary operator i.e.
|ψt2〉 = Û |ψt1〉 (2.17)





= Ĥ |ψ〉 (2.18)
where ~ is Plank’s reduced constant and Ĥ is the Hamiltonian of the system. If the Hamiltonian
of a system is known, then we can completely describe its dynamics. The Hamiltonian is a
Hermitian operator meaning that the unitary transformation is given by
Û = e−
i(t2−t1)Ĥ/~ (2.19)
Postulate 3: Measurement of the State
Contrary to classical systems, where the state can be measured with arbitrary accuracy, quan-
tummechanics places inherent restrictions on the accuracy ofmeasurements. Before describ-
ing themeasurement process, wewill introduce observables. Physical quantities in a quantum
system are given by the observables which are a self-adjoint operators onH. The spectral the-








where the eigenvectors are the set {|e1〉 , . . . , |ed〉} associatedwith the eigenvalues {λ1, . . . , λd}.
P̂λi is the eigenprojector associated to the eigenvalue λi.
To describemeasurements of a quantum state, wewill introduce a projection valuedmeas-
ure (PVM)over a set {λ1, . . . , λn}. ThePVM is given by a collection of projections {P̂λ1 , . . . , P̂λn}over the subsets of the Hilbert spaceH such that
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1. The projections are orthogonal i.e. P̂λiP̂λj = δijP̂λi
2. The projections are complete i.e.∑ni=1 P̂λi = Î
Measurements on a quantum system, |ψ〉 have outcomes {λ1, . . . , λN} which are des-cribed by a PVM on the Hilbert space H. The outcome of the projection is random with a
probability distribution
P (λk) = |P̂λk |ψ〉 |
2 = 〈ψ| P̂λk |ψ〉 (2.21)





This postulate describes the inherent randomness in quantum mechanics. The amount of
information that we can gain by measuring a quantum state or system is limited regardless
of the precision of the measurement device. It also raises the question of how the state is dis-
turbed during measurement. The measurement process gives rise to different interpretations
of quantum mechanics which are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Postulate 4: Composite Systems
The final postulate allows us to describe systems that are made from more than one state.
Any composite quantum states exist in a Hilbert space that is the tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces of the individual states. If each ofN states is prepared individually, the combined state
is simply
|ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψN 〉 (2.23)
This postulate also applies to states that are not simply the product of individual states i.e.
not product states. Such systems are called entangled states.
2.3.2 Quantum Bits and Entanglement
Similar to how information is represented as bits in classical computers, we can introduce
the concept of a quantum bit, which we will call qubits. As mentioned above, qubits are two-
level systems that exist inH2 where we introduce the orthonormal basis |0〉 and |1〉, called thecomputational basis. It is more usual to consider qubits in a Bloch representation,









Figure 2.2: Bloch ball representation of the qubit state |ψ〉. We introduce the real variables
0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ ϕ < 2π where an unphysical global phase has been omitted.
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ ϕ < 2π as shown in figure 2.2. Mathematically speaking, this
representation is a closed ball, rather than a sphere which describes only the surface. The
space bounded by a sphere gives a ball. Pure states exist on the surface on the ball, while
mixed states exist within.
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which form the observables of qubits and are given in the computational basis.
As per postulate 4, we can form composite systems through the tensor product of indi-
vidual qubits for form more complex systems. Given two qubits,
|ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 and |φ〉 = δ |0〉+ γ |1〉 (2.26)
that were prepared individually, the composite system is
|ψ〉 |φ〉 = αδ |00〉+ αγ |01〉+ βδ |10〉+ βγ |11〉 (2.27)
which exists in the Hilbert space H4. Equally, we could consider a state that was prepared in
H4 that is not a product state. Then general form of such a state is
|Ψ〉 = a |00〉+ b |01〉+ c |10〉+ d |11〉 (2.28)
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where we are only constrained by normalisation conditions that |a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1. This
allows us to introduce the states
|Φ+〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
(2.29)
|Φ−〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√
2
(2.30)
|Ψ+〉 = |01〉+ |10〉√
2
(2.31)
|Ψ−〉 = |01〉 − |10〉√
2
(2.32)
which are entangled and form the Bell basis. If we consider measuring the Bell states, per-
haps in the computational basis, we will find the outcomes will be random but always exactly
correlated. In fact, we would find that the outcomes would be correlated for any basis choice.
These states were first introduced in the seminal paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
in 1935 [37], but it was Schrödinger who coined the term
“I would not call [entanglement] one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum
mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure fromclassical lines of thought.”
- Erwin Schrödinger [38]
It wasn’t until 1964 that a method to test whether entanglement was non-classical was
proposed by John Bell who placed a bound on correlations between systems [39]. From the
theory proposed by Bell, Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH) proposed an experiment in
1969 that would verify the theorem [40]. The CHSH inequality is given by
|S| ≤ 2 (2.33)
for
S = E(a, b)− E(a, b′) + E(a′, b) + E(a′, b′) (2.34)
where E is the expectation value for {a, a′}measurements on the first state and {b, b′} on the
second. This bound has been violated numerous times experimentally, most notably in 2015
when three separate experiments closed all loopholes [41–43].
2.3.2.1 Encoding
How |0〉 and |1〉 are encoded will depend on the physical system being used. Some notable
examples of encoding are electron spins; nuclear spins; photon path, polarisation or timing;
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and superconducting flux. Each has their own benefits and drawbacks and will be suited for
different tasks in quantum information processing.
Of course, for quantum communication we will be interested in sending quantum informa-
tion between distant parties, Alice and Bob. Light is already fundamental in modern commu-
nications networks. By considering single-photons, we can encode qubits that are compatible
with much of the existing network architecture. These encodings will be discussed further in
section 2.5.2.
2.3.3 No-Cloning Theorem
A fundamental theorem in quantum mechanics is the no-cloning theorem which will also un-
derpin the security of quantum key distribution (QKD). The general principle of the theorem
states that there is no physical process that copies, or clones, an arbitrary quantum state. We
can state this more formally:
Theorem 2.1: No-Cloning Theorem
The no-cloning theorem states that there is no unitary transformation such
that
Û |ψ〉 |a〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 (2.35)
for an arbitrary quantum state |ψ〉 and an ancillary quantum state |a〉.
Consider two arbitrary quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉. Let us assume that there is a unitary
that allows us to copy a quantum state
Û |ψ〉 |a〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 (2.36)
Û |φ〉 |a〉 = |φ〉 |φ〉 (2.37)
If we compare the overlap of the states on the left and right of the equation we find
〈ψ|φ〉 = (〈ψ|φ〉)2 (2.38)
which has two solutions. Either 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0 and the states are orthogonal or 〈ψ|φ〉 = 1 and the
states are identical. Therefore, we cannot clone an arbitrary quantum state.
2.3.4 Quantum Computing
To motivate the introduction of quantum-safe communication, we will introduce some quan-
tum computing algorithms. While the progression in quantum computing has played a large
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part in the motivation of quantum-safe cryptography, it is not the only factor. However, an al-
gorithm that will break modern cryptography provides a very tangible reason to replace public-
key algorithms.
Shor’s algorithm efficiently factors composite numbers into their prime factors [1] mean-
ing that both RSA and Diffie-Hellman are vulnerable to attacks from a quantum computer. The
estimated number of physical qubits needed to factor RSA-2048 has reduced drastically in re-
cent years from one billion [44,45] to twenty million [46]. A state-of-the-art quantum processor
was recently demonstrated with fifty qubits [2]. Another important metric is the circuit depth
possible during a calculation. The quantum processor managed a circuit depth of 20 which is
far below the estimated 109 required [47]. While this quantum computer is very far away from
the estimates, it is a necessary first step towards ubiquitous quantum computers.
Grover’s algorithm could also be used to search through keys in a block cipher protocol [48].
However, the speed-up is only√n which has been proven as the lower bound for an unordered
search [49]. Therefore, the same security in a post-quantumworld can be achieved by doubling
the key length i.e. moving from 128 bit to 256 bit AES.
2.4 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a fundamentally newmethod of key exchange by exploiting
quantummechanics to ensure security that is guaranteed by the laws of physics. It falls under
the umbrella of quantum safe cryptography and, together with post-quantum cryptography, is
likely to form a crucial part of future global networks.
Unlike the public-key protocols introduced in section 2.2, QKD does not rely on assumed
computationally hard trapdoor functions. Instead, the security is based on the no-cloning the-
orem and, with minimal assumptions, can provide information-theoretic secure key exchange.
The concept for QKD was derived idea developed in the 1960’s by Stephen Wiesner. How-
ever, this wouldn’t be published until 1983 [50]. Through conjugate coding Wiesner developed
two schemes. The first allowed Alice to send twomessages to Bob, but Bob could only choose
to read one message depending on his basis. Upon measurement, the other message would
be destroyed.
The second idea allow uncounterfeitable money to be created based simply on the super-




and β = a− b√
2
(2.39)
banks could print a serial number on each note made from the four states. The basis choice
associated with each qubit would be stored in the bank records. Upon return of a note, the
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bank would be able to measure each qubit in the correct basis to verify that it was the original.
Any attempt to counterfeit a note would result in errors during the verification.
In a QKD protocol, we will introduce a new resource that is available to Alice and Bob:
a quantum channel. This channel allows Alice to send quantum states to Bob. We will, of
course, assume that the channel is prone to errors but we need not assume that the channel
is private. Both Eve and Mallory will have full access. Uniquely, QKD offers the ability to detect
an eavesdropper as measurements of quantum states causes them to collapse.
Aswith public-key cryptography, wewill require an authenticated classical channel between
Alice and Bob to avoid MitM attacks. This classical channel, as with the quantum channel,
can be completely public. The authentication of the classical channel is something that is not
solvedwith QKD andwill need to utilise post-quantumalgorithms. As Alice and Bobwill require
some initial bit of shared secret to authenticate their messages, QKD is sometimes referred
to as quantum key expansion.
As the security of QKD systems stems from the laws of physics it has often been claimed to
be perfectly secure. However, we will see later that side-channels or imperfections in different
physical implementation will decrease the security. It is perhaps more accurate to say that,
provided that the key is securely stored following a protocol, the security of that key does not
decrease with advances in computing.
2.4.1 Protocols
QKD protocols are generally separated into three distinct categories: discrete-variable QKD
(DV-QKD), continuous-variableQKD (CV-QKD) anddistributed-phase-referenceQKD (DPR-QKD).
Here, we will introduce each with discussion of how qubits are encoded and the practicalities
of each.
2.4.1.1 Discrete-Variable
The first ways that it was conceived that information could be encoded on photons was using
orthogonal states to represent 0 or 1. For example, one could use the vertical and horizontal
polarisations of a photon where diagonal and anti-diagonal could be used to encode super-
positions.
A more practical method of encoding information when intending to use fibre optics to
transmit the photons is a time-bin encoding. Now the timing and relative phase information
between two pulses gives us a complete encoding of all quantum states. Provided that the
two time-bins are closely spaced they won’t be as affected by fluctuations in the fibre.
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Figure 2.3: States used to encode information for DV-QKD and CV-QKD.
BB84
The first QKD protocol to be developed Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84), named after its invent-
ors [3] which was demonstrated in a proof-of-principle experiment a few years later [51]. Since
then, there have been numerous demonstrations of BB84 either demonstrating new platforms
or realising backbone quantum networks [52]. BB84 remains a favourite choice for systems
despite alternative protocols being available [53–56].
We will introduce the four states
|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, and |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
(2.40)
that we will refer to as the BB84 states.
BB84 is a prepared-and-measure protocol where Alice and Bob play complementary roles.
Alice prepares a quantum state which she sends to Bob who measures the state in a pre-
defined way.
Algorithm 2.4: Bennett-Brassard 1984
1. Alice generates two uniform and random bit strings, ba and n. The firstbit string will determines the basis, Z = {|0〉,|1〉} if 0 or X = {|+〉,|−〉} if 1.
The second bit string n determines whether the first or second state in
each basis is chosen.
2. Each state is sent sequentially to Bob via the quantum channel.
3. Similarly, Bob generates a bit string, bb uniformly and random. This de-
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termines either theX or Z basis in which to measure. These are equival-
ent to the Pauli x̂ and ẑ observables introduced earlier.
4. Bobmeasures each of the bits in turn using the randomly selected bases
and records the outcomes.
5. Alice and Bob announce their basis bit strings, b{a,b}, over the authentic-ated classical channel. They discard all events where the bases didn’t
match.
6. Using some of the remaining events, they compare their values to check
for eavesdropping. If an unacceptable amount do not match, they abort
the protocol.
7. Finally, privacy amplification can be applied where Alice and Bob sac-
rifice some of their key to reduce the amount of knowledge Eve could
have gained to satisfy security requirements.
Upon successfully finishing a BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob share a symmetric key. If they
wished, they could use a OTP cipher to ensure information-theoretic secure communication.
However, as one bit of key is needed to encrypt each bit of message, more pragmatic systems
will implement a block cipher.
BB84 with Decoy States
As single-photon sources remain technically challenging to engineer, QKD system have pre-
ferred using weakly attenuated laser pulses to generate weak coherent states (WCSs). How-
ever, asWCShave a distribution of photon numbers, it opens the systemup to a photon number
splitting (PNS) attack.
In such an attack, we assume that Mallory has access to a device that can make a non-
demolition of the photon number of the state. She will block each state which contains zero
or one photons, and for each multi-photon state will keep one photon in a quantum memory
until Alice and Bob announce the chosen bases.
One can consider the security of usingWCS in the BB84 protocol describe above. However,
this will offer a far reduced secret key rate due to the information leakage [57, 58]. Instead,
decoy state protocols have been developed allowing Alice and Bob to bound the knowledge
that could have been accessed by Eve [59].
During the first step of the protocol, Alice will randomly modulate the intensity of her WCS.
Typically, Alice and Bob will agree on two decoy states that will be chosen to optimise the key
rate depending on the error rate. AsMallory has noway to tell which decoy state Alice has sent,
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she is more likely to block the decoy states than the signal states. During the basis discussion
stage, Alice and Bob can bound the number of true single-photon events and use that to inform
how much privacy amplification is required, or to abandon the protocol altogether.
Ideally, Alice and Bob would like to have perfect, unbiased estimators of the single-photon
events in their key exchange. However, in a realistic exchange, theywill necessarily have a finite
number of events in which to estimate the parameters. Therefore, they must instead consider
the finite key effects and calculate bounds on the single-photon statistics [60].
E91
Independently of the development of BB84, another protocol was developed by Artur Ekert in
1991 [4]. The Ekert 1991 (E91) protocol takes advantage of the correlations of entangled states
and realised that by distributing two entangled photons between Alice and Bob meant that
their measurements would be correlated. Further, using Bell’s test and CHSH measurements
they could verify that an eavesdropper hadn’t interfered with the states [39,40].
Algorithm 2.5: Ekert 1991
1. Alice generates an entangled state, for example one of the Bell states in
equations 2.29 to 2.32.
2. She sends one qubit from the state to Bob and keeps one for herself.
3. Alice and Bob independently and randomly choose one of the CHSH
angles [40] in which to measure their qubit.
4. After a sufficient number of states, they each announce their basis choi-
ces while keeping the results secret.
5. They use a random set of the measurement results to calculate the S
and verify that the state was entangled.
6. If they can successfully violate a Bell inequality, the remainder of the
events should be correlated.
7. Finally, they apply error reconciliation and privacy amplification as re-
quired.
As Alice and Bob are able to verify that the state is entangled, we don’t need to assume that
one of them is generating the entangled state. The protocol could be equally secure if Charlie,
Eve or Mallory were generating the state. Any tampering with the state would only result in a
reduction of key rate.
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Entanglement-based protocols are often used as a method to prove the security of other
prepare-and-measure protocols. For example, the chosen randomness used in a BB84 pro-
tocol is mathematically equivalent to a postponed measurement on an entangled state.
2.4.1.2 Continuous-Variable
More recently there has been an interest in continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) due to the com-
patibility with current telecommunication equipment [61]. Instead of single-photon detectors
(SPDs), Bob can use photodiodes to performmeasurements on the states through homodyne
(or heterodyne) detection.
CV-QKD uses states that are described in Hilbert spaces of infinite dimension. Protocols
have been proposed that encode information in Gaussian states [62] and squeezed states [63].
Both are considered prepare-and-measure schemes and the outline of the protocols remains
the same.
Algorithm 2.6: Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution
1. Alice encodes a random variable in a quantum state. In the case of Gaus-
sian modulation, Alice encodes the information from a set of overlap-
ping Gaussian states. In the case of squeezed state encoding, she ran-
domly chooses between squeezing in the x̂ and p̂ quadratures.
2. The states are sent to Bob through the quantum channel which is typic-
ally assumed to be a thermal-loss channel.
3. Bob performs a homodyne (or heterodyne) measurement, switching be-
tween the x̂ and p̂ quadratures.
4. Alice and Bob use the classical channel to compare the quadratures they
chose.
5. Using some of thematching bases, they perform parameter estimations
to bound the knowledge that could have been gained by Eve or Mallory.
6. Finally, they perform privacy amplification as required.
For homodyne detection to be meaningful, Alice and Bob need to make sure they share a
local oscillator. This provides a phase reference so that the prepared states can be reconciled
with the measured states. Often, the local oscillator is multiplexed with the encoded state to
avoid any mismatch in the phase fluctuations from the quantum channel [64].
For a long time, there were questions about the security of the CV-QKD systems. There
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has since been a composable proof against general attacks [65] which was later extended to
better consider finite key effects [66]. The post-processing requirements for CV-QKD are also
computationally challenging. Unlike in discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD), where only photons
that reach Bob require analysis, CV-QKD requires each potentially event to be analysed which
leads to large overheads.
2.4.1.3 Distributed-Phase-Reference
Distributed-phase-reference QKD (DPR-QKD) protocols were developed in order to solve prac-
tical issues with the security of QKD systems when using realistic equipment [67]. As single-
photon sources are not widely available, system typically use coherent states that are prone
to PNS attacks. In DPR-QKD protocols, the qubits are encoded in timing or relative phases
of signals where a joint measurement of subsequent signals is required. Protocols include
coherent-one-way (COW) [55] and differential-phase-shift (DPS) [54].
2.4.2 Security and Hacking
Generally, security proofs for QKD protocols fall into three categories. Individual attacks allow
an adversary to interactwith each state individually as it is sent. A collective attack allows them
to process the states and store state indefinitely in a quantum memory. Finally, a coherent
attack allows Mallory to generate arbitrary ancilla states which can interact with the states
and bemeasured jointly. Coherent attacks only limit Mallory to the laws of physics and nothing
more.
A proof of a protocol gives a security guarantee against an adversary but only under certain
assumptions. It is often claimed that QKD is information-theoretic secure when used with a
OTP. However, verifying the assumptions required for security is challenging in a practical
setting and has been scrutinised by the quantum hacking community.
As the systems exist in the real world, the security of a key exchange is only as good as the
model used to describe it. Any part of the system that is not fully characterised may leak in-
formation through side-channels allowing Eve to gain knowledge of the secret key. Such chan-
nels may include polarisation, after-pulses or wavelength. The concept of side-channels is not
something unique to QKD and has been previously exploited to break RSA-4096 keys using a
smartphone microphone [68]. In fact, side-channels were present even in the first demonstra-
tions by Bennett and Brassard:
“. . .power supplies make noise, and not the same noise for the different voltages
needed for different polarizations... Thus, our prototype was unconditionally secure




Photon-number splitting Photon source [57,58]
Inter-symbol interference State modulation [70]
Trojan horse Phase modulation [71–73]
Time-shift Single-photon detectors [74, 75]
Detector Blinding Single-photon detectors [76, 77]
Laser damage Any [78,79]
Table 2.1: Attacks demonstrated against QKD systems. Further details about the attacks, in-cluding countermeasures and bounds, can be found in refs. [5,52].
Since then, there have been a number of attacks proposed on QKD systems exploiting
uncharacterised channels [5]. Many have been demonstrated against both research and com-
mercial systems. A brief list is compiled in table 2.1, although this list is far from exhaustive.
One of the most vulnerable parts of a QKD system seems to be the SPDs. Due to their
complexity, they have been exposed to many attacks which have allowed Mallory to be in
complete control of a key exchange [76,77,80–85].
Counter measures have been proposed to alleviate specific attacks against certain sys-
tems [86, 87]. There have also been bounds set for the amount of information that can be
gained against particular attacks such as the trojan horse attack [88]. However, continually
testing and patching systems with physical changes will be impractical for any ubiquitous net-
work. A new vulnerability could render an entire system insecure requiring the hardware to be
modified or replaced.
2.4.3 Device-Independence
Realising that the arms race between cryptographers and hackers would lead to an unending
cycle, interest turned to reducing the assumptions required for security of a system [6, 89,
90]. In particular, how the assumptions about specific equipment can be removed. Device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) provides a method for Alice and Bob to verify the operation of the
equipment during a protocol through a Bell test. Alice and Bob then only need to ensure that
there are no communication channels out of their lab and that the laws of physics are correct.
Implementing a DI-QKD scheme remains incredibly challenging with modern technology
as it requires near unity single-photon detection [91]. It also requires a loophole-free Bell test
to be performed which, while such experiments have recently been realised [41–43], had rates
that were far slower than needed for communication protocols.
In order to createmore practical systemswith improved security, protocolswere developed
which relaxed the device-independence.Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) re-
moves the need to characterise the detection system, which remains challenging due to their
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complexity [7]. It does, however, still required characterisation of the transmitters. MDI-QKD
will be discussed further in chapter 4.
2.5 Integrated Photonic Circuits
On the route to an accessible technology, wewill need to find a platformwhich allows formany
devices to be made without an exponential increase in resources. Photonic integration is by
no means a new idea having been considered for more than half a century [92]. However, the
techniques have recently been adopted by the quantum photonic community for information
processing.
In this section, we will cover the basic concepts in quantum photonics before discussing
integrated photonics circuits. Some fundamental components that are used to create circuits
will be presented and, finally, some of the more common platforms for photonic integration
will be introduced.
2.5.1 Quantum Photonics
Wewill beginwith the description of a quantised electromagnetic field as a harmonic oscillator
with associated annihilation and creation operators, x̂ and p̂. For a more complete description
or derivation of these operators, we refer the reader to any number of quantum optics text-
books [93–95]. The energy in the field corresponds to discretised packets of energy known as
photons. The number of excitations in the field is described in the Fock basis andwritten as |n〉
for n ∈ Z≥0. The annihilation and creation operators change the photon number accordingly,
â |n〉 =
√
n |n− 1〉 (2.41)
â† |n〉 =
√
n+ 1 |n+ 1〉 (2.42)
â |0〉 = 0 (2.43)
where the final equation imposes that the energy of the field must be positive. The number
operator, n̂ = â†â, is an eigenvector of Fock states such that
n̂ |n〉 = n |n〉 (2.44)
An interesting state in the quantised electromagnetic field is the coherent state, which exist
at the boundary of quantum and classical. Coherent states satisfy
â |α〉 = α |α〉 (2.45)
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The generation of coherent states from vacuum is described through the displacement
operator, D̂(α), and defined as
D̂(α) = eαâ
†−α∗â (2.49)
which acts on the vacuum state, |0〉, to generate a coherent state with average photon number
|α|2:
|α〉 = D̂(α) |0〉 (2.50)
The study of coherent states stemmed from an interest in the boundary of quantum and
classical mechanics and the concept is almost as old as quantummechanics itself [96]. More
practically speaking, coherent states are readily produced from lasers which makes them far
more practical for QKD than probabilistic single-photon sources.
2.5.2 Photon Encoding
We have discussed how single-mode photons can be represented but have yet to mention
exactly what mode is used to encode information. This section will discuss the degrees of
freedom available in photonics in which to encoding information, which are shown in figure
2.4.
Polarisation
The orientation of the electric field can be used to encode information in the polarisation. We
can describe the computational basis by encoding |0〉 as a horizontal photon, |1〉H , and |1〉as vertical, |1〉V . Relative phases and amplitudes between these states allow the entire Bloch
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Figure 2.4: Information can be encoding in photons in different ways where superposition ofeach basis give access to the full Bloch sphere. Subscripts refer to the mode than the Fockstate is in. a Orthogonal polarisations of light can be used as a basis, typically horizontal, H ,and vertical, V are chosen. b The position, or path encoding can be used as a spatial encoding.Basis states are given by a photon either in the top path, t, or the bottom path, b. c The early orlate arrival time of a photon, e and l, can be used to encode the computational basis.
sphere to be access. The manipulation of the states is performed through sequences of half
and quarter wave plates. Polarisation is typically used in free-space quantum optics where
there is minimal rotation of the fields. More recently, there have been developments in integ-
rated optics that have allows waveguide polarisation rotation [97] meaning it could be a useful
encoding scheme in the future.
Path
The spatial mode of photons can be use to encode qubits in which path they are following. The
phase stability of integrated circuits means that paths are the typically encoding of choice.
Two separate waveguides provide different paths which we will call the top, t, and bottom,
b, paths. These can, with relative phases and intensities between the paths, encode arbitrary
qubits in a computational basis. Beam splitters and phasemodulators are used to manipulate
the states and linear optic components can convert from path encoding to polarisation easily.
Time-bin
Finally, the time of arrival can be used to form a basis in distinct bins. Early and late photons,
e and lmodes, can be used to represent |0〉 and |1〉. Again, the relative phases of the time-bins
can be controlled using phase modulation. Delay lines can be used to allow the early and late
photons to interact. Time-binning is used in fibre optics where a polarisation or path encoding






Figure 2.5: There are three main types of waveguide structures: a Slab; b Rib; c Strip. The coreis shown in purple while the cladding is shown in red.
2.5.3 Components
Integrated photonics utilises fundamental components that will be used to guide, control, ma-
nipulate and detect photons. Here we will describe some fundamental components that will
facilitate quantum information processing through linear optics.
Waveguides
To manipulate the path of lights, waveguide structures are created in a photonic integrated
circuit (PIC) which guide light through total internal reflection. It is well established that the
theory of light is is governed by Maxwell’s equations which provide a set of relationships be-
tween the electric field, E , and the magnetic field,H [98]. For light propagating in an insulating
material, where there are no free electric charges or currents, the set of equations become
∇ · E = 0 (2.51)
∇ · H = 0 (2.52)







whereµ0 is themagnetic permeability of free space and ε is the dielectric permittivity of thema-terial. These equations describe the electromagnetic field in a semiconductor material where
the energy of the photon is less than the band gap. By combining the above equations, we can
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of MMI operation. The input light excites a superposition of modes withdifferent propagation velocities. Depending on the length, the modes will either constructivelyor destructively interfere. This figure shows the simplest case for a 2 x 2 MMI but in principlecan be designed to be n x m.
where the refractive index, n(r), is dependent on the spatial coordinates. These equations yield
a plane wave solution which are of the form
E(r, t) = E(x, y)ei(ωt−βz) (2.57)
H(r, t) = H(x, y)ei(ωt−βz) (2.58)
introducing the complex amplitudes, E and H , of the electric and magnetic fields. The angu-
lar frequency of the wave is ω and β = ωN/c is the propagation constant for some effective
refractive index N .
Multi-Mode Interferometer
Different spatial modes in photonics experiments are typically interfered using a beam splitter.
The traditional half-silvered mirror isn’t something that is easily fabricated as a linear optical
components, so another method is required.
Directional couplers allow waveguides to interfere as they are brought in close proximity.
Evanescent coupling allows the mode to shift from one to the other. The splitting ratio of a
directional coupler is dependent on the length of interaction. This makes fabricating accurate
couplers challenging as small variations in length can cause a large change in splitting ratio.
Alternatively, waveguide modes can be interfered with multi-mode interferometers (MMIs)
that are based on the self-imaging principle [99]. A schematic is shown in figure 2.6. Light in
the input mode excites a superposition of modes within the MMI. As these modes propagate,
they constructively and destructively interfere. The length is chosen to allow the light to be split
equally when there is constructive interference into two outputmodes. The same structure can







where r and t are complex numbers that correspond to the reflectivity and transmission, res-









There are a few different methods that we can use to control the phase of photons. Of course,
it only makes sense to talk about a relative phase, such as when a photon is in superposition.





where a phase modulation is applied to the second mode, relative to the first which is left
untouched.
Thermo-optic effects can be used to change the phase of a waveguide by changing the
refractive index and is ubiquitous in integrated photonics. The change of phase, ∆θ, is given
by
∆θ =





whereL is the length of themodulator, ∆T is the change in temperature, λ is the wavelength of
light and dn/dT is the thermo-optic coefficient of the material. Thermo-optic phase modulators
(TOPMs) can achieve very good precision and stability with very low loss but have a slow
response time.
To achieve faster modulation, which will be required for communication protocols, electro-
optic effects have been explored. The effects exploit non-linear properties of a material where
a change of phase is given by
∆θ =
2π · L · χ(2) · E
λ
(2.63)
where E is the applied electric field and χ(2) is the second-order non-linear optical susceptib-
ility. Therefore, only materials that exhibit a second-order component can exhibit this type of
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θ
Figure 2.7: Illustration of MZI made from two 50:50 beam splitters and a phase modulator.
electro-optic modulation. Due to the centro-symmetry in silicon, other methods are required.
However, lithiumniobatemodulators are commercially availablewith bandwidths up to 40GHz
while 100GHz has been demonstrated in laboratories [100, 101].
Carrier effects can be used in semiconductor materials to change the absorption in p-i-n
or p-n junctions which in turn generates a phase relationship through a Kramer-Kronig relation.
These modulations are used where high-bandwidths are required in materials that don’t have
intrinsic electro-optic effects, such as silicon. These modulators have been shown to operate
at 10GHz bandwidths [102].
A final effect that we will mention is the quantum-confined stark effect (QCSE). The effect
presents itself inmaterials where the absorption can be varied through an electric field applied
over a multi-quantum well structures. Again, the change in absorption provides a phase rela-
tionship through the Kramers-Kronig relation and can provide modulation bandwidths above
10GHz [9,97, 103–105]. The QCSE will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
Mach-Zehnder Interferometer
Combining phasemodulators andMMIs, we can create on-chipMach-Zehnder interferometers
(MZIs) which can be used for very fast routing, intensity modulation and phase encoding. A
schematic is shown in figure 2.7 where a phase modulation is applied to one arm of the MZI.
We can calculate the transfer matrix by simply combing the matrices for phase modulation














 1− eiθ i(1 + eiθ)
i(1 + eiθ) −1 + eiθ
 (2.64)
When the phase modulator in the circuit has a high bandwidth, MZIs can be used for fast
intensity modulation of the states, as we will see in chapter 3, but also more stable phase
modulation, which is discussed further in chapter 4. In the ideal case, the phases accumu-
lated in each arm of the MZI will be equivalent. However, due to fabrication tolerances this
is challenging to achieve. Therefore, MZIs combine slow phase modulation to correct for an





An important part of any quantum photonic information processing is detection of single-
photon states. A number of different technologies are available for single-photon detection
[106]. Some metrics used to compare SPDs are
• Efficiency: the probability that the detector will fire given a photon was present.
• Timing Jitter: the uncertainty in the time of arrival of a photon.
• Dead Time: the time in which a detector cannot detect photons after firing.
• Dark Counts: the number of events when no photons are present.
Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) have been widely used for quantum optics experiments
with efficiency in the visible spectrum exceeding 60% [106]. Dark counts for APDs can be
relatively high with kHz rates which can be reduced with cooling. Jitter is typically O(100 ps).
The detection efficiency for longer wavelengths, such as light used in telecommunications, is
typically lower. More recently, there has been a demonstrated of a 1GHz gated APD for QKD
with an efficiency of 55% [107]. There have been demonstrations of integrated Ge-on-Si APDs
with efficiency up to 35%at 125K [108,109].While the efficiency here is lower, there are obvious
advantages in terms of scalability and reduced coupling losses.
Advances in cryogenic cooling technology have allowed superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors (SNSPDs) to becomemorewidely available. Their uptake in quantumphoton-
ics experiments has been rapid due to their unmatched efficiency which can easily exceed
90% with timing jitter of O(10 ps) [106]. Short recovery times can allow for high count rates
and dark counts lower than 1 per hour [110]. Waveguide integrated detectors have been demon-
strated [111] which benefit from enhanced interaction between the confined light and the de-
tector. Photonic cavities have been explored to further increase the detection efficiency and
reduce the jitter [112–114].
2.5.4 Platforms
Differentmaterials will exhibit different properties that provide benefits andweaknesseswhen
making PICs. Some different platforms will be introduced here with some of their favourable
properties discussed.
Silicon-on-Insulator
One of the more mature PIC platform is silicon-on-insulator (SOI) which has leveraged fab-
rication from the ubiquitous silicon microelectronics industry. Complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductor (CMOS) compatibility has enabled large, complex devices to be fabricated [8].
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A high index contrast between the waveguide and the substrate allows tight confinement of
the light meaning small bend radii are possible.
As silicon is centro-symmetric, it has no natural χ(2) which means that there is no electro-
optic effect to use for phase modulation. Instead, modulation is achieved through thermo-
optic effects, which are slow, or carrier injection/depletion modulators, which suffer from
phase dependent losses. There have been attempts to break this centro-symmetry to achieve
high bandwidth modulation [115, 116].
A strongχ(3) non-linearity allows single-photon generation through spontaneous four-wave
mixing (SFWM) [117]. However, as silicon doesn’t have a direct band gap lasers there is no
immediate route to integrating lasers. Instead, hybrid platforms have emerged to utilise III-V
lasers [118, 119]. Doped silicon has allowed fast photodiodes to be waveguide integrated with
high bandwidths [120].
Light can be edge-coupled but grating structures are more common as they are not re-
stricted to the edge of the device. Periodic structures in the silicon projects the waveguide
mode verically into single-mode fibres. Losses have been shown to be as low as 0.36 dB [121],
although the loss is typically higher. Silicon suffers from high non-linear losses which are sup-
pressed at longer wavelengths [122].
Silicon Nitride
Silicon nitride (Si3N4) offers a wider band gap than silicon meaning that it has a much widertransparency. This has added benefits at mid-infra-red wavelengths as the non-linear losses,
such as two-photon absorption [123], are reduced which is crucial for quantum photonic tech-
nologies [124]. Reconfigurable circuits can be achieved through themo-optic phase modula-
tion and MMIs. Like silicon, there is no natural electro-optic effect so any fast modulation is
achieved through carrier effects.
Indium Phosphide
Indiumphosphide (InP) offers benefits over other platforms, especially with its direct band gap
which allows easily integrable lasers. Semiconductor optical amplifiers (SOAs) and distributed
Bragg reflectors (DBRs) structures allow Fabry-Pérot lasers to be created and directly coupled
to waveguides. Alternatively, high-bandwidth distributed feedback (DFB) components are also
available [97, 125]. Multi-quantum well structures allow fast phase modulation up to 40GHz
through the QCSE with similar bandwidth photodiodes also available [97]. Thermo-optic ef-
fects are also available for stable modulation and tuning.
As there is no insulator, like in SOI, there is a very low index contrast to create grating
couplers as the light from similar structures would launch into the substrate. Therefore, edge
couplers are required to access the optical circuits. Spot-size converters (SSCs) are tapered
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waveguides that convert the waveguide to single-mode fibre. This low contrast also means
that the bend radius is larger meaning that the component density is lower than silicon.
More recently, there has been work to replicate SOI with InP membrane on silicon (IMOS)
[126,127]. This increases the index contrast in the waveguides meaning that bend radii can be
smaller [128]. In this first demonstration of SFWM in InP it was noted that the non-linearity is
actually stronger than silicon. However, the non-linear losses through two-photon absorption
is far larger. This could be solved by either increasing the band gap of the material, much
like silicon nitride compared with silicon. Alternatively, longer wavelength photons would be
unable to cause two-photon absorption [122].
Lithium Niobate
Lithium niobate is a favourite choice for phase and intensity modulation offering very high
bandwidth modulation [100, 101]. Single-photon generation is also available through spontan-
eous parametric down conversion (SPDC) in periodically poled structures [129]. Reconfigur-
able circuits have been demonstratedmaking it a potential candidate for future networks [130].
2.6 Summary
In this background chapter, we have introduced important cryptographic techniques, quantum
theory and integrated photonics that will form the foundation for the remainder of this thesis.
The humble beginning of cryptography have been incredibly influential throughout history and
remains a vital endeavour. With a better understand of cryptoanalysis techniques the field will
need to keep evolving.
Advances in the understanding of quantummechanics has allowed a more complete view
of the world. It has also facilitated a new range of quantum technologies to complement their
classical counterparts. Through quantum key distribution, we can develop entirely new ways
to securely communicate. At the same time, thorough analysis will be crucial to their claims
of security.
As with any technology, the mass-manufacturability of quantum photonic circuits will be
key to its success. Developments in integrated platforms have allowed quantum photonics
to progress from modest proof of principle experiments into the commercial world. Quantum
communication systems are set to utilise these techniques to become part of future quantum











The photonic chips were initially conceived by Mark Thompson and Mark Godfrey. The chip
mask was designed by Mark Godfrey and fabricated by Oclaro. The experiment was initially
designed by Chris Erven and Philip Sibson and initial characterisation of the chips performed
by Philip Sibson. I modified the initial experimental design and packaged the devices for elec-
trical and optical testing. I performed the experiment and analysed the data with support from
Philip Sibson. This chapter will expand on the work previously published in reference [105].
Where appropriate, text and figures have been reused that had been written or created by me.
3.1 Introduction
Secure communication protocols have been the focus of much academic research since the
promise of quantum computing attacks against modern cryptography [1]. Quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) aims to provide long-term security without assuming the computational power
of an adversary [3, 4]. However, inconsistencies between theory and experiment have raised
questions in terms of real-world security, while large and power-hungry commercial systems
have slowed wide-scale adoption.
QKD has been under scrutiny from the emerging ‘quantum hacking’ community who have
demonstrated that real-world implementations do not always meet the assumptions of the
theoretical models [7]. This can lead to malicious attacks that allow Mallory to gain informa-
tion about the secret key. These include side channels [131], where vulnerable information is
leaked through uncharacterised channels, or responses to external manipulation of devices
through classical means [71]. In particular, many attacks have been directed at the single-
photon detectors (SPDs) due to their complexity and inconsistencies between theory and ex-
periment [75,80,81].
Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) is a recent protocol that tackles some
of the more prevalent attacks on systems by removing all detector side channels [7]. It does
so by introducing a third party (Charlie) who acts as a relay to mediate detection events by
announcing quantum correlations between states sent by Alice and Bob. The detection events
alone do not contain any information about the secret key, so an eavesdropper cannot gain
information by targeting the detectors.
At the heart of the MDI-QKD protocol is Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference [132], a quan-
tum phenomenon where indistinguishable single-photons incident on a beam splitter inter-
fere. HOM interference is a fundamental phenomenon in quantum optics which describes an
important interaction between photons. However, interference between independent sources
remains challenging due to the requirement of the photons being indistinguishable in all de-
grees of freedom [133]. It is possible to perform HOM-like interference using weak coherent
49
CHAPTER 3. HONG-OU-MANDEL INTERFERENCE BETWEEN INTEGRATED DEVICES
states, albeit with a reduced visibility in coincidences [134].
One of the more challenging degrees of freedom to ensure indistinguishability is the wave-
length of the sources. Heterodyne detection is typically used to measure the frequency differ-
ence between two independent lasers where interference of optical fields on a beam splitter
will produce a beat note whenmeasured by a photodiode. However, photodiodes requiremuch
higher optical powers than those typically used for QKD protocols in order to register meas-
urements. Without drastically increasing the complexity of a system, we can instead use HOM
interference to characterise the wavelength overlap between independent sources.
Integrated quantum photonics has facilitated a drastic increase in complexity of experi-
ments simply not possible with alternatives. The inherent phase stability is a vital resource for
quantumexperimentsmeaning integrated devices are poised to create an accessible platform.
QKD systems have historically been bulky and expensive which has limited their practicality
and has slowed their commercial adoption.
Recent developments on indium phosphide (InP) photonic integrated devices have estab-
lished them as a promising platform for telecommunications [97]. The platform fulfils all of
the requirements to perform QKD at state-of-the-art rates [9]. Themonolithic inclusion of laser
sources provides a method of producing weak coherent states that can be used in a decoy-
state QKD protocol [59]. Efficient and fast phase modulation can be performed through the
quantum-confined stark effect (QCSE) with a bandwidth up to 40GHz [97]. The possibility of
mass productionmeans that InP devices are an excellent candidate to reduce the access cost
of a QKD network and allow wide adoption [125].
In this chapter, we experimentally demonstrate that InP devices fulfil all the requirements
for state-of-the-art HOM interference while also being a practical platform for future quantum
networks. Using on-chip lasers and pulse modulation, we generated weak coherent pulses
(WCPs) and measured a visibility of 46.5± 0.8% between independent devices clocked at
431MHz. Using gain-switching as an alternative means to accomplish phase randomisation
between pulses, we show that the same interference is possible at 250MHz without a reduc-
tion in state fidelity. This visibility is comparable to other demonstrations [135–137] with the
benefit of being performed with integrated devices. Crucially, this level of interference demon-
strates InP fulfills the required control for future MDI-QKD networks.
3.2 Hong-Ou-Mandel Interference
HOM interference is a quantum phenomenon where two indistinguishable single-photons in-
cident on a balanced beam splitter will interfere and bunch. It was first seen by Hong, Ou and
Mandel in 1987 [132] and is fundamental to many quantum information technologies from
computation to communication and sensing.
Conceptually, the experiment is simple. We first consider two single-photons that are dis-
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tinguishable only in their spatial modes. Mathematically, this can be represented as
â†b̂† |0, 0〉a,b = |1, 1〉a,b (3.1)
where a, b are the two spatial modes.
In general, we can consider an ideal beamsplitter to have some relationship between the in-
put and output modes by reflection and transmission components. The transformation matrix










2 = 1 and t∗acrbd + tbdr∗bc = tacr∗bd + t∗bdrbc = 0 (3.3)
where tij , rij ∈ C are the transmission and reflection, respectively, along the input mode i tothe output mode j. The restrictions on rij and tij come from the unitarity of quantum trans-formations.






where the −1 is physically represented as a relative π phase being applied between the two
reflected paths. This representation is not unique andwill depend on the physical systembeing
used. However, all representations are equivalent up to a phase transformation in the output




and b̂† → ĉ† − d̂†√
2
(3.5)
where â and b̂ are the two input modes and ĉ and d̂ the two output modes. Then two photons
incident on a 50:50 beam splitter become















We find that after the photons have interfered there is zero probability that exactly one
photon ends up in each of the output modes of the beam splitter. This is referred to as the
photons bunching, creating the superposition state
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|2, 0〉c,d − |0, 2〉c,d
) (3.7)
If we were to look at the detection events after the beam splitter, we would not see any
coincidences in the output modes. This is a useful measure of how indistinguishable the input
photons are. By deliberately introducing some distinguishability between the two photons (for
example a time delay), a measure of visibility can be introduced as the ratio of coincidences
with and without HOM interference. Explicitly, this is
Visibility = 1− PHOMPind (3.8)
where PHOM is the probability of coincidence with maximal interference and Pind is the probab-ility of coincidence without interference.
3.2.1 Coherent States on a Beam Splitter
While HOM interference is typically considered when single-photons interfere on a beam split-
ter, the same phenomenon can be seen with coherent states. However, the extent of the in-
terference will be reduced due to multi-photon terms [134]. Here, we will consider how the
effect presents itself with WCPs and how the intensity of the light is important. We will distin-
guish this interference from classical wave interference by introducing phase randomisation
between the states which will be discussed further in section 3.2.3.
Consider two coherent states, |α〉 and |β〉, incident on a beam splitter. Before the beam
splitter, the states can be written as
|α〉a = D̂a(α) |0, 0〉a,b = e
αâ








|β〉b = D̂b(β) |0, 0〉a,b = e
βb̂








which, before the beam splitter, can be written jointly as
D̂a(α)⊗ D̂b(β) |0, 0〉a,b (3.11)
From the beam splitter transformation above, the creation operator transformations are
â† → rĉ† + td̂† and b̂† → tĉ† − rd̂† (3.12)
and similarly for the annihilation operators. We will consider a beam splitter with variable re-
flectivity so that we can see how fabrication tolerances within the beam splitter would affect
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the potential visibility. Applying these relations to incident coherent states, we find after the
beam splitter the state becomes
D̂a(α)⊗ D̂b(β) |0〉 =e
αâ
†−α∗âeβb̂






†−rd̂†)−β∗(t∗ĉ−r∗d̂) |0, 0〉c,d (3.14)
=e(αr+βt)ĉ
†−(α∗r∗+β∗t∗)ĉe(αt−βr)d̂
†−(α∗t∗−β∗r∗)d̂ |0, 0〉c,d (3.15)
=D̂c(αr + βt)⊗ D̂d(αt− βr) |0, 0〉c,d (3.16)
















We will model the SPDs as threshold detectors meaning that single-photon events are not
distinguishable from multi-photon events. Therefore, we will need to consider how the effi-
ciency of detection changes with multi-photon events. Consider an SPD with efficiency of de-
tection η, then the probability that the detector clicks, given n photons were present, is
1− P (no photons detected) = 1− (1− η)n (3.18)













P(Detd click) = 1− e−|αt−βr|2ηd (3.21)
Therefore, the probability of a coincidence click, with both coherent states overlapped on a
beam splitter, is
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Figure 3.1: Graph plotting the effect of an unbalanced beam splitter on the visibility of a HOMdip. Maximal visibility is found when the beam splitter is 50:50. Photon number also has aneffect on visibility due to the increased probability ofmulti-photon terms. Here, we plot averagephoton numbers ranging from 1 to 5. Both incoming states are assumed to have equal averagephoton number. As the average photon number tends to zero, the visibility on a 50:50 beamsplitter will tend towards 50%. We assume unity detection efficiency i.e. η{c, d} = 1.











To get a visibility for the HOM dip, we need to consider two coherent states not interfering
on a beam splitter e.g. two states with orthogonal polarisation. Then the distributions after a
beam splitter are the sum of the reflected and transmitted states. Therefore, the probability of
coincidence is given by
Pind(coincidence) = (1− e−ηc(|αr|2+|βt|2))(1− e−ηd(|αt|2+|βr|2)) (3.24)
Wewill see later thatwewant to consider pulses that are phase randomised relative to each
other. For this, we can introduce a phase into the pulse incident fromchannel a.Mathematically
















Pind(coincidence) = (1− e−ηc(|αr|2+|βt|2))(1− e−ηd(|αt|2+|βr|2)) (3.26)
where the visibility of the HOM dip can be calculated from the ratio of the interfering and non-
interfering cases, as introduced in equation (3.8).
Using this equation, we can estimate the visibility of a HOM dip given a variable reflectivity
beam splitter and average photon number, as shown in figure 3.1. The average photon number
is assumed to be the same for both incoming states. As the beam splitter becomes more
reflective (or transmissive), the visibility reduces to zero as the incoming states will no longer
be interfering. However, we do see that small deviations from a 50:50 beam splitter do not
cause the visibility to drastically decrease. We also see that an increase in the average photon
number of the states will reduce the visibility. This is due to an increase in the multi-photon
terms in the coherent states.
3.2.2 Wavelength Dependence
As previously mentioned, we will be using the HOM interference as a measure of wavelength
overlap of independent sources. Therefore, it will be useful to understand what this interaction
will look like. The experiment will see a continuous wave (CW) laser intensity modulated into
pulses with a Gaussian shape in time. We will assume that the linewidth is much smaller than
the frequency broadening due to pulse modulation so that the electric field can be modelled
as a single frequency. This is to say that the pulses will be Fourier-transform limited. We will
also assume that effects from chirp are negligible. Therefore, we can model the normalised
electric field of each pulse as


















where j = a, b are the beam splitter inputs, tp is the full width at half maximum (FWHM) ofthe pulse in time (assumed the same for both inputs), ln(x) is the natural logarithm, ωj are thefrequencies and φj are the phases.








(Ea − Eb) (3.29)
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By substituting the Gaussian pulses from above into the beam splitter relationships we
can find the electric fields after interference. After integrating over the pulses in time, we can
calculate the intensities of the output electric fields as
















where we introduce ∆ω = ωa−ωb to represent the relative frequencies between the two inputfields and ∆φ = φa − φb for the relative phases.
When the intensities of the fields are low the probability of coincidence is proportional to
the product of the intensities averaged over the relative phase [134]. Explicitly, we want to find
P (1 photon in c, 1 photon in d) ≈ 〈IcId〉∆φ (3.32)

















which gives the shape of the interference in terms of the relative frequencies of the two
incoming pulses as










This is the upper bound for the visibility of the interference. Any distinguishability between
the pulses in degrees of freedom other than frequency would cause a reduction in the visibility
of the HOM dip.
3.2.3 Quantum Over Classical
A natural question to ask when considering a quantum effect with electric fields is how the in-
terference is different from classical wave interference. If we considered two coherent electric
fields on a beam splitter we would see an interference in the fields and a change in the number
of coincidences at the output. It could be argued that the limitation of 50% visibility is due to
a misconfiguration of the experimental set up allowing a distinguishability in an unconsidered
degree of freedom.
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We can distinguish the quantum interference from a classical fringe by considering the
intensities of the individual outputs of the beam splitter. In a classical fringe, we would ex-
pect the intensity of the individual beam splitter outputs to vary as the electric fields interfere.
Therefore, to verify that the interference is due to HOM effects, we need to show that the in-
dividual intensities are not changing with the change in coincidences. When we average over
the relative phases and look at the intensity of each beam splitter output we find
〈Ic〉∆φ = 〈Id〉∆φ = 1 (3.35)
So changing the relative wavelengths of the input pulses does not change the intensities
of the individual outputs from the beam splitter. However, as calculated before, the change
in wavelength will cause a decrease in coincidence probability. This difference is due to the
phase randomised nature of the incoming light and distinguishes the interference from clas-
sical interference where the light fields would have a fixed relative phase.
3.3 Sources and Requirements
In this section, we will discuss the main experimental challenges in performing HOM interfer-
ence and describe some of the photon sources that can be used to fulfil the stringent require-
ments of high-visibility interference. To show good interference between light fields, they need
to be indistinguishable. Put more explicitly, for maximal interference, the two pulses need to
have the same wavelength, arrive at the same time, have equal intensities, be in the same
polarisation and have the same pulse shape.
3.3.1 Single-Photons
Historically, Hong-Ou-Mandel interference experiments have been performed with single pho-
tons. The first demonstrations used spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) to gen-
erate pairs of single photons that were distinguishable only in spatial mode [132,138]. By delay-
ing one of the photons before interfering on a beamsplitter, HOM interference could be demon-
strated. Subsequent experiments have demonstrated interference between different single-
photon sources including spontaneous four-wave mixing (SFWM) [139], atomic systems [140],
quantum dots [141] and NV centres [142].
While there have been many advances in single-photon sources through increased rates
and coherence, they remain probabilistic. State-of-the-art rates are currently limited to tens of
MHz [143] meaning they are impractical for modern communication protocols. Therefore, it
is hard to claim that in their current form they will make good candidates for scalable quan-
tum technologies without requiring multiplexing and feed-forward techniques, each of which
introduces their own set of practical challenges.
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It is worth noting that as quantum networks evolve from simple key exchange networks
it will be necessary to develop single-photon sources [144]. As such developments occur,
they will impact the field of QKD which would benefit from on-demand, single-photon sources
provided that they fulfil the rate and loss requirements of modern communication networks.
3.3.2 Weak Coherent States
In the absence of true single-photon sources, another source of light needs to be considered
for scalable quantum key exchange protocols. Coherent states represent a close approxima-
tion to single photons when strongly attenuated. They are also readily produced from lasers
and easily manipulated through phase modulation.
As previously mentioned, the requirements for high-fidelity HOM, and therefore MDI-QKD,
are stringent. Here we discuss some of the requirements for WCP sources to be useful in a
QKD system.
Extinction Ratio
While not necessarily required for HOM interference, for use in a QKD protocol the quantum
states will need to exhibit low encoding errors. The extinction ratio will be the ratio of the
optical powers between the logical |0〉 and |1〉 states. In a time-bin encoding scheme, this
means that there should be a high extinction ratio between the on and off states of the photon
source allowing early and late time-bins to be well defined. A 20dB extinction ratio between
time-bins will result in a 1% error rate in the timing information.
Timing Jitter
In order to keep upwith high data rates ofmodern networks, we will need to have clock speeds
that are comparable to those of classical devices. Therefore, it is important that we have a
small uncertainty, or jitter, of the timing of the states to ensure the quantum states can be
encoded in short time bins. As we move towards GHz clock speeds, timing jitter on the order
of picoseconds will be required.
Coherence
In a time bins encoding scheme, we will need to make sure that the laser pulses in the early
and late time-bins maintain coherence. This will allow us to faithfully encode phase between
the time bins giving a complete encoding scheme. Physically, this means that the coherence
of the laser should be much longer than the separation of the time bins. For a 1GHz clocked
system, we would need coherence longer than 2 ns meaning a linewidth of less than 150MHz.
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Phase Randomisation
A vital part of the HOM interference is for the WCPs to be phase randomised. This means that
each quantum state should have a phase reference that is uncorrelated to the previous state.
Phase randomisation is also an important part of QKD security, that will be discussed further
in chapter 4.
Linearly Polarised
Asmentioned before, the states will need overlap in each degree of freedom. The polarisation
should be linear for maximal interference. While a polarising beam splitter (PBS) can be used
to ensure polarisation overlap for interference, this adds complexity and loss to the system.
Orthogonal polarisations can also introduce side channels into a QKD system to allow Eve to
extract knowledge of the secret key during the exchange.
Wavelength Tunable
Modern telecommunications networks heavily rely onwavelength-divisionmultiplexing (WDM)
to maintain the data rates required. To ensure quantum compatibility with the same networks,
it is likely that the wavelength of a QKD system will need to be tunable in order to switch
between the standardised frequency bands. Thismay also restrict the use ofwavelength filters,
unless they are easily tunable. Moreover, unfiltered wavelengths can introduce side channels
which could be exploited by Eve or Mallory.
3.3.3 Previous Methods
Several methods have been used to generate WCPs for QKD systems. Here we briefly discuss
the benefits and drawbacks of each.
Gain-switched lasers
While gain-switched lasers offer simplicity and easily satisfy the phase randomisation con-
straint, they can suffer from bad timing jitter from the spontaneous emission and have broad
spectra which require filtering [119].
Laser seeding
Laser seeding uses two separately controlled lasers, a master and a slave, to generate pulses
[145]. The control is throughmulti-level RF electronics which can increase the cost of a system
and, again, wavelength filtering is required. This method will be discussed further in chapter
5.
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Figure 3.2: Schematic for the InP transmitters for weak coherent state generation. The integ-rated CW Fabry-Pérot laser is made from two distributed Bragg reflectors (DBRs) which formsa cavity around a semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA). Light is intensity modulated usingmulti-mode interferometers (MMIs) and electro-optic phasemodulators (EOPMs) whichmakea Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). States are coupled into fibre through spot-size convert-ers at the edge of the device.
Intensity modulation
Starting fromaCW laser, the light can be intensitymodulated into distinct timebins. There is no
inherent phase randomisation involved, although, this method doesn’t broaden the spectrum
beyond the Fourier-transform limit meaning wavelength filtering is not required [9].
3.4 Integrated Weak Coherent Source
In this section, wewill describe the integrated transmitters that wewill use for generatingweak
coherent states. Each transmitter is an InP device, measuring 6× 2mm2, that was fabricated
by the commercial foundry service Oclaro. A schematic is shown in figure 3.2 showing the
on-chip laser source and Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI).
3.4.1 Laser Source
As described in chapter 2, a huge benefit for III-V materials, such as InP, over silicon is the abil-
ity to monolithically integrate lasers into devices. This makes the platform particularly suited
for telecommunications and generating weak coherent states for QKD.
Each device contains a Fabry-Pérot CW laser which is shown in figure 3.3. The 1mm long
cavity is made from two distributed Bragg reflector (DBR) gratings which are tunable through
current injection and allow awavelength tuning of around 10 nm. The DBR gratings themselves
are periodic structures of differing refractive index. The peak reflected wavelength (λDBR) isdependent on the grating pitch (Λ) and effective refractive index (neff) of the waveguide andis given by
λDBR = 2Λneff (3.36)
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Figure 3.3: Microscope image of the Waveguide integrated Fabry-Pérot laser. Two tunableDBRs, which forms the optical cavity, and an SOA for optical gain. Gold pads allow wirebond-ing for electrical control through current injection. Each DBR is 200µm long while the SOA is500µm for a total length of 1mm including isolation sections.
From this, we find that changes in the refractive index will linearly change the reflection
peak. The grating pitch is chosen to be 237.7 nm giving a peak reflected wavelength around
1550nm, where neff = 3.26.
From the picture in figure 3.3, we can see that the DBRs are both the same length. Typically,
the rear DBR would be longer to increase the reflectivity back into the cavity which increases
the laser power. While the applications here only require weak coherent states, continuous-
variable QKD (CV-QKD) [62] requires a bright local oscillator which needs to be considered
during chip design. Subsequent chip designs should consider this design change to include a
longer rear DBR to increase the laser power for CV-QKD applications.
The semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) is a single-mode, ridgewaveguide structure that
is optimised for transverse electric (TE) polarisation. An electrical current is used to pump the
carriers for a population inversion. Figure 3.4 shows the characteristics of the laser with a
threshold current of 14mA and a diode voltage around 0.7 V. The optical power is shown to be
linear with applied laser current after the threshold and the diodes were tested up to 80mA.
Operating the laser at higher currents (more than around 60mA) can have detrimental effects
on the lasing stability as heating within the cavity can cause the laser to mode hop. Operating
the laser at currents below 60mA resolves this issue.
Typical spectra of the two transmitter lasers are shown in figure 3.5 which demonstrate
<30pm FWHM and >50dB sideband suppression. The linewidth here is stated as <30pm
FWHM as this is limited to the precision of the optical spectrum analyser (OSA) used (Anritsu
MS9740A). The two lasers were deliberately offset in wavelength to show each spectrum. The
spectra demonstrate the reproducibility offered by integrated optics. Typically, we would ex-
pect the spectrum of a Fabry-Pérot laser to be Lorentzian [146] but the limited precision of the
OSA is unable to measure this level of detail.
While the spectrum is limited by the precision of the OSA, we can put bounds on the
linewidth from coherent measurements. The coherence length of the laser can be calculated
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Figure 3.4: Characteristics of the on-chip laser. We find a lasing current threshold of around14mA and diode voltage of 0.7 V. The power given includes losses from optical componentsand fibre coupling so the on-chip power would be higher.
from the linewidth by
Lcoh = cπ∆v (3.37)
where∆v is the FWHMof the laser in frequency. The integrated lasers fromOclaro have pre-
viously demonstrated a coherence length of 45 cmwhich corresponds to a FWHM of 212MHz
(1.7 pm at 1550 nm) [9]. We will see later that partial coherence can be seen at 1.2m which
provides a lower bound on the FWHM of around 87MHz (or 0.7 pm). In order to measure the
linewidth more accurately than the previous OSA measurement, a self-heterodyne measure-
ment technique [147] can be used but has not been performed in this thesis.
In figure 3.6, we show laser tuning through current injection of the DBRs which will change
the reflection peak through heating effects. By varying the voltage from 0V to 1V, the wave-
length can be tuned by about 10 nmwithin the telecommunications C-band. Both the front and
rear DBRs need to have similar voltages applied to maintain a good cavity mode for lasing. Al-
ternatively, the wavelength can be tuned by changing the temperature of the whole device,
which causes the cavity to expand or contract.
The wavelength of the lasers can also be finely tuned through current injection of the SOA
itself. This is shown in figure 3.7 where changing the driving current from 20 to 28mA sees
an increase in wavelength of around 100pm. This wavelength shift is primarily due to heating
effects in the cavity but carrier effects in the SOA will also be present. As the wavelength
changes, so will the intensity of the laser. As we saw in figure 3.1, the photon number is an
important aspect to control during a HOM interference. Therefore, when using SOA current
injection to sweep the wavelength some attenuation will also be required.
We note here that the narrow linewidth of the laser means that during no experiment with
the InP chips do we need to use a wavelength filter to clean up the light or optical pulses. This
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Figure 3.5:Typical spectra of the two independent on-chip lasers. Each demonstrates a FWHMof 30pm (limited to the precision of the OSA) and a sideband suppression of 50 dB. The twolasers were deliberately detuned in wavelength so both spectra could be seen.
is important as it removed a component that would add cost to any system but also restrict
the wavelength operation of the devices. Without the need for a filter, the lasers are free to
operate in a wavelength that spansmore than 10 nm. This will be crucial as it is likely that QKD
systems will needed to be WDM compatible to meet the demands of high-speed networks for
increased rates or quantum-classical multiplexing.
3.4.2 Phase Modulation
To create weak coherent states, we will use two different types of phase modulation for good
extinction WCPs at high speed.
3.4.2.1 Electro-Optic Phase Modulation
The main modulation effect that we will use is the QCSE which has operating speeds of more
than 40GHz [97, 148]. The waveguide contains a multi quantum well (MQW) structure which
has a variable absorption that is dependent on the electric field applied over the waveguide.
The refractive index change due to this absorption can be calculated through the Kramers-
Kronig relation between the real and imaginary parts. Given a complex function of the form
χ(ω) = χ1(ω) + iχ2(ω) we have that
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where Cauchy principal value is denoted by P . From this, the refractive index, n, is related to
the absorption coefficient, α, by [149]








As we are only interested here in the refractive index change due to the QCSE, we will
neglect all other electro-optic effects. We will also assume that the changes in the absorp-
tion are localised within a small region [150]. Therefore, we can rewrite the refractive index as
n(ω) = n0(ω) + ∆n(ω) and similarly for the absorption coefficient. Within the frequency range









By comparing the absorption of the material with and without the electric field, α(ω) can
be estimated. Numerical integration can then be used to calculate the refractive index change
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Figure 3.7: By changing the driving current of the on-chip laser, we can change the wavelengththrough heating and carrier effects. This will also vary the power output of the laser. The pre-cision of the wavelength tuning is only limited by the control of the current source.
due to an applied electric field. For small refractive index changes
∆n ∝ E2 (3.41)
where E is the applied electric field [148]. As the electric field increases, the effect saturates
meaning that the quadratic nature is only valid for small changes in the refractive index. Exactly
how the electric field and the refractive index are proportional is related to the exciton peak
which is dependent on the specific material.
The exact relationship between phase and applied voltage has not been calculated for the
devices presented here. This is due to the complexity of the circuit meaning it was not possible
to isolate the effects of a single modulator.
The modulators are oriented parallel to the major flat axis of the substrate so that linear
electro-optic effects add to the QCSE, whereas they would subtract if placed orthogonally.
While the effect from the QCSE can reach speeds in excess of 40GHz, design of the modu-
lator and device packaging are important tomaximise performance. For speeds above 10GHz,
the modulator should be less than 1mm [97]. To ensure the faithful transfer of RF signals to
the chip, wirebond length should be minimised and effective termination employed to stop
reflections.
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Figure 3.8: Microscope image of an integrated Mach-Zehnder interferometer made from twoMMIs and two EOPMs which can be used for intensity modulation of light into WCPs. TheMZImeasures approximately 1mm in length and around 350µm in width. Electrical connectionsto the EOPMs can be made via the bond pads.
3.4.2.2 Mach-Zehnder Interferometer
Aswewill be operating the chip laser in CWmode,we need tomodulate the intensity of the light
to create well-defined time bins for our WCPs. Using electro-optic phase modulators (EOPMs)
as described above, together with multi-mode interferometers (MMIs), we can create an MZI
with modulation speeds in excess of 10GHz. A microscope image of the integrated MZI is
shown in figure 3.8.
The structure is 1mm in length, while themodulators themselves are approximately 500µm
to ensure modulation speeds of more than 10GHz. MMIs are used as integrated 50:50 beam
splitters to split the light between the two EOPMs. Unlike directional couplers which exhibit a
drastic wavelength-dependent splitting ratio, MMIs are used to ensure a good splitting for a
wide range of wavelengths. Bond pads are used for electrical connections to the modulators
and provide bias voltages and currents.
3.4.2.3 Thermo-Optic Phase Modulation
Imperfections in the MZIs due to the fabrication of the devices mean that the phases accu-
mulated on the top and bottom path are not the same. While not designed for thermo-optic
modulation, the EOPMs have a resistance of around 10Ω which can also be used to vary the
phase. By passing a small current over one arm of the MZI, we can correct for the phase mis-
match to recover the desired performance.
To operate the MZI using the thermo-optic effect on one modulator and electro-optic mod-
ulation on the other, a negative DC voltage offset is first applied to both modulators. This is
to balance the phase-dependent losses in both arms of the MZI and to access the quadratic
effects of the QCSE. A current is then used to apply thermo-optic phases to balance any phase
mismatch between the two arms. This current will also cause a small phase change due to
electro-optic effect but these changes will be small so can be compensated for using the DC
offset. RF signals can then be applied to the electro-optic modulator to create high-extinction
ratio states.
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Figure 3.9: Effect of applying thermo-optic phasemodulation (TOPM) and electro-optic phasemodulation (EOPM) within an MZI. Without heating, we can only get an extinction of 15 dB byusing the QCSE. By correcting for phase differences through thermo-optic effects, we canincrease the extinction to more than 35dB.
Figure 3.9 demonstrates how heating effects can change the characteristics of an MZI. By
changing the voltage bias for the QCSE over one arm of themodulator (Φ) whilst the other arm
is kept constant (θ) we can characterise the performance. Φ is swept over the range 0 to −10V
and the power at the arm output of the MZI is measured. We can then compare the difference
in DC modulation with and without heating.
Without heating, the absorption effects mean that the extinction ratio possible is limited
to only around 15 dB. However, by correcting for the phase difference in the two arms, the
extinction ratio can be increased to 30dB with voltage swing of 3Vpp.
Using this heating technique, we can apply RF modulation to the MZI to create WCPs, as
shown in figure 3.10. Without correcting for detector and electronic timing uncertainty, the
FWHM is 175 ps. We also find an extinction ratio of more than 20dB for a 2Vpp electricalpulse.
3.4.3 Fibre Coupling
To efficiently couple the light from the waveguide mode (1.5µm) to a fibre mode (10µm), a
spot-size converter (SSC) on the chip is used to expand the light mode to 3µm. The SSC also
changes the mode to be more circular from the elliptical waveguide mode. A lensed fibre was
then used to convert this mode to a standard 10µm fibre mode. The fibre was held in a Elliot
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Figure 3.10:Histogramof single-photon events after intensitymodulationwith anMZI.We findan extinction ratio of just over 20 dB and a FWHM of 175 ps. The histogram is not correctedfor detector or time-tagging jitter so the FWHM includes these uncertainties. The slope afterthe pulse is attributed to the initial signal shape from the signal generator, the impedancematching on the PCB and reflections from the RF termination.
Gold fibre launch stage with piezo-electric actuators that gave a precision of 10 nm in the X, Y
and Z axes over a range of 25µm.
To reduce reflections back into the waveguide, the facet of the SSC is at an angle relative
to the edge of the chip. On these devices, the waveguides are at 7° to the edge which min-
imises back scattering from the high refractive index contrast. When coupling from the chip
through air into a fibre, we need to consider refraction to minimise loss. From Snell’s law, we
can calculate that the fibre should be at 23° to the edge of the chip, given that the waveguide
refractive index is 3.26.
It was not possible to directly measure the coupling losses on these devices as there were
no test structures to isolate the waveguides and spot-size converters. From foundry tests, the
coupling loss from an SSC to a standard single-mode fibre was estimated to be 1.5 dB. It is
expected that these devices will have similar losses.
3.4.4 Packaging
To access the electrical components of the integrated devices, we need to create a package to
transfer the signals from the driving electronics to the chip. A PCBwas designed to electrically
connect themodulators and laser to SMA connectors for high-speed operation and DC pins for
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Figure 3.11: Chip packaging to breakout the electrical connections on the chip. SMA connect-ors were used for the high-speed connections to offer a response of more than 10GHz. Ca-pacitors and resistors were also used for termination of RF modulation signals. DC pins wereused for low-speed connections for thermo-optic modulation and distributed Bragg reflectortuning. The bottom of the PCB is cut out to allow optical access to the side of the chip.
biasing. A render is shown in figure 3.11. The bottom of the chip is ground which connects to
a copper block that is also connected to the ground of the PCB. Silver epoxy was used to glue
the chip to the mount to ensure a good electrical connection. It also provided a good thermal
connection for temperature stabilisation. ThePCB is designedwith a cut-out for optical access
to the chip from one side.
In order tomaintain a good signal integrity, the impedance of the tracks needs tomatch the
electronics. As the devices require a number of RF connections to a small area, using standard
FR-4material would not be sufficient. Instead, Rogers 6006nsmaterial was chosen for its high
dielectric constant of 6.15 meaning that narrow conductor-backed coplanar waveguides (CB-
CPWs) could maintain a 50Ω impedance. A schematic of the waveguides is shown in figure














where, for a track of width a, waveguide of width b and substrate of height h we have
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whereK(k) is the elliptic integral of the first kind.
The thickness of the substrate used was 250µm so a track of width 260µm with a spa-
cing of 100µm (giving a total waveguide width of 460µm) has a characteristic impedance of
50Ω. Ideally, to avoid microstrip line modes the design should have h  b and the ground
plane should extend away from the waveguide more than b [152]. In this design, these restric-
tions will be relaxed due to space constraints. However, through operation we will see that the
waveguide can support a modulation bandwidth up to 10GHz.
The tracks were designed and then laser etched into the copper on the substrate. The PCB
was given a gold coating using electroplating to avoid oxidation of the copper and to help with
gold wirebonding. In future iterations, a nickel layer should be applied before the gold to avoid
gold diffusing into the copper. SMA, DC pins, capacitors and resistors were then soldered onto
the PCB using a low-temperature solder paste.
The pads on the chip werewirebonded to the PCBwith a 25µmball bond and then awedge-
bond onto the PCB. Silver epoxy was then applied over the wedgebond to ensure a good elec-
trical contact with the PCB and to increase durability. The PCB was designed such that the
length of the RF wirebonds was minimised so that capacitance and resistance of the gold
wire were reduced. Such effects can be detrimental for high-speed operation.
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An RF signal could be applied to one side of an EOPMwhile the other side provided termin-
ation to minimise electrical reflections. A capacitor blocked the DC component of the signal
while a 50Ω resistor terminates the AC signal.
3.5 Fibre-Optic Transmitter
For initial demonstrations of the on-chip laser and pulse generation, it will be useful to have a
well characterised source of WCPs. Here, we describe the commercial fibre components that
can be used to replicate the chip components.
3.5.1 State Preparation
A CW fibre laser (Yenista T100s-hp) with a wide tuning around the C-band in steps of 1 pmwas
used as the source. This meant that the laser could be swept very precisely compared with
the integrated laser, which would remain fixed.
The lithium niobate fibre modulator (ThorLabs LN27S-FC) was used to intensity modulate
the light. It required a 5Vpp pulse meaning that amplification of the signal from the pulsepattern generator (PPG) was needed. The amplifier used was an SHF 810 with 29dB gain and
up to 40GHz operation.





where τp is the FWHM of the pulse in time and ∆ω is the angular frequency FWHM. For a pulsewidth of τp = 100 ps the minimum spectral width of a Gaussian pulse is 4GHz. The typicallinewidth of the fibre laser was <400 kHz so it is a good approximation to assume that any
WCPs will be Fourier-transform limited as the contribution from pulsing is much larger than
the linewidth.
3.6 Measurement
As the pulses were coupled into fibre, we could make use of commercial fibre components
for control, interference and measurement. This section will describe the required control off
chip, as well as the detection and correlation of photons.
3.6.1 Polarisation and Projection
Fibre polarisation controllers are used to rotate the polarisation of the pulses and aPBS gives a
known polarisation in a polarisation maintaining fibre. A polarisation-maintaining 50:50 beam
71
CHAPTER 3. HONG-OU-MANDEL INTERFERENCE BETWEEN INTEGRATED DEVICES
splitter is used for the interference to ensure that both transmitters are overlapped in polarisa-
tion.
3.6.2 Photon Number Feedback
As we will be using the current of the on-chip laser to vary the wavelength this will also change
the power. To ensure maximal interference, both transmitters should have an equal photon
number. Using the sum total counts of the detectors, a feedback loop was used to ensure that
both transmitters (fibre or chip-based) remained constant in photon number. Each transmit-
ter used a digital variable optical attenuator (VOA) (Oz Optics DA100) to vary the power with
0.01 dB precision.
3.6.3 Detection
The detectors used in the experiment were fibre-coupled superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors (SNSPDs) from Photonspot which were chosen over other single-photon
detectors for their high efficiency (>80%), small timing jitter (30 ps) and short recovery time
(100 ns). The detectorswere housed in a closed-cycle helium refrigerator that was kept at 0.7 K.
A successful event was indicated by an RF signal of around 10mV which was amplified with
a low-noise amplifier to around 200mV which could then be time-tagged.
3.6.4 Time-tagging
Detection eventswere time-tagged using a PicoQuant Hydraharp 400 and saved to a computer
for later analysis. An optical link was used to provide a synchronisation signal from the trans-
mitters to the time-tagger. The precision of timing events could be set by the user and could
be as low as 1 ps with an electronic jitter of<12 ps. The dead time of the tagging electronics is
<80ns, which is comparable to the detector dead time so should not impact the experiment.
In this experiment, 16 ps bins were used. As the exact series of events could be reconstruc-
ted from the time tags, the number of coincidences could be calculated from the saved tags
provided the timing information between transmitters had been calibrated.
The coincidence window could be varied in the analysis after to ensure that the coincid-
ences come from when the pulse is a Gaussian shape. As we see from figure 3.10, there is a
‘tail’ on the later edge of the pulses that could cause chirp in the pulse. This would have two
effects on the HOM interference. Firstly, if the two pulse shapes are different, this would cause
a reduced interference as the photons would have different wavelengths. Secondly, this would




As the HOM interference is dependent on the time of arrival of the two pulses, we need to
ensure that the pulses arrive at the beam splitter at the same time. It is also crucial that we can
reconstruct the events using the timing electronics, meaning that we require to fully calibrate
the optical and electrical delays. This meant that the pulses that seemed to match in the time-
tagging electronics were actually those that interfered at the beam splitter.
We will make the assumption that the total delay (optical and electronic) between the two
arms of the measurement system after the beam splitter was less than 50ns. This was reas-
onable as 50ns in fibre equates to about 12m, and is similar in the coaxial RF cables. Then
the pulse generation could be slowed to send a pulse at less than 10MHz so that the pulse
separation was more than 100ns and the pulses could be matched to the nearest coincident
event. The delay between the arms of the measurement in this experiment were found to be
less than 10 ns which was verified through the HOM interference.
To keep the transmitter electronics synchronised with the detection electronics, an optical
signal was sent over a separate fibre which acted as a reference clock.
3.7 Control Electronics
A multi-channel DC voltage source was used to create a voltage potential over the EOPMs for
the QCSE. Each modulator could be controlled separately up to a maximum bias of 10V. The
DC biases were mixed with the RF signals using bias tees (Mini-Circuits ZX85-12G-S+) with a
bandwidth of up to 12GHz.
To generate the RF signals, a PPG (Keysight 81134A) was used which had a maximum
output voltage swing of 2Vpp. A PPG was used over a more general arbitrary waveform gen-erator as only two levels were required for operation of the device for this test. The minimum
pulse width that could be set was 100ps which when measured on an oscilloscope (Keysight
DSA91304A) was around 120ps FWHM. Themaximum speed of the PPG was 3.35GHz which
could be varied and frequency dividers could also be used to vary the pulse repetition rate.
A separate voltage source was used to pass a small current over one side of the MZI to
achieve thermo-optic phasemodulation. The voltage could be set with a precision of 1mVwith
typically 200 to 700mV being required for modulation. These values depended heavily on the
fabrication of the device as well as different resistances from packaging.
A 10 kΩ thermistor placed in the copper mount was used to give feedback to a PID loop
controlled by an Arroyo 6601 and a Peltier under the chip mount stabilised the temperature.
The temperature is maintained around 25 ◦C with an instability of less than 0.01 ◦C.
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Figure 3.13: Experimental schematic for HOM interference between a fibre laser and on-chiplaser with external pulse modulation. Both the on-chip and fibre CW lasers are modulated intoWCPswith digital VOAs and lithium niobate intensitymodulators (P.Mod). Polarisation control(PC) contains both a polarisation rotator and a PBS to ensure overlap. The pulses interfere ata 50:50 beam splitter and the outputs are measured by SPDs.
3.8 Fibre Optic Hong-Ou-Mandel Demonstration
To simplify the first tests of the integrated devices, a transmitter was set up using a fibre laser
and lithium niobate intensity modulators so that HOM interference could be demonstrated
with a tested source. The on-chip laser was also intensity modulated using a separate fibre
modulator. A schematic of the experiment is shown in figure 3.13. This setup would let us
isolate the chip laser to characterise the interference using commercial components.
3.8.1 Fibre Laser Wavelength Sweep
The initial tests of the system used the wavelength tunability of the fibre laser as the variable
degree of freedom while the on-chip laser remained fixed in wavelength and power. This first
demonstration would show that the integrated laser source would have a long enough coher-
ence over the 100 ps pulse to interfere. Thiswould also provide information about the precision
required from tunability of the on-chip laser.
The wavelengths of the individual lasers were first coarsely overlapped on an OSA. Then
the fibre laser could be finely tuned relative to the integrated laser and coincidence counts
measured. The timing of the pulses was controlled with electrical delays in the PPGs and a
histogram used to overlap them with picosecond resolution. For this experiment the system
clock was set to 1.72GHz. A pulse was sent every 4 clock cycles for a state repetition rate
of 431MHz. Polarisation controllers and PBSs ensured both transmitters were in the same
polarisation mode before interference.
In figure 3.14, we show the single and coincidence events as the fibre laser is swept in
1 pm steps over a 150 pm range. As the two transmitters become more indistinguishable in
wavelength, the number of coincidences reduces close to the theoretical maximum visibility
of 50%. From the current injection of the on-chip laser in figure 3.7, we can see that this level
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Figure 3.14: The fibre laser wavelength was tuned over a 150 pm range relative to the fixedon-chip laser. The pulses were interfered on a beam splitter to show good interference of48.4± 1.8% which is close to the theoretical limit. The total counts remain constant throughthe sweep showing that the coincidence dip is not explained through classical interference.
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Figure 3.15: By increasing the current of the on-chip laser, whilst keeping the fibre laser fixed,we can change the relative wavelength through heating effects. We find HOM interferenceas the lasers become indistinguishable in wavelength. The total number of counts on eachdetector was used to vary the attenuation to account for the increasing laser power. From thefit, we find a visibility of 45.7± 2.0%.
of precision is well within the capability of the chip.
By looking at the total number of counts in each detector, we can see that they do not vary
with the change in coincidences. This demonstrates that the reduction in coincidences cannot
be attributed to classical interference. The difference between the detector counts is due to a
slight difference in efficiency between detectors.
3.8.2 On-Chip Laser Current Sweep
As we have demonstrated that the on-chip laser can show HOM interference, we now need to
show that the wavelength of the laser can be controlled with the precision required.
Using the same experimental setup as in figure 3.13, we can fix the wavelength of the fibre
laser and use the current injection of the integrated laser to tune thewavelength. As the current
injection will also vary the photon number per pulse, we used a digital VOAwith feedback from
the sum total number of events from both SPDs.
In figure 3.15, we change the wavelength of the chip laser by sweeping the driving current
from 12 to 34mA. As before, we see a reduction in coincidence counts close to the maximum
visibility of 50% [134]. The number of counts in each detector remained constant through the
experiment verifying that this is not coherent interference between lasers.
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Figure 3.16: Experimental setup of of the HOM interference experiment. Two identical InPchips prepare quantum states of light to be interfered on a 50:50 beam splitter. On-chip CWlasers are intensity modulated into time bins with MZIs. The pulses are coupled into a fibrewhere variable optical attenuators (VOAs) ensurematched intensities and polarisation control-lers (PCs) and polarising beam splitters (PBSs) overlap the polarisation. Pulses are interferedon a beam splitter (BS) and detected by superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors(SNSPDs). An optical channel (not shown) synchronises the transmitters and detectors.
3.9 Hong-Ou-Mandel Interference Between Independent Integrated
Devices
Having demonstrated that the linewidth and control of the chip laser was sufficient to demon-
strate interference, the next step is to demonstrate that two independently controlled devices
could show the same interference.
The experiment uses two InP devices which we will call Alice and Bob and a schematic is
shown in figure 3.16. Each chip measures only 6× 2mm2 and contains all the photonic com-
ponents to generate the required states to perform HOM interference between independent
devices. One only need compare the sizes of these optical components to fibre based optics
to justify the benefits of integrated devices.
3.9.1 HOM Interference
Hong-Ou-Mandel interference was demonstrated between two independent photonic integ-
rated circuits (PICs) by varying the relative wavelengths of the lasers, where weak coherent
states (WCSs) were modulated from CW lasers at 431MHz using MZIs. The relative wave-
length of the lasers was chosen as the distinguishing degree of freedom as all others could
be overlapped manually. However, a sweep in timing or polarisation would have seen similar
interference provided a good wavelength overlap.
The two transmitters were initially overlapped in time, polarisation and photon number. Us-
ing ps resolution electronic delays in the pulse generation, a histogram from the SPDs allowed
a timing overlap between the pulses at the beam splitter. Care was taken to ensure that the
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Figure 3.17: HOM dip between independently generated WCPs by two integrated devices. Bychanging the relative wavelength between the two devices, we demonstrate a reduction incoincidences due to HOM interference. From the fit (shown in purple) we find a visibility of46.5± 0.8% which is limited to 50% for coherent states due to multi-photon terms.
pulses that were overlapped on the histogram matched with the pulses that could have in-
terfered on the beam splitter and not a repetition rate or sync window apart. This required
calibration of the relative optical and electronic delays after the beam splitter.
Similarly, the photon number of each pulse was calibrated using a histogram of the pulses
relative to one another. This allowed the photon number to be calibrated regardless of the
detector efficiency and fibre losses, provided that the beam splitter was balanced. By looking
at each transmitter independently an average photon number per pulse was calculated to be
10−3. The value was chosen tominimise effects frommulti-photon terms in the coherent state
and to be far away from saturation of the detectors, both of which would have reduced the
visibility.
As previously mentioned, current injection into the SOA can be used to vary the wavelength
with a precision of 80 fm. However, this will also change the power of the laser and increase
the number of photons per pulse. Therefore, a digital VOA was used to vary the attenuation
during the sweep based on the sum total of detection events. The assumption was made that
the losses (coupling or otherwise) did not vary during the experiment.
The polarisation of the transmitters was rotated using fibre polarisation controllers and the
pulses were immediately sent through a PBS after which was kept in polarisation maintaining
fibre. The beam splitter used polarisation maintaining fibre to ensure that the polarisation did
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Figure 3.18: Schematic for how coherence of the lasers can be checked through coincidencesof events between the two detectors in different time bins, ti. The colours are the same asthose used in figure 3.20. We can check between states that interfered on the beam splitter(purple) and those that did not interfere (red).
not change after the beam splitter. After the interference, the polarisation maintaining fibre
was no longer required as only the time of arrival of photons was important at the detectors.
In figure 3.17, we demonstrate Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between the two devices by
sweeping the relative wavelengths of the lasers. From a Gaussian fit we find a visibility of
46.5± 0.8%. It is pertinent to note that during the experiment there was no active feedback
to control the polarisation, pulse carving or timing which demonstrates the stability possible
with an integrated platform.
3.10 HOM Interference with Actively Phase Randomised Pulses
We have previously discussed that, to demonstrate quantum interference instead of classical
interference, the laser pulses should be phase randomised relative to one another. In the pre-
vious experiment, as the lasers were not phase locked, we could average over the phases by
taking data for long enough for the phases between the two lasers to drift. However, for QKD
purposes this would not meet criteria for security. This means that we need to be able to act-
ively create pulses with randomised phases between states. This section will describe how
we can utilise gain-switching to create phase randomised windows and intensity modulation
to create well-defined pulses.
To verify that the WCPs are phase randomised, we can use coincidence counts between
neighbouring pulses while both lasers are active. By this, we mean that we will look at events
that occurred in the two detectors, but were separated by a time bin. This is shown in figure
3.18 where we introduce the time bins ti and ti−1. Events that happened in the same time bin
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Figure 3.19: Photon flux of the on-chip laser during gain-switching as measured by an SPD. A200ps −1.5 V RF signal is applied to the cavity at 250MHz. The laser power oscillates for 1 nsafter lasing resumes due to mode competition. After stabilising, a 2 ns window can be usedfor coherent state encoding.
will have interfered at the beam splitter so we can verify the HOM visibility. This is shown in
purple. However, we can also look at events that are separated by a time bin (i.e. coincident
events between ti and ti−1) which is shown in red. If the lasers have a coherence time thatis much longer than the separation between the time bins, we would expect to see the same
HOM interference. This is because there will be a fixed phase relationship between the states
sent in time bin ti and ti−1.
However, if we were to phase randomise between these states, it would no longer be true
that there would be a fixed phase relationship so we would see no correlation between sub-
sequent time bins.
Laser gain-switching is a technique used to cause phase randomisation by keeping the
laser below threshold and only applying current when a WCP is desired. As the pulses are lim-
ited to the timing of a spontaneous emission, the timing jitter of the pulses is usually large.
There is also a wavelength broadening meaning that optical filtering is required for HOM inter-
ference [119].
Insteadof gain-switching to generate pulses,we can reverse the high-speedpulse to provide
a negative voltage between pulse carving. These pulses removes the carriers in the diode and
allows the optical cavity to empty to make phase randomised windows. The upper-state life-
time of semiconductors is short, as is the cavity lifetime, meaning this can still be done at a
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Figure 3.20: HOM interference both without (left) and with (right) phase randomisation be-tween pulses. We show the coincidences between pulses that interfered and check the coher-ence with subsequent pulses. In case without phase randomisation, we find a fitted visibilityof 47.3± 1.0% while when actively phase randomising we find 48.1± 1.1% visibility.
high repetition rate.
In figure 3.19, we demonstrate gain-switching the on-chip laser by providing a −1.5 V RF
signal. This drains the cavity so that when lasing resumes the phase will come from a spon-
taneous emission and will be random compared with the previous window. The internal clock
of the PPG was set to 2GHz for this experiment, with a pulse being sent by each transmitter
every 8 clock cycles giving a state repetition rate of 250MHz.
After the negative signals, the lasing oscillates before returning to a continuous (and use-
ful) lasing mode. These oscillations can be attributed to mode competition in the laser cav-
ity and also ringing in the RF signal. Therefore, we can still generate states at 250MHz and
demonstrate good state preparation through intensity modulation.
In figure 3.20, we demonstrate two HOM fringes without (left) and with (right) active phase
randomisation between states. The two independent lasers are never coherent as they are in-
dependently driven. Both experiments see a visibility of more than 47%. When the pulses are
coherent, we see a partial relationship between the pulses as the relative wavelength between
the lasers changes. If there was complete coherence, this would be a sinusoidal fringe as
subsequent pulses tune in and out of phase (similar to the error fringe from Bell state projec-
tions seen in the next chapter). After phase randomisation, we find no relationship between
coincidences of subsequent pulses.
We have demonstrated that by combining gain-switching and intensity modulation of an
integrated CW laser can produce phase randomised WCPs. The states are capable of HOM in-
terferencemaintaining a comparable visibility to state-of-the-art without requiring any external
wavelength filtering.
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3.11 Outlook
In this chapter, we have demonstrated state-of-the-art Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between
independent, integrated photonic devices. By utilising monolithically fabricated lasers and
EOPMs, we generatedWCPswith precise control over all degrees of freedom. By changing the
relative wavelength of the devices, we demonstrated aHOMdipwith a visibility of 46.5± 0.8%.
Further, we demonstrate gain-switching of the on-chip laser to provide actively phase random-
ised pulses.We show that the introduction of phase randomisation doesn’t reduce the visibility
of the interference and also doesn’t require the pulses to be wavelength filtered.
The stability and scalability of this integrated platform makes it a good contender for ac-
cessible metropolitan QKD. This demonstration is the first step towards chip-based MDI-QKD
which facilitates resource sharingwithout sacrificing security by introducing trusted nodes. Ac-
cess can be provided through the cheap and scalable InP platform, while expensive resources,
such as SPDs, optical switches and time taggers can be shared between all users. The flex-
ibility of the integrated photonic platform allows increased rates through wavelength division
multiplexing [153] and enables fully integrated systems through on-chip detection [154] further
reducing a major barrier towards widespread quantum secure communications.
3.11.1 Active Stabilisation
Performing this experiment in a controlled laboratory environment is obviously favourable for
prolonged operation over several hours. However, as the aim will be to create devices that
can be deployed on real-world networks, the systems will need to compensate for drifts in the
fibres and electronic control.
Polarisation drifts could be stabilised by using the unused arm of the PBS. An electrically
controlled polarisation rotator could employ a feedback loop to reduce the power of the un-
used arm. At the single-photon level, the number of detection events on an SPD can be used as
feedback to the control system and the polarisation rotated to maximise the extinction ratio.
It has been demonstrated in field trials that polarisation in deployed fibre is more favourable
with regards to polarisation drift than spooled lab fibre [155].
Wavelength can be stabilised using the visibility of HOM interference by minimising co-
incidences. By changing the current one transmitter, the wavelength can be precisely tuned.
While this will change the power of the laser, if only small changes in current are required then
this power change will be negligible.
Timing stabilisation can be achieved by looking at the time of arrival of the pulses. In partic-
ular, the FWHMcan be used to ensure that the pulses are overlapped i.e.minimising the FWHM
in the histogram of detection events means that the pulses will be maximally overlapped.
Given a good current source to drive the laser, the average photon number is unlikely to
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change dramatically. On-chip fast photodiodes can be used to locally monitor the power to
provide any required feedback. Having fibres fixed to the chips with UV cured glue will remove
any change in loss from fibre coupling.
3.11.2 Wavelength Division Multiplexing
Asmentioned previously, there is no need to filter the pulses to see interference. This is import-
ant as it allows the transmitters to be easily wavelength tunedmaking it compatible withWDM
and possible classical-quantum multiplexing. An interesting demonstration of this would be
to multiplex the quantum signals with classical data to verify that quantum interference can
still be seen. This could be an important consideration for compatibility with future networks.
One would need to consider cross-talk from neighbouring channels to ensure maximal inter-
ference.
3.11.3 DFB Laser
The delay caused by the laser relaxation after phase randomisation could be reduced by using
a distributed feedback (DFB) laser. DBR lasers will take time to relax after gain-switching as
the cavity will support many modes until a single mode becomes dominant. This behaviour
is shown in figure 3.19 where the laser oscillates before becoming more stable. DFB lasers










The work in this chapter made used of devices conceived and designed by Mark Thompson
and Mark Godfrey. Mark Godfrey compiled the chip mask that was then fabricated by Oclaro.
The experimental setup was modified from the previous chapter with support from Philip Sib-
son. FPGA and RF electronic design was supported by Andy Hart. I performed the experiment
and analysed the data to estimate key rates. Security analysis of the transmitters was per-
formed in collaboration with The National Physical Laboratories using an FPGA programmed
by Andy Hart. I developed the experiment and operated the integrated transmitters. The integ-
rated receiver concept was designed by Nicola Tyler, Philip Sibson, Jorge Barreto and Mark
Thompson. Silicon devices were fabricated in Glasgow in the group of Robert Hadfield. I per-
formed analysis and simulation of an measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution system with estimated parameters to inform fabrication decisions. Initial tests of com-
ponents was performed by Ben Slater and Robert Heath but are not included in this thesis.
Parts of this chapter have been published and are available in references [103,104,156]. Where
appropriate, text and figures have been reused that had been written or created by me.
4.1 Introduction
Quantum technologies promise a paradigm shift compared to their classical counterparts that
will undermine our current methods of secure communication [1]. It will soon become neces-
sary to deploy key exchange systems that are immune to such increases in computing power.
As introduced previously, quantum key distribution (QKD) is one such approach which exploits
quantum phenomena to exchange secret keys between distant parties without relying on as-
sumed computationally hard problems [3,4]. However, the stringent requirements for precise
control has predominately limited QKD systems to small networks and laboratories. To realise
ubiquitous quantum devices, new platforms are required for robust operation in harsh envir-
onments.
The integrated photonics platform, that was utilised in chapter 3, has seen vast improve-
ments in recent years and represents a promising platform for mass-adoption of quantum
technologies [157]. In particular, indium phosphide (InP) offers crucial benefits for commu-
nication in a robust, phase-stable and compact platform including monolithically integrated
lasers with mW powers and narrow linewidths. We saw that fast electro-optic phase modula-
tion allowmanipulation of light at a bandwidth of 10GHz. Using the same components, we can
encode timing and phase on states of light which makes the platform well suited for quantum
communication protocols [9].
Quantum-secured communication has been a leading quantum technology since its ad-
vent [3, 4] and has seen many proof-of-principle demonstrations, networks and commercial
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systems [136, 137, 158–160]. However, implementation security of these systems is an active
area of research due to potential information leakage that is not considered in security proofs.
Such side-channels may allow an eavesdropper to gain sensitive information during a key ex-
change [161] or an attacker to manipulate a system and determine the secret key through
classical means [81, 162].
To counter these attacks fromMallory through uncharacterised side-channels, device-inde-
pendent QKD schemes have been developed to limit the number of assumptions required
for security [163]. One such prominent vulnerability is with single-photon detectors (SPDs)
for which measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) has been proposed [7]. This ap-
proach removes all possible attacks against the detection system.
In this chapter, we experimentally demonstrate MDI-QKD using cost-effective, mass man-
ufacturable, chip-based transmitters that could facilitate commercial quantum-secured com-
munication. We show that 1 kbps of secret key can be exchanged at 100 km and predict posit-
ive key rates atmore than 350 km. The system removes detector vulnerabilities and represents
a viable solution for near-term metropolitan quantum networks.
4.2 Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
Device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) protocols were invented out of a necessity to counter de-
velopments by the quantum hacking community [6]. Systems that were thought to be secure
would readily leak information to an adversary through uncharacterised or overlooked side-
channels [161]. While there are proven methods of removing these attacks from a system [88],
the attacks must first be publicly known. Therefore, any such countermeasures provide no
guarantee against future attacks that may be present in a system.
DI-QKD removes all assumptions about the physical system apart from two. The only as-
sumptions required about the system are
1. Alice and Bob have their own devices that are spatially isolated.
2. All parties (Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eve and Mallory) must obey quantum mechanics.
The assumptions don’t require Alice or Bob to trust the devices they are given, and it could
be assumed that an adversarywas preparing the quantumstates. Through aBell test, Alice and
Bob can verify that their protocol was secure, regardless of whether they trust the equipment.
While DI-QKD maximises security, the difficulties of performing a loophole free bell test mean
that proposed protocols are not yet a practical method of key exchange. Loophole-free tests
have been performed but require low-loss links and high detection efficiency [41–43].
To increase security in a practical way, new device-independent protocols were developed.
MDI-QKD removes all potential side channels on the detection system which could be ex-
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Figure 4.1: MDI-QKD protocol schematic for time-bin encoding. Alice and Bob act symmet-rically by generating BB84 states and sending them to Charlie, an untrusted third party, overquantum channels. Charlie projects the states in the Bell basis and announces all success-ful events. Alice and Bob can then infer a key after sharing state basis information over anauthenticated classical channel which can be public.
ploited by a malicious adversary [7]. A schematic of the experiment is shown in figure 4.1.
Unlike traditional point-to-point protocols, Alice and Bob act symmetrically by sending Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) states to a third party, Charlie. Upon receipt of the states, Charlie meas-
ures the states in the Bell basis and publicly announces all successful events. The outcomes
indicate quantum correlations between states but, without encoding knowledge known only
by Alice and Bob, reveal no information about the secret key. This allows Charlie to be com-
pletely untrusted and it could even be assumed that Eve or Mallory is operating the receiver
without compromising the security. By sharing the basis information for each state, Alice and
Bob are able to infer a secret key which can be used in a symmetric key algorithm.
As we use a weak coherent source, we need to estimate the number of single-photon
events. We employ a four-intensity decoy state analysis [164] to bound the single-photon er-
rors and yields. In this protocol, the Z basis is used to generate key while theX basis bounds
the knowledge of an eavesdropper.
While MDI-QKD typically offers a lower key rate at short distances when compared with
point-to-point systems [9], it can generate a positive key rate at greater distances [158] as the
errors are proportional to the square of the dark count probability. It also offers the potential
for themeasurement equipment to be shared betweenmultiple parties through optical switch-
ing without compromising security. The protocol removes the asymmetry between Alice and
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Bob which allows for simpler metropolitan networks without reducing security by introducing
trusted nodes.
4.2.1 Protocol
Here, we outline more explicitly the protocol that Alice and Bob will use to distribute their
random secret. A schematic of the protocol is shown in figure 4.1.
1. Preparation Alice and Bob, independently and randomly, choose weak coherent states
(WCSs) from the four BB84 states: |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉. They will also choose an intensity, at
random, to satisfy a decoy state protocol. The bases choices do not need to be equally
weighted and the optimal choices will depend on the gains and errors in a finite key
regime. Both the state and intensity choice should remain secret at this stage. These
states are then sent to Charlie via the quantum channels.
2. Measurement Upon receipt of the states fromAlice and Bob, Charlie performs a joint Bell
state projection. The physical projection will depend on the encoding used. In a time-bin
encoding scheme, coincidences between early and late clicks of two detectors indicates
|ψ±〉 projections, as shown in figure 4.2. Using linear optics, it is only possible to project
onto two of the four Bell states [165, 166]. However, security can be guaranteed even if
projection onto only one Bell is possible.
3. Announcement Each successful projection is publicly announced by Charlie, along with
timing information. Unsuccessful events (those that are not coincidence clicks) are not
required for the key exchange. However, they can be useful as feedback to Alice and Bob
to calibrate their systems.
4. Basis Discussion Alice and Bob each announced the basis chosen for each successful
projection, but not their chosen bit. When their bases choices were the same, they can
use the rules in table 4.1 to determine a shared key. In each case (except where they both
sent in theX basis and the outcome was |ψ+〉) either Alice or Bob flips their bit.
5. Parameter Estimation Using the public information from Charlie about successful pro-
jections, Alice and Bob can calculate error rates and gains to bound the knowledge of
Eve. They can then apply error correction and privacy amplification on their secret bit
string, as required.
MDI-QKD has been used to demonstrate key rates at distances much further than those
possible with traditional point-to-point systems [158]. This is due to how the signal rate com-
pares with the error rate. The distance limitation of a QKD system is when the probability of a
successful event becomes on the order of a error due to the dark count rate of the system. In a
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Basis |ψ−〉 |ψ+〉
Z Bit flip Bit flip
X Bit flip -
Table 4.1: Post-selection rules of measurement outcomes in different bases. If Alice and Bobsent states in the same basis, one of them will have to bit-flip unless they both chose the Xbasis and the result was |ψ+〉.
QKD system, we need to compare the probability of a pulse being transmitted over an optical
fibre and being detected by the system. So for some WCS with intensity µ and detector with
efficiency η, we have the probability of a successful event being
1− e−10
0.2·L/10·µ·η (4.1)
for some distance L between Alice and Bob and assuming 0.2 dB/km loss from optical fibres.
A given detection system will have a probability of dark count that we will call P d.c.. So for
a protocol such as BB84, when we have
P d.c. ≈ 1− e−10
0.2·L/10·µ·η (4.2)
then the system will no longer be able to generate a positive key rate as the dark counts will
dramatically increase the error rate in the system.
In comparison, an MDI-QKD system looks for coincidence measurements between detect-
ors to indicate successful events. Therefore, for the same distance of fibre between Alice and
Bob, the limit will be on the square of the dark count rate i.e. (P d.c.)2. While the requirement
for coincidences for a projection will also limit the number of successful events, the quadratic
reduction in errors will allow key generation at much further distances.
This is only a limiting factor if the dark count rate of the detector system is significant.
Recent advances in superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) have shown
that SNSPDs can run for many hours without a single dark event [110]. Then standard point-to-
point links can show positive key rates at more than 400 km [167].
4.2.2 Bell State Projection
To understand how the states are projected in the Bell basis, consider the entangled states in
a time-bin encoding
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where e and l refer to early and late time-bins of the state. Considering the Bell states incident




































So we find that by just using a beam splitter and threshold detectors, it isn’t possible to
distinguish |Φ±〉 states. We can actually go further with this statement to say that only two
of the four Bell states can be detected simultaneous with linear optics [165, 166]. However,
through coincidences between time of arrival of the photons at the detectors, we can project
onto |ψ±〉 states. These projections are shown in figure 4.2 where the photons interfere on a
50:50 beam splitter and timing information of successful detections can be correlated.
4.2.3 Security and Key Rate Estimation
The security of QKD protocols is founded in the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics.
When Alice and Bob send their single photons, they can be sure that Eve cannot faithfully
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duplicate the states to copy the information. However, Alice and Bob will not be sending true
single photons, but instead will send weak coherent states. As there is the possibility of multi-
photon events, regardless of how small, Alice and Bobwill need to bound the number of events
that were true single photon events. It is commonplace to use a decoy state protocol, where
Alice and Bob vary the average intensities of their states at random [168]. It is possible to
perform secure QKDwithout decoy state analysis, but the key rates are drastically reduced [59].
For a decoy state protocol, the estimated key rate of MDI-QKD per pulse in the asymptotic












where Y Z11 andEX11 are the yield in the Z basis and error in theX basis, respectively, when AliceandBob both sent single photons. These quantities are not directlymeasurable sowewill need
to bound them using a decoy state protocol.QZS,S andEZS,S are the gain and error in theZ basisand both can be measured directly. pz is the probability that Alice and Bob choose to send astate in the Z basis. In a biased-basis scheme, this can be chosen arbitrarily to maximise key
rate provided that finite key effects are accounted for. In the asymptotic limit, this will be set
to 1. Finally, we introduce the error correction inefficiency, fe > 1, which is typically 1.16 andthe binary entropy function defined as
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). (4.9)
As we are not using single photons, we cannot determine the single photon errors and
yields exactly. Therefore, we need to use a decoy state technique [59] to give lower and upper
bounds of Y Z11 and EX11, respectively. We then need to define the lower bound of the secret keyrate as
R ≤ R (4.10)
In essence, decoys states are measuring the loss of the channel during a key exchange
to bound the knowledge that could be gain by an eavesdropper. By Alice and Bob sending
























where µa (µb) are the intensities of Alice’s (Bob’s) pulses. The gain, Qiµσ , is defined to be thenumber of successful Bell state projections when Alice and Bob send states in either the basis
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i with intensities µ and σ, respectively. These measurable values provide a set of linear equa-
tions which can be used to bound the yield and errors for single photon events.
In this experiment, we used a four intensity decoy state protocol [164] where we consider
four sources: ν, σ, µ, s. The ν source is vacuum, σ and µ are decoy pulses in the X basis with
average photon numbers σ and µ, respectively. Finally, the s source emits pulses with intensity
s in the Z basis only. We will assume that Alice and Bob use the same intensities. In an MDI-
QKD protocol, we use the X basis to bound the knowledge of Eve or Mallory and the Z basis
to generate key. This is due to the minimum possible error of 25% in theX basis [136] which in
turn is due to the reducedHong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) visibility possible with coherent states [134].
This can be understood by separating the possible cases into those that interfered, and those
that didn’t. Of those that interfered, we would expect no errors. Of those that didn’t interfere,
there is a 50% chance of error.
From the measurable equations 4.11 and 4.12, we can calculate an lower bound on the



































































where the lower bound of Y X11 from above is used. Both the single-photon yield and error iscalculated from experimental values (such as those provided in appendix A) to determine an
estimated key rate.
4.2.4 Model
From the parameters of the system (photon numbers and errors), we can create a model to
verify that the system behaves as expected. This will also allow us to predict the performance
of the system at further distances without needing to gather data for days or weeks.
The detectors used in this systemare SNSPDs due to their high efficiency and low recovery-
time and jitter [111]. The detectors operate at 80% efficiency, with a dead-time of <100 ns and
jitter of 30 ps. The average photon number per state is calibrated before a key exchange by
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EXµaµb µ σ ν
µ 30% 40% 50%
σ 40% 30% 50%
ν 50% 50% 50%
Table 4.2: Estimated errors that were used to characterise the Z basis errors that are basedon HOM interference and similar papers.
estimating the losses through the system and detection efficiency. The efficiency of detec-
tion should also include the losses associated with fibre components preceding detection i.e.
polarisation control. In this system, the loss is around 1 dB.
The gain of the system,Q{X,Z}µa,µb , is the probability of projection onto a Bell state in either the
X or Z basis. We can estimate the gain from the average photon number of each transmitter,
the detection efficiency and the transmitters loss. We will assume that the transmission loss
is the standard 0.2 dB/km, although fibre optic losses can be as a low as 0.14 dB/km [170]
while fibres with 0.17 dB/km loss are commercially available [171]. The gain is independent of






1− exp(−10− 0.2×L2×10 µaη))× (1− exp(−10− 0.2×L2×10 µbη))+Qd.c. (4.15)
where Qd.c. are the successful projections that are because of dark counts in the system. As
SNSPDs have dark counts of 100Hz this value is typically (10−6)2 for the chosen gating win-
dow. The value is quoted as squared as we are looking for coincidences between the two
detectors.
The 3/8 pre-factor is due to the probability of a successful projection given two random
states sent by Alice and Bob. One half of the time, the states will be projected onto a Bell state
that cannot be determined by themeasurement device [165,166]. Of the remainder, one half will
be projected successfully onto |ψ−〉 (1/4 of the total states), while with probability 1/2 they will
be successfully projected onto |ψ+〉 (1/8 of the total states). We will see later that by increasing
the number of detectors in the receiver, this can be increased closer to the maximum of 1/2.
To calculate the probability of coincidence from the coherent states, we will use the same
derivation from chapter 3. However, here the distance L, which measures the distance be-
tween Alice and Bob, is halved. This is because Charlie will sit at a centralised location. We
will assume that this is half way between Alice and Bob, so theWCSs from Alice and Bob need
to only travel half the distance.
Tomodel the errors, we need to include contributions fromdark counts in the systemwhich
will have an error probability of 50%. Therefore, the corrected error rate will be
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where ε{X,Z}m,n are the error rates during a key exchange which will need to estimated from anexperiment to accurately model the system. In the equation, the dark events are subtracted
from the gain which can then be multiplied by the system error rate. The dark count events
can then be considered separately. Positive key rate should be possible until the signal gain is
on the order of the dark events.
By using thismodel, we can start to understand how the systemshould behave. Aswe have
shown that we can control independent devices well enough to show good HOM interference,
the rest of the errorswill come fromencoding the states. Fromsimilar papers, we can estimate
what we would expect theX basis errors to be [136, 137]. These are given in table 4.2. Setting
the photon numbers to 0.2 in the Z basis and 0.1 and 0.01 for the X basis decoy states, we
can model what error rates are required in the Z basis.
In figure 4.3, we show the dependence ofZ basis errors on the key rate at varying distances.
By using predicted values for the X basis, we can vary the Z basis error to find the limit of
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Figure 4.4: Microscope image of the 6× 2mm2 indium phosphide transmitter. The complex-ity possible with integrated photonics is demonstrated by having two separate distributedBragg reflector (DBR) cavity lasers, three Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs), an asym-metric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (aMZI) and a high-bandwidth photodiode (PD). Light iscoupled to fibre through spot-size converters (SSCs) at the edges of the chip.
positive key generation. We find that to generate positive key rates at more than 100 km we
will require that the error must be below 1%. This means that we will need to improve the
extinction ratio of the pulses in chapter 3 to reduce the time-encoding error. At distances of
more than 300 km, even more stringent requirements on the Z basis error are found.
4.2.5 Shared Resources
As MDI-QKD introduces Charlie to mediate the key exchange, this easily facilitates sharing re-
sources by switching between users connecting to a centralised node. In a metropolitan net-
work, each user can access the quantum network with a transmitter device and simple optical
switching allows all users to exchange secret keyswith every other user. Such optical switches
are already available commercially with less than 1 dB insertion loss which is acceptable for
QKD systems [172].
While superconducting detectors are currently considered research equipment, there have
been many advances in the technology of both the detector fabrication and cryogenic coolers
which means that widespread adoption of SNSPDs should be anticipated. More advanced
quantum networks will be heavily dependant on the unrivalled specifications that SNSPDs
offer. Moreover, the potential for waveguide integrated detectors [111–113], fast modulation
at cryogenic temperatures [173] and wavelength demultiplexing [174] means that an MDI-QKD
system could benefit from further photonic integration.
4.3 Integrated Transmitters
InP transmitters provide all the required optical components to create high fidelity BB84 states
as required forMDI-QKD. By using chip-based transmitters the power, size andweight of the re-
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Figure 4.5: A schematic view of each chip used in the MDI-QKD protocol. Electro-optic phasemodulators (EOPMs) and multi-mode interferometers (MMIs) are used to encode time-binstates. T. Enc is used to intensity modulate the continuous wave laser to encode timinginformation, I. Mod varies the pulse intensity for decoy state preparation and Ph. Enc en-codes phases between the time-bins. The semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) can be gainswitched for phase randomisation and a fast photodiode (PD) provides on-chip feedback.
quired optical components can be dramatically reduced compared to fibre (and free-space) al-
ternatives. Monolithic fabrication also facilitates massmanufacture without requiring manual
assembly which would further decrease cost and increase availability.
It is worth noting that the technology is still maturing and optimisation of designs is still
required before devices can be confidently reproduced to a required standard for secure com-
munication. The transmitters used for this experiment (figure 4.4) were originally designed to
operate as transceiver modules which would allow two-way operation. The delay line in the
centre of the device could be used for encoding and decoding time-bin encoded states. How-
ever, thewaveguideswere found to be too lossy to be useful, showing how further optimisation
of designs is required. The design of such a delay line is challenging as the loss in a waveguide
can be as high as 2 dB/cm [125]. For a 500ps delay in a material with a refractive index of 3,
the loss could be as high as 10 dB before considering bend losses. These losses are mostly
linked to waveguide roughness and two-photon and free carrier absorption in InP [128].
A schematic of the chip is shown in figure 4.5 to clarify which parts of the chip shown in
figure 4.4 are used for this experiment. Cascaded Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) are
used to encode time, phase and intensity onto WCSs. We will encode our quantum states in a
time-bin encoding scheme and the four BB84 states are shown in figure 4.6. The early and late
time-bins of the states will be our |0〉 and |1〉 states where a superposition of these creates
more complicated states. A relative phase can be applied between the time-bins for a full
encoding. We will define the |+〉 state to be when the two time-bins are in phase. To encode a
|−〉 state, we need to apply a π phase shift between time-bins.
In this section, we will describe the operation of the transmitters to create weak coherent
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Figure 4.6: BB84 states in a time-bin encoded scheme. Pulses are separated by a time ∆twhere the timing forms the computational basis. A late pulse indicates a |0〉 while an earlypulse indicates a |1〉. |+〉 and |−〉 states can be realised through superposition of early andlate pulses with relative phases. The intensity of the pulses in the X basis is halved so thatthe average photon number over the states remains constant between bases.
devices for use in MDI-QKD systems.
4.3.1 On-Chip Laser
To generate WCSs, we will utilise the on-chip laser that was described in chapter 3. The Fabry-
Pérot laser demonstrates a narrow linewidth to ensure coherence within a time-bin encoded
state. The wavelength tunability of the laser through DBR current injection, temperature and
semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) current injection will allow the wavelengths of separate
devices to be precisely overlapped. We will also be able to exploit the short upper state and
cavity lifetimes to create phase randomised pulses. This method is described in more detail
in section 3.10.
4.3.2 Timing Encoding
The early and late time-bins of the state will be the logical |0〉 and |1〉 states, respectively. There-
fore, we need to be able to create distinct pulses in either time-bin i.e. there should be a good
extinction ratio between the two time-bins. As we are using a continuous wave (CW) laser as
our light source, it will need to be intensity modulated to encode time. From the previous sec-
tion, we saw that the error of the timing encoding will need to be very low to ensure positive
key generation at long distances.
As in the previous chapter, time encoding the states will be performed using an Mach-
Zehnder interferometer to carve the CW laser into 130 ps pulses. To increase the extinction
ratio of the pulses compared to the previous experiment, the RF signal from the driving elec-
tronics was amplified to increase the possible voltage swing to 4Vpp.
To encode a state in the diagonal basis, the MZI carves two pulses in quick succession.
This requires that the coherence length of the laser is longer than the pulse separation to
ensure coherence within a state.
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Figure 4.7: Schematic for the MZI which is used to encode a π phase. θ and phi are phasesapplied by themodulators andψ{in,out} are the input and output states from theMZI, as shown.
The reduction in intensity for the decoy states could be realised by reducing the voltage
of the RF signal driving the T. Enc MZI. However, this would reduce the extinction ratio of the
pulses in the Z basis and would introduce more errors for the decoy states. Instead, we will
introduce another component below to perform intensitymodulation below allowing the entire
state to be intensity modulated and maintaining a high extinction ratio.
4.3.3 Phase Encoding
Typically, phase encoding would be performed using a fast, phase modulator. However, the
losses associated with the quantum-confined stark effect (QCSE) mean that applying a π
phase between early and late time-bins would also cause a drastic change in intensity. This
could compromise security as the intensities between |+〉 and |−〉 states would be different.
Therefore, instead of using a single modulator to encode phases between time-bins, we
can use an MZI in a push-pull method. Consider an MZI with θ phase on the top arm and φ
phase on the bottomwhere ψin and ψout are the input and output states as shown in figure 4.7.








We can consider applying two sets of phases to the modulators. Firstly, if we apply ϑ to








While, if we were to reverse how the phases were applied, and have no phase on the top
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which represents a π phase shift between the two outcomes. Therefore, to apply a phase shift
to encode the |−〉, we should switch between the two cases for the early and late time-bins.
This avoids the loss associated with the QCSE effect whilst also reducing the voltage required
for phase encoding. The value of ϑ will not affect the phase relationship but will change the
intensity of the output state ψout.
4.3.4 Phase Randomisation
For the security of the protocol, we need to ensure that the states are phase randomised so that
the output photon statistics are Poissonian for decoy state estimation. We can use the gain
switching demonstrated in chapter 3 to ensure that subsequent states are phase randomised.
We of course still require that early and late time-bins within a state are phase coherent.
A negative pulse can be used to gain switch the on-chip laser in between states to random-
ise the phase. This RF signal allows the cavity and conduction band time to empty meaning
that lasing will continue from a spontaneous emission. As the lasing resumes, mode compet-
ition and electrical ringing will cause oscillations in the output power. After around 1 ns, these
oscillations relax and the laser resumes in a continuous wave operation. We can then encode
timing and phase information. As the laser has relaxed into continuous operation, the states
will be single moded in frequency allowing phase coherent time-bins and meaning that wave-
length filtering is not required beyond the integrated laser cavity. More detail can be found in
chapter 3.
4.3.5 Chip-Generated BB84 States
In figure 4.8, we showhistogramsof the four time-bin encodedBB84 states generated from the
InP devices. We demonstrate a 500ps separation, 130 ps full width at half maximum (FWHM)
pulses with an extinction ratio of more than 30dB. For the diagonal states, the intensity be-
tween early and late time-bins remains constant. The intensities are normalised and the in-
tensities of the diagonal states will be determined through the decoy state preparation in the
next section. Laser gain switching is applied between each state to ensure phase randomisa-
tion. This has the added effect of reducing the total number of counts per second allowing
higher photon number per pulse before detector saturation.
4.3.6 Decoy State Preparation
While the absorption of the QCSE is an issue when encoding phase, it can be used to vary
the intensity for decoy state preparation. The effect has a bandwidth of >10GHz so a single
electro-optic phase modulator (EOPM) can be used. By biasing a modulator in the circuit to
9V below the chip ground, we can quickly modulate with around 2Vpp to vary the intensityby 15 dB. We are also able to choose whether we pulse the intensity MZI which creates the
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of the phase randomised BB84 states generated from the InP trans-mitters using cascaded Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs). The timing encoding demon-strates a 30dB extinction ratio and a 130ps FWHM. The timing information is not correctedfor detector or timing jitter. Intensities of states are normalised as their true intensities willchange during the decoy state preparation.
pulses which can be useful for encoding a vacuum state with an intensity of 30 dB below that
of signal states.
As the intensities of the decoy states are not fixed by the protocol, we will need to model
how these intensities will vary the secret key rate. It has been previously shown that reducing
the intensity of decoy states will increase the secret key rate [175]. However, wewill still require
enough successful events to bound the knowledge of Eve or Mallory.
4.3.7 State Choice
In a QKD system, the states should be chosen randomly. However, for simplicity in this proof-
of-principle experiment the states send by Alice and Bob are a fixed pattern chosen to gather
statistics of all of the possible combination of states required for key rate estimation. States
that play no part in key rate estimation (for example when Alice sends a state in X and Bob
in Z) are deliberately removed. In the asymptotic limit, sending these states would not impact
the key rate. We will discuss later how these sorts of states would need to be considered in a












Figure 4.9: The experiment required a number of pieces of equipment to control the trans-mitters and provide synchronisation signals for the detection. This figure shows the “controlplane” of the experiment and howAlice, Bob andCharlie were connected. The experiment useda single computer to control all three parties.
4.4 Control Electronics
In order to operate the transmitters, there is a selection of control devices needed. In this
section we will describe them. An overview of the electronic control is shown in figure 4.9
which shows how the transmitters are controlled, as well as the data links to the receiver. A
centralised computer controls Alice, Bob and Charlie.
4.4.0.1 Temperature Control
Two Arroyo 6301 are used to stabilise the temperature of each transmitter independently. A
10 kΩ thermistor is put into the base of the transmitter package as close as possible to the
transmitter. Thermal paste is used to ensure a good thermal contact to the mount and the
silver epoxy used for the chips provides a good thermal contact to the chip. A peltier is used
to heat and cool the package through a thermo-electric effect and can be driven with up to 3A
of current. The transmitters dissipate very little heat as most of the operation relies on electro-
optic effects. Some heating is caused by thermo-opticmodulation (<100mWper thermo-optic
phasemodulator (TOPM)) and laser driving. The temperatures are chosen to be above the am-
bient room temperature and also to overlap the wavelengths between the two lasers. Typical
temperatures were between 25 ◦C and 30 ◦C, required around 100mA from the Arroyo con-
troller and had an instability of less than 0.01 ◦C. Good temperature stability of the chips is
important as much of the optical circuit is temperature sensitive. A change in temperature will
cause the cavity to expand or contract to change the wavelength. It can also cause a change
in the operating conditions of the MZIs due to phase differences in the top and bottom arms
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Figure 4.10: By applying a DC bias over each arm of the MZI we can characterise the per-formance. When no thermo-optic phase compensation is applied, the possible extinction ra-tio is reduced. The loss between the arms means that the QCSE can’t be used to compensatetheir phase difference. When current is passed over one arm to compensate for the phasemismatch (44mA), the MZI is symmetric and allows a much larger intensity swing at lowervoltages.
or varying splitting ratios in the multi-mode interferometers (MMIs).
4.4.0.2 Laser Driver
The same Arroyo 6301 boxes also provided stable current sources to drive the on-chip lasers.
The lasers show a threshold current around 12mA (figure 3.4) and can be driven with voltages
above 100mA. Aswell as an increase in power, an increase in current will provide awavelength
shift due to heating in the cavity. With a current precision of 0.01mA, the wavelength of the
laser can be controlled in steps of 80 fm through heating and carrier effects in the SOA. This
provides the find control for high-fidelity overlap between independently operated transmitters.
4.4.0.3 Phase Modulator Biasing
For the QCSE, a reverse bias over the modulator was required. DC driving electronics provided
the reverse bias while bias tees combined the DC and RF signals for high-speed operation. A
range from 0 to −10V was possible and optimal conditions depended on device and purpose.
For example, extinction ratio was found to be best at −9V for intensity modulation. However,
phase encoding would only require −7V.
Ideally, the light in an MZI would experience the same phase in both arms. However, due to
fabrication imperfections and tolerances, the light in each arm accumulates a different phase,














Figure 4.11: Oscilloscope data of the electrical signals required for the BB84 states. P. Mod isused to create the pulses, Ph. Rand for gain switching the laser, Ph. Enc. for phase encodingand Int. Mod for decoy state preparation.
the phase dependent loss mean that the extinction ratio would be reduced as the intensity of
light would be different in each arm. Instead, we can exploit an imperfection in the EOPMs
which causes a resistance of around 10Ω. By passing a current through the modulator on one
arm of a MZI, we can adjust the relative phase which will minimise the MZI output intensity.
Figure 4.10 shows how heating along one side of the MZI corrects for the different phases.
When the MZI is operated without correction, the phase dependent loss associated with the
QCSE doesn’t allow for the light to be easily minimised. However, after thermo-optic phase
modulation is applied, the MZI acts more predictably where equal electro-optic phases mean
that output light is always minimised. This optimisation, will also make finding optimal phase
conditions to apply a π phase between time-bins easier.
4.4.0.4 RF Electronics
Each transmitter requires four high-speed signals for phase randomisation, timing encoding,
intensity modulation and phase encoding. Oscilloscope traces of the electrical pulses used
are shown in figure 4.11. Only the intensity modulation, which is used for the decoy state pre-
paration, requires more than a two-level signal. To create the signal and two decoy intensities,
we will require four different levels which will need to have a high degree of precision. RF sig-
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nals will also be required for synchronisation to the timetagger to consolidator the detection
events with the states that were sent.
In order to generate enough synchronised signals, an arbitrary waveform generator (AWG)
provided a 250MHz signal to two pulse pattern generators (PPGs) and an field-programmable
gate array (FPGA). Each was then clocked at 2GHz allowing early and late time-bins to be
500ps separated. The AWG could then provide the multi-level signal required for the intensity
modulation.
The phase randomisation and phase encoding was controlled by the PPGs. The laser cav-
ities and SOAs were drained with 1.5 V, 200ps pulses and remained around 0V for the qubit
encoding. The pulse for this needs to have minimal noise as this could interfere with the las-
ing. The relative phases between the time-bins were encoded using square waves where the
pattern was designed such that there are equal on and off states. This meant that the aver-
age voltage for the RF signal remain around 0V meaning modulator biasing didn’t need chan-
ging between sequences. The PPG also provided a 31.25MHz synchronisation signal to the
timetagger through an optical channel.
The FPGA generated the signal for pulse carving which were around 100ps FWHM. From
figure 4.11, the difference between cost-effective solutions and commercial products is evid-
ent. The inter-symbol interference (ISI) from the FPGA means that the second pulse for diag-
onal states has a higher intensity. We also find that the noise after the pulse is increased. The
security implications for these imperfections will be discussed later. For this experiment, the
ISI could be compensated with the rest of the circuit.
4.5 Receiver
The receiver that Charlie will use for MDI-QKD is a projection onto Bell states. Depending on
the encoding, this device used for projection will be slightly different. In a time-bin encoding
scheme, a projection onto |ψ±〉 depending on coincidences between time-bins of the detectors
which is shown in figure 4.2.
4.5.1 Fibre components
The schematic of the Bell state measurements is simple. However, other fibre optic compon-
ents were required to ensure good overlap of the states from Alice and Bob. To correct for
polarisation drift in the fibre, two polarisation controllers were used to rotate the states. In-
dependent polarising beam splitters (PBSs) for Alice and Bob polarised the light which is
then sent into the polarisation maintaining fibre. The PBSs had an extinction ratio of 35 dB.
A polarisation-maintaining fibre beam splitter was used to interfere the states.
The polarisation controllers used here were manually operated. However, commercial po-
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larisation rotators are available which could be used to actively compensate for drifts in fibre.
The unused port of the PBS can be used for active feedback with further single-photon detect-
ors. Alternatively, the polarisation could be converted to a path encoding and compensated
for on chip [176].
After interference, standard single mode fibre can be used as only the time of arrival of the
photons is important. Further 50:50 beam splitters will be used to separate each arm of the
beam splitter to multiple detectors to increase rates.
4.5.2 Detection
SNSPDs are used for detection due to their high efficiency (80%), low dark counts (100 cps),
good timing jitter (30 ps) and short recovery time (100 ns) [106]. Time of arrival is tagged using
a Picoquant Hydraharp which is synchronised with the transmitters using a separate optical
link.
The detectors are biased so to be close to their critical current to maximise detection effi-
ciency which can exceed 80%with these particular detectors. However, there is also an optim-
isation to reduce the number of dark counts. Typically, 80% efficiency can be achieved with
only 100 dark counts per second. The Photonspot systems do not ship with a shunt resistor in
parallel with the nanowire which allows the detector to recover when under bright illumination.
Without this shunt resistor, the detector can latch where the DC current can cause continual
heating in the nanowire which stops it from superconducting. A 50Ω resistor was added to
the system which allows the bias current to pass to ground after the detector has stopped
superconducting.
4.5.3 Banked detectors
Despite the record short recovery time that SNSPDs offer, this time can still be destructive
for fast clocked systems. In a time-bin encoded scheme, it is difficult to detect a |ψ+〉 state
as it would require a coincidence of concurrent time-bins of the same detector, as shown
in figure 4.2. In a 1GHz clocked system, the time-bins are separated by only 1 ns meaning
the recovery time of the detector would need to be less than this. SNSPDs typically have a
detector recovery time on the order of 100 ns meaning that a coincidence between time-bins
is impossible.While superconducting detectors existwith sub-nanoseconddead time, theywill
typically sacrifice efficiency by reducing the length of the nanowire or wavelength tunability by
creating a photonic cavity [112, 113].
In order to increase the possible rates of a time-bin encoded MDI-QKD system, we can
introduce a pseudo-photon-number resolving bank of detectors. Each detection arm of the
measurement beam splitter is further split to many detectors. This allows |ψ+〉 to be detected
with some probability depending on the number of detectors available. This kind of banked
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Figure 4.12: a We plot the effect of the probability of detection, given a detector dead time (innumber of cycles) against distance. b The probability of coincidence is plotted against timewith varied number of detectors in a receiver bank. A photon number of 0.2 is assumed in bothcases and the dashed line is a detector with zero dead time.
detection system also means that we can increase the number of events before saturation of
the detectors.
To characterise the benefits of a banked detector system, we should consider the effect of
deadtime on a SPD. First, we consider the probability of a click, ξ, in an SPD given a coherent
statewith average photon number,µ, somedetection efficiency, η, and dead timeof the system,
k. Consider that that the system is unable to detect a photon for some time after a successful
event and that the probability of detection is the same for each clock cycle. The efficiency is
then modelled as
ξ = (1− exp(10−
0.2·L
2·10 · η · µ)) · (1− ξ)k (4.21)
where k is the number of cycles that the detector is dead i.e. system clock rate multiplied by
detector deadtime. For example, given a 250MHz clock rate and a dead time of 100 ns, we
would have k = 25. The loss from Alice and Bob to Charlie is estimated in the usual way
with 0.2 dB/km and L is the distance between Alice and Bob. For large dead times, this model
has no analytical solution. However, we can numerically estimate what we would expect the
efficiency to be.
First, we consider the effect of dead time against the probability of a detection event as
shown in figure 4.12a. We find that at short distances, the number of dead cycles has a drastic
impact on the probability of detection as the detector is required to recover. If we were to con-
sider a 1GHz system and detectors with 100 ns recovery time, the probability of a successful
event is reduced by about ten times when compared to a systemwith no dead time at 0 km. As
the distance increases, the probability of detection when considering deadtime will converge
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on the ideal case as the photon number will reduce with loss.
In an MDI-QKD system, we will be concerned with detection coincidences to determine
successful Bell state projections.We can use the samemodel above, but square the probability
of a single event assuming that both detectors have the same dead time and efficiency. We
will only look for events where exactly two detectors click, one from either side of the beam
splitter. Therefore, for a bank ofm detectors, we can model the probability of coincidence as
P (coindience) = (m
2
)2
· ξ2 · (1− ξ)m−2 (4.22)
where ξ is the efficiency of a single click from equation (4.21), taking into account that the aver-
age photon number at each detector will be reduced as the number of detectors is increased.
By changing the number of detectors in the bank, we can see how this will affect the coin-
cidence probability as a function of distance. This is shown in figure 4.12b. For short distances,
introducing a bank detection system can increase the probability of detection when compared
to two detectors. This advantage will decrease at further distances as the photon number re-
duces with loss.
There are two things that this model doesn’t consider. First, is the loss of the optical net-
work required to separate the states to the bank of detectors. Commercial fibre components
are well engineered and would introduce minimal losses for the simple task of separating the
light. Second is the increase probability of detecting |ψ+〉. As the number of detectors in a
bank increases, the prefactor of 3/8 can be made arbitrarily close to the theoretical limit of 1/2.
4.5.4 Time Tagging
In order to correlate the detection events, time tagging is required to reconstruct the sequence
of events. This experiment used a PicoQuant Hydraharp to time-tag the four detector events
relative to a synchronisation signal sent from the transmitter control electronics. This can then
be used to determine the time of arrival and correlate each detection event to others and to
the states sent.
For short distances betweenAlice, Bob andCharlie (low loss links), the number of detection
events can exceed ten million counts per second (0.1 photons per pulse at 100MHz). It can be
challenging to extract all events from the time tagger whilst simultaneously correlating events.
To avoid buffer overflow in the timetagger, the timing events were saved directly to a computer
so that the data could be analysed offline. In a commercial system, an FPGA or application-
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) could be developed to directly correlate events to replace the
timetagger and reduce the computational intensity of data analysis.
It is important that the absolute time delay is known so that the states can be faithfully
reconstructed relative to the states sent. For this experiment, the delay between transmitter
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Figure 4.13: By changing the window that we accept a successful measurement, the error rate,gain and secret key rate will be affected. The Z basis error rate increases exponentially whilethe gain will plateau. From this, we can find an optimal point of around 240ps window width.
channels is minimal by design. However, in a real-world key exchange this would need to be
more thoroughly characterised.
As the detection events are first-in first out, we only need to check for coincidences when
we know that the event was in the late time-bin of the qubit. This is because both |ψ±〉 have a
click in both the early and late time-bins. This will reduce the number of unnecessary calcula-
tions we can increase the rate at which the data can be analysed.
4.5.5 Synchronisation
To be able to reconstruct the measurements and match them with the transmitters, a syn-
chronisation signal was provided to the timetagger. The timetagger was then able to provide
exact timing of events for later analysis. An RF signal from one of the PPGs was sent to an
SFP to SMA breakout board (Hi-tech Global SMA-SFP) which converted the electrical signal to
optical. A fibre was used to send the signal to the receiver system and another breakout used
to provide the electrical signal to the timetagger.
4.5.6 Qubit Gating
From time of arrival relative to the sync signal, the detection events are collected into pre-
determined windows which correspond to the early and late time-bins of the qubits. The win-
dow width was varied as there will be a trade-off between the detection probability and the
error rate. As shown in figure 4.3, there is a limit to the error rate that the decoy protocol can
tolerate to generate a positive key rate.
Figure 4.13 shows the effect of changing the gating windows within which events are ac-
cepted. By increasing the window size, the Z basis error will increase as the extinction ratio
in the state generation will be reduced. Similarly, the gain will also increase and both will de-
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Figure 4.14: Schematic of the integrated MDI-QKD experiment. Alice and Bob each operate anintegrated transmitter and send BB84 states over quantum channels to Charlie. The states areprojected in the Bell basis using a banked detection system.
termine the secret key rate. By looking at the key rate generation, we can find a compromise
of window size to maximise performance. After the gain plateaus, the key rate decreases as
it will be determined by the exponentially rising error.
For this experiment, a gating window of 240ps was chosen to maximise gain whilst also
minimising the error at longer distances. From figure 4.3, we found that at longer distances a
lower Z basis error is required.
4.6 Results
Here, wewill discuss the results of the key generation between the two integrated transmitters.
A schematic of the experiment is shown in figure 4.14. Two InP transmitters independently
generate weak coherent BB84 states. These are sent over quantum channels to the receiver,
Charlie. In this experiment, the states are projected in the Bell basis using a fibre beam split-
ter where banked detectors are used to determine successful events which can be publicly
announced.
4.6.1 Calibration and Optimisation
As mentioned before, the MDI-QKD protocol is very dependent on high fidelity HOM interfer-
ence. Therefore, wemust make sure that the two different transmitters have a good overlap in
all degrees of freedom. In this section we will discuss methods used to create indistinguish-
able pulses.
The states from each transmitter are polarised using a PBS and timing can be controlled
using picosecond delays in the RF driving electronics. Photon number is calibrated from the
detectors, where fibre loss and detection efficiency had been previously calibrated.
Phase encoding was the most challenging to calibrate as this would require an independ-
ently calibrated reference. For example, we could use an aMZI and compare the output be-
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Figure 4.15: To overlap the two transmitters in wavelength, we can prepare BB84 states andtune the relative wavelength of the lasers. The change in wavelength will cause HOM inter-ference. However, this will also cause changes in the relative phases between early and latetime-bins. This causes a sinusoidal fringe as the lasers become indistinguishable.
tween |+〉 and |−〉 input states. However, this added complexity to the receiver would either
require optical switching or increased losses.
Alternatively, we can create |±〉 states with one transmitter, and tune the other transmitter
to minimise the error rate. Through the MZI phase encoding, we can create an approximate π
phase just by looking at the intensities of the early and late pulses. When the intensities are
the same, we should expect a good phase encoding, as shown in section 4.3.3 for MZI phase
encoding. This will depend on the time encoding states being the same for the early and late
time-bins. However, ISI can cause the electrical driving voltages to change depending on the
bit string meaning that the intensities can vary. This is shown in figure 4.11 where the P. Mod.
pulses change intensity throughout the sequence. This can also introduce side-channels and
will be discussed later.
In figure 4.15, we show the error dependence on wavelength for both the X and Z bases.
Alice and Bob send a known set of BB84 states to Charlie which allows an error rate to be calcu-
lated.Wewill assume that Alice’swavelengthwill remain fixed andwill stand as the target state
preparation for Bob. As Bob tunes the wavelength of his states, the relative phases between
early and late time-bins will also change. This will mean that his |+〉 and |−〉 states will tune in
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Figure 4.16: We demonstrate positive key rates up to 200 km over an emulated fibre link. Atmetropolitan distances (25 km), we show a key rate of 12.7 kbps is achievable while at 100 km,more than 1 kbps can be exchanged. Using the errors and gains from the system, we modelthat positive key generation is possible at more than 350 km.
the HOM interference, as previously derived. However, the error will oscillate sinusoidally with
the varying phases as the change in wavelength causes different phase dependency between













· cos(β ·∆ω) (4.23)
where β will depend on the separation of the time-bins. This fringe allows a precise overlap
of wavelength through the HOM interference whilst verifying good state preparation in the
diagonal basis. A fit is also shown in figure 4.15 which shows good agreement with the data.
The Z basis measurements are not dependent on HOM interference as successful events
should only occur between non-interfering states (|0〉 and |1〉). This is only dependent on the in-
tensitymodulation of theweak coherent pulses (WCPs). So the error remains constant through
the sweep with an average of less than 1%.
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4.6.2 Key Rate
MDI-QKD was demonstrated between two independent InP devices. Secret key rates were es-
timated over an emulated fibre link (using variable optical attenuators assuming 0.2 dB/km)
and are shown in figure 4.16. Atmetropolitan distances (25 km), key rates ofmore than 12 kbps
are estimated in the asymptotic limit with positive key rates demonstrated up to 200 km. Bey-
ond this distance, the integration time required for a reasonable number detection events in-
creases exponentially. For example, at 300 km we would need to integrate for six days. How-
ever, by characterising the experimental performance, we predict that a quantum-secured key
exchange is possible at distances of more than 350 km.
We show that interference between independent transmitters is possible for 500ps separ-
ated (2GHz clocked) time-bin encoded states with state of the art quantum bit error rates. We
find an error of 30% in theX basis, which is limited to a theoretical minimum of 25%, demon-
strating a good indistinguishability in all degrees of freedom. In the Z basis, we achieve a
quantum-bit error rate of 0.5%.
The mean photon number was 0.2 in the Z basis for the signal states. In the X basis the
mean photon numbers were 0.1 and 0.01 for decoy state analysis. The vacuum state intens-
ities are measured as 5 × 10-4. Low photon numbers were used to limit the saturation of the
detectors at low channel losses and allow positive key generation at further distances. The
transmitter electronics is clocked at 2GHz with a state being sent every 8 clock cycles giving
a 250MHz qubit rate. The bases were biased to produce an equal number of Z andX states,
and therefore each of theX decoy states were sent one third as often as a Z signal state. The
error rates and gains used to calculate the key rate can be found in appendix A.
4.7 Outlook
In this proof-of-principle demonstration, we have extended the functionality of integrated trans-
mitters for measurement-device-independent QKDmaking it a promising platform for ametro-
politan scale quantum-secured network. Building on the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference shown
in chapter 3, we are able to show good interference between independent transmitters whilst
also encoding BB84, time-bin encoded states. The devices show state-of-the-art error rates
allowing predicted positive key rates at distances beyond 350 km.
Integrated photonics offers benefits for future networks with reduced power, weight and
size requirements while simultaneously facilitating increased complexity with inherent phase
stability. Indium phosphide devices are shown as a feasible platform for QKD networks, allow-
ing relatively cost-effective devices to be easily mass manufactured. Integrated laser sources
and efficient phase modulation satisfy all the requirements of high-fidelity quantum state pre-
paration in a single monolithically fabricated platform.
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The topology of MDI-QKD means that citywide resource sharing can be achieved through
commercially available optical switches at an untrusted centralised location. Furthermore,
banks of detectors can be used to increase secret key rates. Advances in cryogenic cooling
mean superconducting detectors are becoming more readily available and will likely be a vital
part of future quantum-compatible networks. Such nodes will form the basis for more com-
plex communication protocols that will require quantum repeaters and photonic information
processing [144].
It is becoming increasingly vital that the future of secure communication is addressed to
counter advances in classical and quantum computing. While quantum key distribution has
been demonstrated as a potential candidate in future networks it has yet to be widely adop-
ted. Concerns of side-channel attacks on physical implementations undermines the security
promises of QKD systems. Here, we have improved on previous demonstrations of integrated
QKD systems by removing all detection side-channels which vastly increases confidence in
the security of the system.Mass-manufacturability and robust operationmean that integrated
systems are poised to create an accessible platform for widespread quantum-secured com-
munication.
4.7.1 Full System Demonstration
This experiment focused on the technology and, thus, it is a proof-of-principle experiment that
dealt with the demonstration of the chips. There are many aspects of a full protocol that will
still need to be added before a key can be exchanged. Not least of which is the distribution of
Alice, Bob and Charlie to separate locations. Such a separation will require extensive feedback
and synchronisation between Alice, Bob and Charlie to minimise error rates. The MDI-QKD
protocol as presented previously would need to be expanded to allow for initialisation between
Alice and Bob.
When estimating the key rate from the experiment, we assumed that we could accurately
estimate the asymptotic limit. To ensure that the single-photon events are accurate Alice and
Bobwould need to have an infinite number of events. In a realistic key exchange, it is necessary
that the number of events will be finite. Therefore, the bounds must be modified to consider
statistical fluctuations in the data set. A method of calculating these statistical variations for
MDI-QKD is given in ref. [164].
Interestingly, when one considers finite-key effects the optimisation of intensities for decoy
states becomes practically challenging. This is, in part, due to a trade-off of security against
size of data set. By increasing the photon number, Alice and Bob can generate a larger data
set more quickly. However, this also gives Eve more opportunity to exploit multi-photon terms.
Such effects have been studied and fast algorithms developed for optimisation [169].
To demonstrate the key exchange, we chose a pre-determined set of states that Alice and
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Figure 4.17: Picture of the specialised FPGA controller (HTG-K800 Xilinx Kintex UltraScale 060FPGA in A1517 package) for integrated QKD. The driver can provide RF and DC signals for high-speed operation as well as stabilisation and laser driving. The board measures only 20 cm inlength which is much more compact that general rack mounted equipment.
Bob would send to Charlie so as to estimate the errors and gains efficiently. However, the
security of QKD requires that the states being sent are independently and randomly chosen.
Quantum random number generator (QRNG) devices have been demonstrated to produce ran-
domness at Gb/s [120,177,178] which also utilise the InP platform. One could imagine a QRNG
and the transmitters in a single design so that all of the optical components could be on a
single photonic integrated circuit (PIC).
One might argue that demonstrating the transmitters without state randomisation would
be invalid as the destructive effects such as ISI could have a detrimental effect on the system.
However, such effects will be present in the driving electronics but should not be inherent
in a modulator provided that the termination and bandwidth are sufficient. InP devices have
previously been demonstrated for QKD with QRNG derived randomness which demonstrates
that ISI effects are not inherent in the devices [9]. The effect of ISI within the driving electronics
will be discussed further in the next section.
4.7.2 Miniaturised Electronics
To truly utilise integrated photonics, dedicated and specialised electronics will need to be de-
veloped which would reduce the power, weight and cost of a system. Here we will discuss one
such attempt to provide specialised driving electronics and consider how choices of driving
electronics will need to be informed by security analysis.
4.7.2.1 Purpose-built FPGA
The integrated transmitters only require a limited number of signals to operate, as shown in
figure 4.11. Therefore, the generalised AWG are overkill and lots of functionality is not utilised.
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By considering what the requirements are, the driving electronics can be reduced to a single
FPGAwhich is shown in figure 4.17. The board can provide RF signals for high-speed operation.
It also has the capability to provide DC signals for thermo-optic phase modulation and laser
driving. Togetherwith a PID controller for temperature stability, an entire QKD transmitter could
be drastically reduced in size. Benefits of specialised driving electronics could also reduce the
driving voltages for modulation as the chip could be closer to the driver. This would reduce the
losses associated with PCB waveguides and connections, especially for the high bandwidth
requirements of communication devices.
However, while the stringent requirements for state generation means that one needs to
be careful with the design of RF electronics for QKD systems. Detrimental effects with RF
electronics can introduce side-channels that can be exploited by Eve or Mallory. By reducing
the cost of the control electronics can also potentially open up the system to attacks due to
inaccuracies in control.
4.7.3 Security Trade-off
While MDI-QKD removes all possible attacks on the detectors, there is still the possibility of
Mallory gaining information by targeting the transmitters. Therefore, the security of the trans-
mitters will still need to be characterised to ensure the security of a key exchange. Many at-
tacks have been demonstrated on different QKD system [179]. However, to date there have
been none demonstrated against integrated devices. Without the technology to relieve all at-
tacks with DI-QKD, we must attempt to characterise the transmitters to mitigate potential at-
tacks or side-channels.
In collaboration with The National Physical Laboratories (NPL), we have performed pre-
liminary characterisation of the integrated devices and their performances. In particular, the
collaboration looked at how cost-effective driving electronics can introduce side-channels
through ISI. This work discusses the necessary trade-off between the cost a system and its
security. The work has been published in reference [156].
ISI is an interference effect where symbols used for communication are distorted by those
sent before. In classical communication, this causes an increase in errors making the channel
less reliable. Such effects can also affect QKD systems.
The quantum states are encoded in WCPs with relative phases between them. Early and
late time-bins are used to create a binary basis and can be used in MDI-QKD, BB84, coherent-
one-way (COW) and differential-phase-shift (DPS) protocols. The intensity preparation of the
states is shown in figure 4.18. The WCPs have, on average, intensities that are less than one
photon. The exactly intensity will depend on the protocol, distance and error rate. However,
it is vital that the intensity of the states is well calibrated to faithfully estimate the number
of single-photons events. A system’s ability to maintain precise levels will be paramount for
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State 1 State 2 State 3
Figure 4.18: States sent to characterise the performance of the chip and FPGA and check forISI. The early and late time-bins are as before. We are only testing the timing encoding and theearly and late time-bins are as before.
its security. By sending and measuring all nine combinations of states we can see where ISI
might impact performance and security of a system.
Recent progress with single-photonmeasurement devices mean that NPL are able to char-
acterise the system at the single-photon level so as to more accurately test a functioning QKD
system. A gated single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) (IDQuantique 210, 300 ps FWHM) was
synchronised to the transmitter FPGA with a tunable delay. The efficiency was 0.02% for this
short gate time. By scanning with the tunable delay, the detector could measure a sequence
of pulses. However, as the gate has some finite width, the detector profile needed to be decon-
volved to recover the true measured signal from the transmitter. The transmitter was operated
at 1.031GHz.
In figure 4.19, we can seemeasured histograms of state sequences generated from an InP
transmitter operated with a specialised FPGA board. By sending all combinations of possible
states we can see evidence of ISI having an effect. When a pulse is succeeded by an empty
time-bin a “shoulder” appears that is about 2 dB above the noise floor. Furthermore, The back-
ground power and maximum intensity of pulses seems heavily dependent on what state has
preceded it. It is not possible to deconvolve the ISI from chip packaging or electronic interfer-
ence. Further investigation would be required as to whether the chip or PCB electrical design
is required to change to reduce electrical reflections or if the FPGA requires attention.
While ISI is a well known effect in classical communication, it may have more serious im-
pacts in quantum communication where the security may be compromised. This initial char-
acterisation demonstrates that measurements of QKD systems at the single-photon level are
possible. This work helped inform standardisation by the Industry Specification Group on QKD
of the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI-ISG-QKD) [180].
4.8 Fully Integrated QKD
The simplicity of the receiver in MDI-QKD lends itself towards an integrated platform [181].
Waveguide integrated single-photon detectors [111], on-chip wavelength demultiplexing [174]
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Figure 4.19:Histogram of states sent by an integrated device using specialised electronics. Bysending different sequences of states we can analyse ISI which might compromise securitythrough side-channels. Figure has been reproduced from [156].
and cryogenic optical switching [173] mean that a completely integrated receiver device could
further decrease the cost of QKD systems. Fully integrated measurement devices facilitate a
drastic increase in the number of detectors to allow a higher count rate before saturation and
relax the need for sub-nanosecond deadtimes. Key rates could be further increased through
wavelength divisionmultiplexing which can also allow coexistence with classical signals [153].
Integrated transmitters will facilitate the wide adoption of QKD transmitters where a cent-
ralised resource can be shared between many users. In this section, we will discuss the first
steps towards a fully optically integrated QKD system where InP and silicon-on-insulator (SOI)
can be complementary in a single system.
4.8.1 Receiver Device
With integrated transmitters demonstrated, is seems reasonable to consider how a receiver
for MDI-QKD could utilise integrated photonics. The SOI photonic platform has been well de-
veloped in the last decade meaning that such a circuit can be created with minimal losses [8].
Such advances will likely play a crucial role in widespread quantum communication deploy-
ment.
Aswe have seen, projecting time-bin encoded states in the Bell basis requires a very simple
optical circuit. The interference of the states requires a 50:50 beam splitter where SPDs re-
cord the time of arrival. Coincidences between time-bins indicate successful projections. In
comparison, this measurement device is much simpler than protocols such as BB84, COW or
DPS which would require delay lines and stable phase shifters. It is possible to make a PIC to
decode these signals [9] without the SPD. However, waveguide integrated of detectors likely
requires cryogenic temperatures which limits the use of typical phase shifters due to carrier
freeze out.
Here, we will discuss how each part of an MDI-QKD receiver can be replaced with an integ-
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Figure 4.20:Microscope image of theMDI-QKD receiver silicon chip. Grating couplers are usedto couple pulses into the waveguides which are then interfered in an MMI before detected bywaveguide integrated detectors. The device includes two copies of a receiver, demonstratingthe scalability of the platform. There is also a cut back waveguide to ensure maximal couplingonto the device. This image was provided by R. Heath of devices fabricated by J. Paul anddesigned by D. Sahin and J. Barreto.
rated component in SOI PIC. A microscope image of the first test receiver is shown in figure
4.20.
Grating Couplers
By exploiting the high index contrast of SOI, grating couplers can be used to efficiently convert
a fibre optic mode into a waveguide mode. Coupling losses tend to be higher than when using
edge couplers. However, designs have been reported with losses as low as 0.36 dB [121]. The
grating period determines the peak wavelength which can be quite narrow. The gratings were
designed for 1550 nm for compatibility with the transmitters.
To ensure maximal coupling, two grating couplers at the top and bottom were connected
to a waveguide allowing cut back measurements and feedback for blind alignment.
Multi-Mode Interferometer
The states can be interfered on an MMI where the splitting ratio of the component is design
for a particular wavelength. The exact ratio is a function of the wavelength and size of the
component. If the input wavelength changes, so will the splitting ratio. Due to fabrication tol-
erances, the researchers at Glasgow were unsure whether the splitting ratio of 50:50 could be
easily achieved. This uncertainty is what motivated figure 3.1 where visibility was calculated
as the splitting ratio changed. We could see that high visibility could be maintained even if the
splitting ratio was off by a few percent.
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Figure 4.21: Experimental schematic for fully integrated quantum key distribution. Alice andBob use independent InP devices which generate BB84 states on-chip. The receiver (Charlie)is an SOI device with grating couplers and waveguide-integrated detectors.
Waveguide Integrated Detectors
Aniobium-titanium-nitride (NbTiN) thin filmon SOIwas used tomake the devicewhich allowed
the waveguide integrated SNSPDs to be etched directly on the substrate. The optical circuit
could then be created around the SNSPDs. The confinement in the waveguide should mean
that there is a strong coupling to the nanowire meaning a high efficiency. To increase coup-
ling, the nanowire is made in a meander on top of the waveguide which should increase the
interaction between the nanowire and photons.
4.8.2 Experimental Setup
Combining the InP transmitters and the SOI receiver would allow aQKD systemwhere all of the
optical components are on integrated devices. The states can be generated with the InP PICs
while the states can be interfered andmeasured on a simple SOI circuit. Figure 4.21 shows the
schematic of the experimental demonstration.
From the model that was developed in section 4.2.4, we can estimate what we would ex-
pect the performance of the system to be. We saw previously that HOM interference is not
severely impacted by a splitting ratio that is a few percent either side of 50:50. Therefore, we
can assume that the error rate would be equivalent to what was found with the fibre-optic
receiver. However, the losses within the chip will potentially be high which would reduce the
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Figure 4.22: The estimated efficiency of the integrated detectors is low which is due to chipcoupling and waveguide losses. Here, we compare how this will effect the key rate against thefibre system, given the same number of dark counts. The key rates possible are about 1% andpositive generation only possible to 300 km.
expected gain. While grating couplers can be designed with low loss, it is quite likely that the
first deviceswill exhibit higher loss. The efficiency of thewaveguide detectors is also unknown.
We will assume that the efficiency will be around 10% to be pessimistic and that the detectors
will have the same dark count rate.
Figure 4.22 compares the previous demonstration with the revised efficiency. The reduced
efficiency gives a key rate approximately 20 dB below the previous experiment until around
300 km. After this point, the dark count rate of the detectors becomes dominant and so posit-
ive key generation is no longer possible.
Unfortunately, due to fabrication difficulties, the experiment as described was never able
to come to fruition. Challenges when etching the NbTiN to create the SNSPDs meant that the
chip was over etched which reduced the thickness of the silicon. This changed the peak coup-
ling wavelength for the grating couplers by around 100nm. This wavelength is not compatible
with the InP transmitters and would also have serious implications for rest of the circuit. New
devices have been fabricated to compensate for this over-etch and can now be characterised









Philip Sibson and I designed the photonic chips and compiled the chip mask that was fab-
ricated by Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute. I designed the PCB for electrical operation and
optical connection. I packaged the chipwith support fromAlasdair Price andGrahamMarshall.
I performed characterisation of the initial components of the circuits which included laser driv-
ing under both DC and RF operation and a preliminary test of laser seeding capability.
5.1 Introduction
Recent developments inmonolithic fabrication have facilitated a drastic increase in the optical
complexity which has been thoroughly utilised for quantum information experiments [8]. The
inherent phase stability allows a level of control on a scale simply not possible with fibre or
bulk alternatives. However, the technology is still under heavy development to improve the
performances of devices at both component and circuit levels. As such, further optimisation
is required to fully benefit from the integration of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems.
While the demonstrations in previous chapters showed state-of-the-art performances from
indium phosphide (InP) devices, several non-idealities were noted which are in need of im-
provement. The phase imperfections in the Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) meant that
a resistance over the electro-optic phase modulators (EOPMs) needed to be used to maxim-
ise the performance of the device. By including dedicated thermo-optic phase modulators
(TOPMs), the performance may be further increased and allow a true “push-pull” method of
modulation to be used. Similarly, the dimensions of the laser components could be optim-
ised to increase laser performance. Tuning the lengths of the front and rear distributed Bragg
reflectors (DBRs) and increasing the semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) length should in-
crease the laser intensity. These considerations may be crucial for continuous-variable QKD
(CV-QKD) demonstrations where a bright local oscillator is required.
Performance gains can also be made from the continual development of the InP platform.
Modulator bandwidths are continually increasing and laser linewidths and sideband suppres-
sion always improving meaning that the optimal performance of integrated photonics is yet
to be achieved. Even passive losses through waveguides have halved since the initial designs
from 2 to 1 dB/cm. Thismakes integrated photon delay linesmore accessible whichmay allow
simpler operation.
In this chapter, we will introduce the next generation designs of InP QKD transmitters. Op-
tical components are added to improve performance over the previous designs. Newmethods
of generating BB84 states are also introduced by exploiting both circuit design and laser inter-
action. The packaging process will be described to demonstrate how devices can be optically
and electrically connected for robust operation.
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MMI DBR SOACI-PM TOPMDFB PD
Figure 5.1: List of components used for the chip schematics: distributed feedback (DFB)laser, multi-mode interferometer (MMI), distributed Bragg reflector (DBR), current-injectionphase modulator (CI-PM), semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA), photodiode (PD), thermo-optic phase modulator (TOPM).
5.2 Pulsed Laser Seeding
In the previous chapter, we saw how states could be encoded through intensity and phase
modulation of a continuous wave (CW) laser. This allows 2GHz clocked states to be gener-
ated with high fidelity. However, for a QKD system, we required the state to be phase random-
ised which meant that the state rate needed to be reduced to 250MHz. Alternatively, phase
randomisation can be achieved with a separate phase modulator where a set of finite phases
are randomly chosen which approximates a random phase [9]. This requires a multi-level sig-
nal to operate the modulator which increases the complexity of the system and detrimental
phase-dependent losses can compromise security. To ensure high bandwidth key exchanges,
whilst maintaining simplicity, we might consider a different method of state generation.
Pulsed laser seeding (PLS) is an optical technique that is based on optical-injection locking
of lasers which can be used to create narrow pulses with low timing jitter when compared with
gain-switching or intensitymodulation [182,183]. A schematic is shown in figure 5.2a. An initial
(master) laser operates in CW mode which is injected into a second (slave) laser. The slave is
electrically pulsed which creates an optical pulse from the injected photons and inherits the
phase of the master. As the process is not reliant on a spontaneous emission, the pulse width
can be very narrow [145]. However, as the master laser is running in CW operation, the phase
of the pulsed slave laser will only drift slowly with the changing phase of themaster laser. This
will not be sufficient for QKD pulses which require phase randomisation between states.
The pulses generated from optical-injection locking could be phase randomised using a
further modulator. This increases the complexity of the optical system and driving electrics
so is not ideal. Instead, we can consider phase randomising the phase of the master laser
before the optical injection. This is the idea behind the PLS technique.
Instead of operating the maser laser in a CW mode, it is given a DC offset below the lasing
threshold and an RF signal gain-switches to provide a long, phase randomised pulse. The pulse
is variably attenuated and passed through a circulator to isolate it from the slave laser pulses.
A DC offset below the lasing threshold is provided to the slave and an electrical pulse then
gain-switches the slave laser when the master optical pulse is in the cavity. This causes the
slave to produce a narrow pulse that inherits the optical properties of the master laser. As
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the master laser is being gain switched, the pulses produced by the slave laser will be phase
randomised.
This method of PLS provides the base pulses for a QKD system but encoding is still re-
quired. Previous demonstrations have used a polarisation encoding to generate the BB84
states in adition to PLS [137]. However, for a time-bin encoding one can consider encoding
the states directly with the master laser. To maintain phase coherence between time-bins, the
master laser can be kept above threshold for two cycles. The pulses generated from the slave
laser will then also have a phase coherence. By adjusting the driving voltage for the master
laser between time-bins, a phase shift can be created between early and late time-bins. By
fine tuning the parameters of a system, all of the BB84 states can be generated in a time-bin
encoding scheme by just using PLS.
PLS provides a method of generating BB84 states by overcoming some of the issues with
gain-switching or intensity modulation of lasers while also reducing the optical complexity
of a circuit. As we saw in chapter 4 when gain switching the laser, the repetition rate of the
stateswas reduced as the laser was required to relax into a coherent CWstate. Only then could
coherent state be encoded. Previous demonstrations [137, 145] have overcome this limitation
as themaster laser does not need to relax to a continuous state before seeding the slave laser
allowing GHz state rate.
The electrical requirements for the PLS remain stringent with RF signals requiring high res-
olution vertical precision to sufficiently control the phases of the master laser. PLS has been
demonstrated using fibre optic components to show high-fidelity Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) in-
terference and measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [137, 145].
5.2.1 Integrated Laser Seeded Transmitter
In this section, we will present two designs for integrated laser seeding transmitters for time-
bin encoded QKD. The devices were fabricated by Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI)
from InP and measure only 6× 4mm2. Edge couplers on the side of the chip allow optical
accesswhile the electrical connections are routed to the remaining three sides. Test structures
are included in the design to measure the laser characteristics, photodiode performance and
cutbacks allow the waveguide and coupling losses to be estimated. This device also contains
a quantum random number generator (QRNG) which will be discussed in section 5.3.
Figure 5.3 shows the GDS for the device and aptly demonstrates the complexity achievable
with photonic integrated circuits (PICs). The optical components are shown in blue, while the
electrical connections are in red. Schematics of the transmitters are shown in figure 5.2 and
the integrated QRNG is discussed further in section 5.3. In total, the device contains eight
Fabry-Pérot lasers. The fabrication process meant that all spot-size converters (SSCs) had
to be on the same side of the device. Therefore, each SSC was separated with multi-mode
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Figure 5.2: a Fibre schematic for pulsed laser seeding (PLS). A master laser provides a pulsewhich is attenuated and sent to the slave through a circulator. The slave then generates a pulsefrom this seed which is sent to the output. As there is no non-linearity to exploit for a circulator,the usual method of laser seeding cannot be achieved in integrated photonics. These are thesimplest conceivable circuits to attempt PLS in a PIC. b The master can inject light through a1× 2 MMI which also allows half of the slave light to the output. c The master and slave are inseries. Light is injected into the rear DBR of the slave which is also connected directly to theoutput.
interferometers (MMIs) to the different parts of the chip. This will increase the losses in the
circuit and should be considered for the characterisation of the device.
Electrical connections were routed to the side of the chip in staggered rows to help with
wirebonding. Waveguide crossings were added where appropriate as the stack does not have
a separated electrical layer. Due to the number of electrical connections, shared grounds were
implemented to reduce the number of bond pads required.
Currently, there are no standardmethods to integrate optical isolation or circulators. There-
fore, the standard design for PLS cannot be replicated exactly in the circuit. In this PIC, we
include the two simplest methods to allow the master to inject light into the slave. These are
shown in figure 5.2. First, (fig. 5.2b) we consider the two lasers connected by a 1× 2MMI. The
master can inject light into the front of the slave, which can then be pulsed. Half of the light
will then leave the device through the output port. The second design (fig. 5.2c) considers the
lasers in series along a waveguide. The master injects light through the rear DBR from which
the slave can then create a pulse.
Without isolation between the master and slave laser, back reflections are a potential is-
sue. Such reflections could make it more difficult for the phase randomisation as remnants of
previous pulses may impart their phase on subsequent ones. This may be less problematic in
design 5.2c as the rear DBR will suppress reflections from the edge facet of the device.
Since this chip was designed and fabricated, similar work was published demonstrating an
integrated PLS transmitter based on the InP platform [184]. The designs are similar to those
present here but use distributed feedback (DFB) lasers in series with an MZI in between to
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Figure 5.4: Cross-section and top view schematic of the grounded coplanar waveguide(GCPW) structure. The track width, a, total width b, substrate height, h, and dielectric constant
Er determine the characteristic impedance of the track. Vias provide a shield to suppress sur-face wave modes. Vias are spaced Svia which determines their performance.
attenuate the master laser, as required.
5.2.2 Optical and Electrical Packaging
The complexity of the device requires careful consideration to ensure optical and electrical
packaging for high-speed operation. This section will describe the design choices for the PCB
and how the device was put together. This allows initial tests to be performed.
PCB Design
The electrical connections for integrated devices is challenging, especially in test devices
where on-chip real estate is valuable and therefore fully utilised. In figure 5.5 we show the
PCB designed to connect most (but not all) components of the chip shown in figure 5.3. For
this initial test, the QRNG section of the chip was not connected to reduce the number of elec-
trical connections. In total, 33 electrical lines were included in the design for the initial testing
of the integrated lasers, modulators and photodiodes (PDs).
The PCB wasmade from Rogers 6006 for its high dielectric constant (6.45) and contained
four layers. The top layer of the PCB is electroless nickel immersion gold (ENIG) plated for
the wirebond connections. The first two layers were dedicated to the RF tracks. The top layer
provided signal lines through coplanar waveguide (CPW)while the second layer provided isola-
tion from the DC tracks below. The CPWdimensions can be calculated using equations presen-
ted in chapter 3. The high dielectric constant allowed narrow CPWs while maintaining a 50Ω
impedance.
To improve the performance over previous designs, a via fence was included along the
RF tracks to create a grounded CPW (GCPW) which should increase the bandwidth [185]. A
schematic is shown in figure 5.4. This via fence reflects the signal and stops a surface wave
being created along the track. The spacing between the vias is important to maximise band-
width, as is the spacing between the track and via. Generally speaking, microwaves will reflect
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Figure 5.5: PCB designed to connect the HHI device to control and measurement equipment.The chip sits in the middle of the PCB so that RF track length can be minimised. RF lines areshielded with vias to create GCPW for high bandwidth and are connected to edge-launch SMAconnectors. DC lines are routed through a lower layer of the PCB and connected to an FFCreceptacle. A section of the PCB is milled out to allow a VGA to be mounted for optical con-nection. Screw holes allow the package to bemounted to a heat sink for thermalmanagement.
off of gaps which are less than 1/4 of their wavelength [186]. Therefore, the spacing between
each via can be calculated as






where f is the maximum frequency of operation and Er is the dielectric constant of the sub-strate. For this PCB design, the viaswere placed 500µm from the track and spaced 1mmapart
meaning theGCPWshould have a bandwidth up to 25GHz. SMAedge-launch connectors rated
to 26.5GHz were soldered to the tracks and grounds for high speed signals.
The DC tracks were routed through the third and fourth layers of the PCB. To save space
on the top layer of the PCB, the bond pads for the DC connections were capped vias that had
been previously plated and plugged. This allows the connections to be immediately routed to
a lower layer. These were then routed to an FFC connector on the side of the PCB.
The chip contains a PIN PD for test purposes. To isolate this from the rest of the circuit, a
separate ground was created so that it could be tested separately from the rest of the circuit.
A GCPW was used to connect this where both ground pads on the chip could be connected to
the grounds of the G-S-G line.
The chipwas placed in the center of the PCB tominimise the RF track lengths required. One
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Figure 5.6: The chip facets are designed as 500µmspaced so as to be compatible with stand-ard VGAs. The facets are at a 7° angle to the edge of the chip to reduce back reflections intothe chip. To maximise coupling, the VGA chosen was polished to match this angle. However,once rotated, the vertical spacing of the fibres in the VGA are no longer 500µm spaced. Thismeant only one fibre could be connected to the device for these initial tests.
side of the PCB was curved to further reduce the distance to the chip. This section of the PCB
was partially milled out the width, length and thickness of the chip so that the top of the chip
would be flush with the top of the PCB. This makes wirebonding the chip easier and allows
wirebond length to be minimised. This section was plated for thermal conductivity and plated
vias added to the bottom of the PCB for thermal management and temperature stabilisation.
As in the previous chips, the SSCs were angled at 7° from the edge of the chip. This is to
reduce the back reflections into the chip. To increase the coupling from the chip to the v-groove
array (VGA), the chip was rotated by 7° in the PCB design. The VGA could then be polished at
a 7° in the opposite direction and be aligned parallel to the PCB. Unfortunately, the geometry
of this design was not fully considered meaning that once rotated, the VGA was no longer
500µm vertically spaced. This is shown in figure 5.6. When the first fibre is aligned to the chip,
the subsequent fibres no longer line up with the chip facets. Future designs should consider
this in the compilation of the chip mask. By adjusting the spacing between SSCs on the chip,
a standard polished VGA can be used to connect all the optical ports. Alternatively, one can
sacrifice coupling efficiency by leaving the chip parallel with the PCB and using a standard
flat-faced VGA.
One should also note that 7° is not the optimal angle for coupling from the chip to the
VGA. The refractive index of the InP waveguides is 3.26 whereas standard optical fibre has a
refractive index of 1.44. Therefore, through Snell’s law, the optimal angle for coupling from an
SSC to fibre would be 16°.
A section at the edge of the chip was milled out to provide a space for the VGA to be held
while being glued to the chip. The cutout was designed to allow the chip to hang over the side
by about 0.5mm to ease gluing the VGA to the chip. A section at the edge of the PCB was also
partially milled out to a depth of around 0.5mm. This was to allow the bare fibres to remain
horizontal and not change the pitch of the VGA when aligned to the chip. It also provides a
place for the fibres to be fixed to the PCB for strain relief to make the packaged device more
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robust.
Solder pads were placed as close to the chip as possible for a thermistor to be used for
thermal stabilisation. Tracks were routed to the bottom of the PCB to provide good thermal
connectivity to the chip and peltier. Screw holes were provided to allow the device to be con-
nected to a heat sink and were surrounded by vias to shield the PCB from RF radiation.
Chip Mounting
Unlike the device from Oclaro, where the bottom of the device was the ground plane, there
is no need to electrically connect the bottom of the devices from HHI. However, silver epoxy
was still used for its strong adhesive properties and good thermal conductivity to aid with
temperature stabilising the device. A section of the PCB was partially milled out meaning that
placing the chip was more challenging as the sides of the chip would be below the top of the
PCB.
To accurately place the chip onto the PCB, vacuum tweezers were used. A silicone cupwas
used to pick up the chip from the top which could be released when the chip was in position.
Silver epoxy was spread onto the milled out section where the chip was then placed. The chip
was allowed to overhang the PCB by 0.5mm to ease VGA connection. The PCB was then
heated to 100 ◦C for 30min to allow the silver epoxy to cure.
Wirebonding
25µmgold wire is used to connect the chip bond pads to the PCB which was heated to 100 ◦C.
A high-voltage electrode provides a spark to the end of the wire creating a 50µmball at the end
of a capillary. The capillary is positioned above the chip bond pad connected to the chip bond
pad through thermosonic bonding, which using a combination of heat, pressure and ultrasonic
energy to form a bond. The wire is then fed through the capillary to form a loop so the wire
can be connected to the PCB pad with a wedge bond, again using thermosonic bonding. This
method can be used to create connections to devices with bandwidths above 60GHz [187],
while coax wirebonds have been developed to support bandwidths above 100GHz [188].
Optical Connection
The device contains eight SSCs on the side of the chip which are designed to convert from the
2.5µmwaveguide mode to a 10µmmode that is more circular. This means that we don’t need
to use lensed fibres and can connect the SSCs directly to SMF fibre. The SSCs are 500µm
spaced so as to be compatible with the standard VGA which was provided by Oz Optics for
this device.
A brass vacuum chuck was designed from the dimensions of the VGA so that it could be
securely held during alignment and gluing. The chuck was placed on a 6-axis micro-positioner
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Figure 5.7: Photograph of the packaged PLS test device. The InP chip is glued to the centreof the PCB with the VGA glued to the edge couplers for optical access. Fibre strain relief isshown to the left were the bare fibres from the VGA are attached to the PCB. The electricalpads on the chip have been wirebonded to the PCB for electrical control through SMA and FFCconnections.
(Thorlabs NanoMax) so that it could be well aligned with the orientation of the chip.
The integrated lasers were used to align the VGA to the chip. A stable current source
provided each laser with 75mA. The device had been designed with lasers at both the top
and bottom of the chip to allow the orientation of the VGA to match that of the chip. As men-
tioned before, and shown in figure 5.6, it was not possible to align all of the fibres in the VGA
with the SSCs. Therefore, the SSCwith themost test structures was chosen to be the only fibre
aligned.
Once the fibre was sufficiently aligned, the VGA was moved back from the chip to allow
glue to be applied between the VGA and the chip. Index matched, UV-cured glue (Dymax OP-
4-20632) was used to attach the fibres and the chip. Only a small gap between the VGA and
chip was required due to the low viscosity of the glue allowing it to permeate between them.
Once the glue had been applied, the VGA moved forward to be in contact with the chip. A
UV LED lamp illuminated the area to cure the glue which was left for 12 hours. Silicone glue
was then applied to the bare fibres at the edge of the PCB for strain relief and left to dry. Once
the silicone had dried, the vacuum was turned off and the brass chuck could be lowered away
from the device. To ensure that the UV cured glue was completely cured, the entire device was
placed into a UV steriliser and left for a further 12 hours.
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Figure 5.8: Current sweep of the on-chip, Fabry-Pérot test lasers. The two designs have differ-ent SOA and front DBR lengths which are shown at the top of the figure. Both show a lasingthreshold of around 30mA. We find that the longer SOA provides considerably more powerdespite the shorter front DBRs. Fluctuations in power are likely due to the mode competitionin the cavity. Reduction in power for 300µmSOA are likely attributed to heating of the diode re-ducing efficiency. The effect is elastic so reducing the current recovers the original efficiency.
A photograph of the packaged chip under the steriliser is shown in figure 5.7. The HHI chip
sits in the middle of the device and is glued and wirebonded to the PCB. The VGA is attached
with UV cured glue and the bare fibres are attached to the PCB with silicone glue to provide
strain relief. Electrical connections can bemade through the SMA and FFC connections on the
edge of the PCB.
The packaged device was screwed to a heat sink with nylon screws to avoid thermal loops.
A peltier placed directly under the chip. An Arroyo 6305 was connected to both the thermistor
and peliter and a PID loop was calibrated to stabilise the temperature. A case was placed over
the PCB to reduce air flowover the devicewhich can cause thermal instability. The temperature
was set to 25 ◦C and the PID loopmaintained a temperature instability of less than 0.01 ◦C. The
device could then be electrically and optically tested to characterise the performance.
5.2.3 Laser Operation
This device contains two Fabry-Pérot laser test structures to assess their characteristics. A
cavity is formed from two current-injection tunable DBRs which are of different lengths. The
rear DBR is 300µm in length for both test lasers which should provide 95% reflectivity. Two
different front DBR lengthswere chosen, aswell as different lengths for the SOA. The first laser
(figure 5.8a) had a front DBR length of 150µmwith an SOA length of 300µm. The second laser
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Figure 5.9: Spectra from an OSA of an on-chip laser 5.8a whilst tuning the wavelength with theDBRs. Current injection of the tunable DBRs causes a change of peak reflectedwavelength and,therefore, laser wavelength. The lasers are single-mode, with a FWHM of <30pm which waslimited by the optical spectrum analyser (OSA) precision. However, the sideband suppressionis only 30 dB and varies with DBR tuning. The wavelength can be tuned by 3 nm with a currentof 40mA.
(figure 5.8b) had a front DBR length of 50µm and SOA length of 500µm. The reduction in DBR
length from 150µm to 50µm is estimated by the foundry to reduce the reflectivity from 75%
to 25%. Both cavities also contain a current-injection phase modulator (CI-PM) which can
be used to precisely tune the wavelength of the laser. This method is preferred over current
injection of the SOA as it will not affect the output power of the laser. The schematics of the
two lasers designs are shown in figure 5.8.
A current sweep of each of the test laser SOAs was performed to measure threshold
and power characteristics which are shown in figure 5.8. Both laser designs show a lasing
threshold of around 30mA and gain is initially linear. At high driving currents, both lasers ex-
hibit fluctuations in power. This is likely attributed to mode competition within the laser cavity
caused by cavity heating. The increased SOA length in configuration 5.8b allows the laser to
reach around three times higher power for the same driving current. This will be partially due
to the longer gain medium allowing a higher amplification and also the reduced reflectivity of
the front DBR allowing more light to escape the cavity. The power given in figure 5.8 is not
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corrected for coupling or routing component loss and so the power on-chip is expected to be
higher.
At currents above 100mA, the 300µm SOA begins to decrease in power and by 150mA
the optical power has drastically reduced. While more investigation is required, this is likely
due an increase in temperature of the diode reducing its efficiency. The effect is elastic so
reducing the driving current recovers the efficiency of the laser. This breakdown could possibly
be remedied through better thermal management.
Figure 5.9 shows typical specta of the lasers while tuning the DBRs through current injec-
tion as measured by an OSA. The lasing is single-mode with a full width at half maximum
(FWHM) of <30pm which is limited to the resolution of the OSA used (Anritsu MS9740A).
However, the laser only achieves 30dB of sideband suppressionwhen DBRs are suitably tuned.
Both the laser configurations exhibit similar spectra so only laser configuration 5.8a is shown.
This suppression is much less than the 50dB found in the Oclaro lasers of similar design.
These sidebands are likely due to the reflected wavelength of the DBRs being quite broad al-
lowing multiple modes to co-exist.
By tuning the front and rear DBRs, the lasingwavelength can be changed. Passing a current
through the DBRs causes them to heat, expanding the grating period and reducing the peak
reflected wavelength. With a current up to 40mA, the wavelength of the laser can be tuned by
around 3nm. Fine tuning of the wavelength can be achieved by adjusting the temperature of
the device or current injection of the CI-PM within the cavity.
5.2.4 Gain Switching
By applying a DC offset and RF signal to the SOA of a laser, we can test its ability to gain-switch.
This ability will be important in creating phase randomised pulses either for use in PLS or for
further manipulation in another QKD transmitter scheme.
The SOA within the laser cavity is connected to a GCPW line on the PCB for high-speed op-
eration. Using a bias tee, the DC offset provided by a stable current source (Arroyo 6305) and
an RF signal provided by a pulse pattern generator (PPG) (Keysight 81134A) are combined. The
laser is attenuated with a variable optical attenuator (VOA) (OzOptics DA-100) and measured
with a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) (Photospot). The detection
events are correlated with a time-tagger (PicoQuant Hydraharp) which creates a histogram
where the time of arrival is relative to a sync signal provided by the PPG. The device is temper-
ature stabilised at 25 ◦C with an instability of less than 0.01 ◦C.
By changing the DC offset below, around and above the lasing threshold, we can character-
ise the effect of gain-switching, as shown in figure 5.10. A 2Vpp 1GHz square wave is appliedto the SOA for each DC offset. When then DC offset is well below threshold (20mA), the RF
signal does not bring the laser above threshold so the laser cannot start lasing. At the lasing
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Figure 5.10: Gain switching test of the on-chip lasers. A bias tee mixes a DC offset with an RFsignal. A 1GHz 2Vpp square wave was used and the DC offset was varied around the lasingthreshold. 20mA (left), 30mA (middle), 40mA (right). When the DC offset is just below thethreshold, 120 ps pulses can be generated with an extinction ratio of around 25dB.
threshold (30mA), the square wave creates pulses of around 120ps FWHM but only during
the positive section of the square wave. Otherwise, the laser remains below threshold imply-
ing that the pulses would be phase randomised. This, however, would need to be verified. A
25dB extinction ratio is also achieved. Once the DC offset is above the threshold (40mA), the
RF signal will still generate pulses. However, in between pulses, the laser does not return be-
low threshold. Therefore, we would expect a phase relationship between subsequent pulses
which could be checked with an asymmetric MZI (aMZI).
A spectrum of the gain switched laser is shown in figure 5.11. By gain-switching the laser,
the spectrum is broadened from <30pm to 80pm FWHM. The sideband suppression is also
reduced to only 10 dB. Such effects would imply that spectral filtering would be required before
use as aQKDsource to ensure high-fidelity interference is possible but also to remove potential
side-channel attacks.
5.2.5 Laser Seeding
As described above, the device contains two methods of performing PLS as shown in fig-
ure 5.2b and c. In the absence of a circulator or isolator on chip, these two methods are the
simplest conceivable designs. Unfortunately, due to themisalignment of the VGA and the chip,
only design 5.2a was accessible for testing.
In this design, the master and slave lasers are connected with a 1× 2 MMI which allows
the master pulses to reach the slave, but also for half of the slave light to be emitted from the
device. Both the SOA are connected with GCPW to allow for high-speed operation. The setup
is as with the gain-switching tests above, with a second stable current source and RF signal
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Figure 5.11: A spectrum of the gain switched laser when the DC offset is just below threshold(30mA) with a 2Vpp 1GHz square wave. The spectrum is broadened which is usual for a gainswitched laser where the central peak has a FWHM of 80pm. The sideband suppression isalso reduced to only around 10 dB.
provided to the device to control the master and slave lasers independently. Electronic delays
were used to overlap the master and slave gain-switching in time. Single-photon events can
again be measured with an SNSPD and time-tagger to correlate events with the PPG.
In figure 5.12, we show a histogram of single-photon events when 1GHz square waves are
applied to both the master and slave lasers. The master laser had a DC offset of 30mA, which
is lasing threshold, to reduce the turn-on time. This should, however, ensure that the pulses
are phase randomised. The slave offset is set at 20mA which, as we saw previously, should
mean that no pulses are created despite the RF signal.
The histogram shows characteristics that are similar to that of the gain-switched pulses
above. The FWHM is around 120ps and the extinction ratio is around 20dB. Therefore, it is
unclear if the device is successfully performing PLS as a reduction of pulse width is com-
mon when compared with gain-switching. Similar demonstrations have shown pulse widths
of 40 ps [145, 184].
Further testing of this PLS is required to verify its operation. One might consider first
demonstrating that pulses can be created through optical-injection locking [182, 183] to show
a reduced pulse width. This should then allow an easier verification of PLS when the mas-
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Figure 5.12: Histogram of single-photon events from the PLS design. The master and slavelasers have a DC offset of 30mA and 20mA, respectively. By applying 1GHz square wavesto both lasers, we can get pulses that should be phase randomised. However, this will needtesting. Pulses show 120ps FWHM with a 20dB extinction ratio.
ter laser is pulsed. The final step towards creating a transmitter, would be to demonstrate
phase control between the time-bins for X basis encoding. This encoding could either utilise
a change in the RF driving voltage of the SOA, or the CI-PMwithin the laser cavity itself. Revised
packaging could allow the second PLS design to be tested and loss measurements from the
coupling and waveguides could help with characterisation.
5.3 Quantum Random Number Generation
The security of any QKD system is reliant on having a stream of unbiased randomness avail-
able in real-time to determine the states to be sent and the measurement basis. For a GHz-
clocked transmitter generating BB84 states about 4Gb/s of randomness in required to de-
termine the basis, state and decoy level. Generating high bandwidth randomness is real-time
remains practically challenging.
Pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) are readily available which provide perceived
randomness at high-bandwidths through a predetermined algorithm based off an initial seed.
As the algorithm is predetermined, the numbers are not sufficient for a QKD system as a
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Figure 5.13: Schematic for the QRNG using on-chip laser sources and fast PDs for homodynemeasurement. Each laser can be independently controlled and variably attenuated with MZIsallowing the lasers to be tuned in power. A further MZI acts as a beam splitter with a tunablesplitting ratio to interfere the two light sources.
compromised initial seed would compromise the entire protocol [189,190]. Therefore, another
source of randomness is required.
Instead, methods have been developed to exploit the randomness that is inherent in quan-
tummechanics. As such, a number of QRNGs have been developedmostly based off sampling
quantum states of light [178]. Themost viable for QKD systems seem to be based off measure-
ments of continuous-variable states of light, with bandwidths of 68Gb/s having been demon-
strated [191].
The inclusion of laser sources and fast PDs in the InP platform mean that a QRNG can be
completely integrated in a single PIC. One such design is includedwithin the chip design shown
in figure 5.3 and a schematic is given in figure 5.13. Two laser sources are directly integrated
into the waveguides which can be individually, variably attenuated with an MZI. The two arms
are combined with another MZI which can act as a beam splitter with a tunable splitting ratio.
Measurements are performed by two fast PDs with bandwidths of >35GHz.
This design allows randomness to be generated through three different techniques: amp-
lified vacuum state measurement with homodyne detection [192, 193], laser intensity fluctu-
ations [120] or homodyne phase measurements [194]. All three have been demonstrated to
generate random bits at Gb/s rates with the main restriction being the post-processing com-
putational intensity [178].
The full integration of a QRNG mean that the optics for a QKD transmitter have here been
completely contained within a single PIC. Processing the random numbers could be achieved
with a dedicated field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or application-specific integrated cir-
cuit (ASIC) which could increase the randomness generation bandwidth. Signals from the
QRNG could be used to directly drive modulators in the QKD transmitter.
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5.4 Next Generation QKD Transmitters
In the experiments shown in chapters 3 and 4, therewere non-ideal choices in the designwhich
limited the performance. For example, the delay line in the transmitter was too lossy to be used
and the MZIs needed to exploit an imperfection in the EOPMs to adjust the phases through
thermo-optic effects. With the first demonstrations in mind, we can improve on the design to
increase the performance.
We can also use advances in the design and fabrication of the individual components.
Waveguide loss has been decreased from 2 to 1 dB/cm [125] meaning that optical delay lines
are more achievable.
In figure 5.14, we show the GDS of the next generation QKD transmitters based on InP
and fabricated by Fraunhofer HHI. The design is similar to the PLS device with the optical
connections occupying one side and the electrical connections along the remaining three. As
before, Fabry-Pérot lasers can be used as a light source. However, the HHI foundry offers
the option of DFB lasers, of which one is included in the design for optical testing. The phase
modulators offered don’t yet include EOPMs so a combination of TOPMs and CI-PMs are used
which will likely have a lower bandwidth.
The design utilises the optical complexity offered by integrated photonics to allow three
separate methods of generating BB84 states in a single devices. The following sections will
describe each.
5.4.1 Composite Laser Transmitter
In an effort to reduce the required electronic control, this circuit introduces independent sour-
ces to generate each of the four BB84 states. These are combined in a passive, optical circuit
with MMIs into a single output mode. A schematic of the transmitter is shown in figure 5.15
with each of the four sources labelled.
Each of the different sources is a Fabry-Pérot laser which enters the optical circuit at differ-
ent points to create different timing and phase relations for a time-bin encoding. The timing
is achieved with an aMZI while the relative phases are created from the phase in the beam
splitter transformation.
We have demonstrated that the Fraunhofer HHI lasers are capable of generating gain-
switched pulses at 1 GHz with an extinction ratio of 25 dB allowing phase randomised pulses
to be generated at high rates. The timing of the electronics is easily controlled to 1 ps resolution
allowing the pulses from the sources to be overlapped in time. Also, from chapter 3 we found
it was possible to overlap independent sources in all degrees of freedom with high-fidelity.
Therefore, we should not expect using independent sources to introduce side-channels to be
exploited by Eve or Mallory.
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Figure 5.15:Schematic of the composite laser source transmitter. By using independent lasersto generate each of the different states, we can gain-switch each to ensure phase randomisa-tion. A relatively simple optical circuit can then be used to encode the four BB84 states intime-bins. The loss compensation MZI can match the losses between the two paths in theaMZI while the phase compensation modulators allows fine tuning of the relative phases.
To consider how each laser source generates each BB84 state, consider the operator trans-










where â† and b̂† are the creation operators for the top and bottom paths, respectively.
The delay line in the circuit will convert pulses in the top path from early to late while the
bottom path will be unaffected i.e.
â†e → â
†
l and b̂†e → b̂†e (5.3)
where will assume for the purpose of analysis that the circuit is lossless. Of course, the loss
between the long and short arm of the aMZI will be different. A nested MZI is included to
compensate for this loss.
These transformations can be applied to each laser source, where we consider that each
can be independently pulsed in the early time-bin. First consider the lasers in theZ basis, which










whereas the |1〉 laser pulse becomes
b̂†e








5.4. NEXT GENERATION QKD TRANSMITTERS
Equivalently, we can apply the transformations to the X basis laser pulses which will ex-










































By looking at the output port from the top path, we find that we can generate the states
|0〉 = â†e, |1〉 = â
†





l ), and |−〉 = 1√2 (â†e − â†l ) (5.8)
where the states have been renormalised considering only the top path. There is no need to
compensate the intensity of the Z and X basis as was the case with the intensity modulated
states.
As is usual for QKD transmitters, we will be using weak coherent states (WCSs) instead
of single photons so the bottom path (b̂†) can be considered a loss. However, this loss is
before the states have been sent through the quantum channel so can be compensated with
an increased pulse intensity. Phase modulators within the aMZI allow fine adjustments of the
relative phases between the long and short arms which are unlikely to be phase matched due
to fabrication tolerances.
One final thing to consider with this transmitter is the spectral broadening and sideband
suppression reduction seenwhilst gain-switching.Without proper filtering, such spectrawould
exhibit reduced interference duringmeasurement and possible information leakage to Eve and
Mallory. Commercially available filters should resolve these issues and also allow the laser
wavelengths to be precisely overlapped.
Future designs could considering including a master laser to seed each source in a PLS
scheme. Pulse length could be shortened, aswell as delay length, whichwould allow the device
to operate at higher clock rates. Provided that the measurement devices could support the
high rates, this could further increase the rates of QKD systems.
5.4.2 Delay Line Time-Bin Encoding
While the previous generation of devices included delay lines to encode timing information,
they were too lossy to be used. We have included a delay line in the design of this chip which
should have lower losses. This should reduce the complexity of the control electronics and
mean phase randomised pulses can be generated froma laser sourcewhich can subsequently
be encoded into phase coherent time-bins. A schematic of the transmitter is shown in figure
5.16a.
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To test the performance of two laser sources, both Fabry-Pérot andDFB lasers are included
each of which can generate phase-randomised WCSs. Cascaded MZIs and a delay line can
then encode information in time-bins. Each MZI includes both TOPMs to perform calibration
and CI-PMs for high-speed operation.
The first MZI is used to attenuate the pulses accordingly for a decoy state protocol while
the second acts as a high-speed tunable beam splitter. For the X basis states, the MZI splits
the states, with half being delayed. This means that the early and late time-bins will be phase
coherent as they have come from the same pulse.
5.4.3 Intensity Modulation
Finally, this device can operate in the same way as the Oclaro chip from chapter 4. The laser
sources are run in CW and WCSs are modulated from an MZI, with a pulse in both time-bins
being used to encode X basis states. Phase randomisation is achieved either through gain-
switching the laser source or with a CI-PM. Relative phases are again encoded with an MZI
to avoid phase-dependent losses and a final MZI modulates the intensity of the states for a
decoy protocol.
The design has been improved over the previous circuit with TOPMs included in each MZI
to correct phase differences between the two paths. A DFB laser is also included so that phase
randomisation performance can be tested and compared to the results previously demon-
strated in chapter 4.
5.5 Outlook
While a number of QKD demonstrations have been presented in recent years (notably refer-
ences [9, 102, 104, 195, 196]) progression in the technology will always allow higher-bandwidth
designs and new protocol demonstrations. This chapter has introduced new circuits that im-
prove on previous devices, whilst also facilitating new operating techniques.
A recent demonstration presented PLS as a useful source of WCS through an MDI-QKD
protocol [137]. Despite the lack of isolation or circulators in integrated photonics, we have
presented two circuits to achieve similar pulse preparation. The high-speed operation of the
integrated lasers show promising initial characterisation, albeit in need of wavelength filter-
ing. With further work on their operation, the circuits should be capable of high-fidelity state
generation.
Demonstrations of high-fidelity laser overlap from chapter 3 mean that a composite trans-
mitter with multiple laser sources becomes viable without introducing side-channels to be
exploited by Eve and Mallory. While the optical circuit becomesmore complex, the high-speed
electronics required is reduced. Phase coherent time-bins can be encoded from phase ran-
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domised pulses with optical delay lines where most of the encoding is performed passively.
Improvements over the initial QKD transmitters have been included both utilising a better
understanding of the operation of integrated photonics and new components available from
the foundry. Such modification should help to improve both the bandwidth and fidelity of the
states. The devices have been fabricated and so can now be packaged and tested by tech-









This thesis has advanced the application of integrated photonic devices for quantum-secured
key exchange.We introduced theHong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference effect as a fundamental
tool in quantum optics. Interference was demonstrated between independently controlled, in-
tegrated devices with a visibility of 46.5± 0.8%, close to the theoretical maximum of 50%.
The devices used entirely integrated components to generate weak coherent pulses (WCPs)
at 431MHz and did not require any wavelength filtering beyond the laser cavity. Active phase
randomisation of the on-chip laser was achieved through gain-switching at a reduced rate of
250MHz to maintain compatibility with time-bin encoding. Again, interference was demon-
strated with a high visibility.
Using further integrated components, we encoded 2GHz clocked, time-bin encoded quan-
tum states from the on-chip laser and interfered them to demonstrate measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD). We show a phase error rates less than 30%
with bit error rates around 0.5%. We introduced a bank of detectors at the receiver to increase
key rates. At short distances (25 km), over 12 kbps could be securely exchange, while at 100 km
1 kbpswas shown. Positive key generationwasdemonstrated at 200 kmand, from the perform-
ance of the system, we predict that positive key generation is possible at distances beyond
350 km. The trade-off between cost-effective electronics and security was discussed. Inter-
symbol interference (ISI) was shown as a potential side-channel which would need to be ad-
dressed in future systems. Finally, a fully-integrated system was presented by utilising wave-
guide integrated detectors. A silicon device could replace the fibre-optic receiver used in the
first demonstration. This would facilitate further accessibility in a future network and potential
benefits for photonic routing and detection efficiency.
We explored how developments in integrated photonics can improve the performances
of quantum key distribution (QKD) transmitters and introduced new photonic circuit designs.
Through pulsed laser seeding (PLS), we aim to increase the generation rate of phase random-
ised quantum states so that integrated devices can fulfil the bandwidth requirements of mod-
ern networks. The devices were electrically and optically packaged and initial characterisation
showed promising results for these new devices. Quantum random number generator (QRNG)
designs were integrated with QKD transmitters on a single monolithically fabricated device to
allow modulation directly from true randomness. All of the photonic components have been
combined in a single chip. Dedicated electronics chipswould allow trulymass-manufacturable
QKD systems. Finally, new circuit designs for simplified state generationwere introduced.With





It is paramount that the security of crucial network infrastructure is addressed as computing
power inevitably increases. Quantum computing is one known threat against modern commu-
nication protocols. However, the situation is more dire than arguments over the ‘if’ or ‘when’
of quantum computing. The underlying security of all widely used cryptographic systems is
based from assumed computationally-hard, mathematical problems. There is no guarantee of
the validity of these assumptions, or even that they currently remain valid.
In developing a new precedent for secure cryptography, dubbed ‘quantum-safe’, there are
two available routes. The first, which is favourable to the current network architecture, creates
public-cryptography based off of new problems that are thought to be even more difficult to
solve than those in current protocols. While these protocols will utilise the same classical
computers, there is still no guarantee of their security. Even under full scrutiny of the scientific
community, a new quantum algorithm may be imminent.
QKD offers an entirely different solution with security founded in well established laws of
physics. However, there are several key issues that need to be addressed before quantum-
secured networks can be widely deployed. First, we must ensure that we can the theoretical
security of a protocol is maintained in physical QKD systems. Second, there must be a way
to mass-manufacture devices with the precision required to create, manipulate and detect
quantum states.
This thesis aims to alleviate both of these concerns. By implementing new protocols and
carefully considering the operation of the transmitter, we can ensure that a system satisfies
the conditions of protocol security. We have demonstrated this new system based on the in-
tegrated photonics platform. Monolithic fabrication will be the only that we can truly satisfy
the mass-manufacturability of QKD devices.
The final concern with introducing QKD networks is that creating “quantum-ready” net-
works will either be too costly or impractical. I will finish by arguing that quantum-secured
communication is only the first use case for developing these new networks. As quantum
technologies advance, new protocols will drive the development of these networks based on
the same components. Single-photon detection and quantum state manipulation will all be
requirements of any future quantum network. The integrated QKD devices presented here will






MDI-QKD GAINS AND ERRORS

Here, we provide the experimental values used to estimate the secret key rates. The errors,
EX,Zµµ , and gains, QX,Zµµ , are as defined previously in the protocol description. The secret keyrates, S, are provided as well as acquisition time, T, for reference. Photon numbers are fixed at
0.2 for the signal states and {0.1, 0.01} for the decoy states.
Attenuation (Distance) S (bps) eZss (%) QZss T (seconds)
5 dB (25 km) 12721.46 0.416 4.61× 10−4 60
10 dB (50 km) 5471.16 0.535 2.45× 10−4 60
15 dB (75 km) 2374.80 0.451 9.66× 10−5 600
20dB (100 km) 1084.58 0.518 3.16× 10−5 600
25dB (125 km) 143.23 0.426 1.20× 10−5 1800
30dB (150 km) 92.37 0.564 3.64× 10−6 1800
35dB (175 km) 42.79 0.523 1.32× 10−6 3600
40dB (200 km) 1.25 0.431 3.58× 10−7 3600
Table A.1: Z basis errors and gains, secret key rate, S, and the data acquisition time, T.
161
APPENDIX A. MDI-QKD GAINS AND ERRORS
eXij µ ω ν Q
X
ij µ ω ν
5dB µ 29.2% 44.4% 52.0% µ 1.68× 10−4 3.96× 10−5 2.53× 10−5
(25 km) ω 43.9% 32.0% 50.9% ω 4.02× 10−5 1.63× 10−6 3.41× 10−7
ν 50.3% 50.5% 50.0% ν 3.24× 10−5 3.72× 10−7 1.20× 10−9
10 dB µ 31.9% 45.3% 51.6% µ 7.72× 10−5 2.01× 10−5 1.36× 10−5
(50 km) ω 44.9% 31.7% 60.8% ω 1.91× 10−5 7.56× 10−7 9.84× 10−8
ν 50.6% 49.2% 50.0% ν 1.59× 10−5 1.80× 10−7 0.00
5dB µ 29.7% 44.4% 51.1% µ 3.34× 10−5 8.62× 10−6 5.80× 10−6
(75 km) ω 43.7% 32.9% 53.1% ω 8.47× 10−6 3.56× 10−7 6.89× 10−8
ν 50.5% 49.1% 55.6% ν 6.88× 10−6 7.32× 10−8 4.80× 10−10
20dB µ 30.0% 45.7% 51.3% µ 1.16× 10−5 3.26× 10−6 2.36× 10−6
(100 km) ω 42.5% 32.6% 54.5% ω 2.61× 10−6 1.35× 10−7 2.76× 10−8
ν 49.9% 50.5% 50.0% ν 2.03× 10−6 2.28× 10−8 1.20× 10−10
25dB µ 35.1% 46.4% 51.5% µ 3.53× 10−6 9.42× 10−7 6.59× 10−7
(125 km) ω 46.0% 34.6% 56.5% ω 9.45× 10−7 3.32× 10−8 4.28× 10−9
ν 50.1% 50.7% 50.0% ν 8.40× 10−7 9.08× 10−9 0.00
30dB µ 31.7% 43.2% 51.5% µ 1.04× 10−6 2.84× 10−7 1.93× 10−7
150 km) ω 45.8% 31.6% 65.0% ω 2.98× 10−7 1.06× 10−8 1.12× 10−9
ν 50.7% 62.1% 50.0% ν 2.60× 10−7 1.76× 10−9 0.00
35dB µ 30.3% 45.5% 51.7% µ 4.62× 10−7 1.35× 10−7 9.63× 10−8
(175 km) ω 44.7% 31.9% 48.0% ω 1.06× 10−7 5.34× 10−9 1.30× 10−9
ν 51.5% 50.0% 50.0% ν 8.27× 10−8 1.12× 10−9 0.00
40dB µ 30.7% 47.2% 52.1% µ 1.20× 10−7 2.99× 10−8 2.21× 10−8
(200 km) ω 42.8% 35.5% 45.7% ω 3.36× 10−8 1.42× 10−9 3.80× 10−10
ν 51.3% 37.0% 50.0% ν 2.57× 10−8 3.40× 10−10 0.00
Table A.2: X basis errors and gains for MDI-QKD key rates estimation.
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100 TIPS FOR DOING A PHD

1. Always go to the bar with someone more senior than you
2. Ask forgiveness, not permission
3. Remember that you will forget things
4. Always make figures on a white background
5. Timelines are useful to give you perspective
6. It is impossible to keep to a timeline
7. Work out how long you think something will take, and then multiple by 10 [197]
8. Academic clocks run at least 5 minutes late
9. Be nice to the admin team, they know where your supervisor is
10. Long days 6= productivity
11. Coffee is your friend
12. No one else has a clue what they’re talking about either
13. You will make stupid mistakes
14. Equipment will break
15. Where a paper is published has no relation to the work’s quality
16. If someone on Stack Overflow hasn’t solved your problem, you’re probably in too deep
17. Learn LATEX and never look back
18. The complexity of coding LATEX is inversely proportional to how long you expect it to take
19. Aesthetics are almost as important as content
20. Remember to take a holiday
21. Don’t feel guilty about ignoring emails on holiday
22. Take holidays after conferences so that you’re already over the jet lag
23. Backup your data
24. Most meetings are optional
25. Imposter syndrome is real [198]
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26. Only be sassy in person, don’t leave written evidence
27. If you leave something until the last minute it only takes a minute
28. Give your files sensible names
29. Don’t rely on collaborators
30. If it’s important it’s worth a second email
31. Your supervisor isn’t always right
32. If it is stupid but it works, it isn’t stupid
33. Don’t fix what ain’t broke
34. Don’t update software unless you have to
35. Publications don’t fairly represent the number of failed attempts
36. Try not to be over ambitious i.e. 100 is a big number
37. Don’t ask questions that are “more of a comment, really”
38. The poster title is the abstract
39. “Everything not saved will be lost” - Nintendo "Quit Screen"
40. Dolly Parton didn’t specify which 9 to 5 i.e. working hours are flexible
41. The best way to find a typo is to click submit
42. Your family won’t understand what your PhD is about no matter how many times you try
43. Finish first, perfect later
44. It’s never going to be perfect
45. Someone’s lack of provisions during their PhD doesn’t excuse your lack of provisions
46. Do something badly enough once and no one will ask you to do it again
47. Always tell someone the deadline is earlier than it actually is
48. Original doesn’t mean good
49. Tradition is a terrible reason to do something
50. Always save the data, not just a plot
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51. Start saving early for when you run out of funding
52. It’s important to admit when you don’t know or understand something
53. Remember it’s not your money when buying something
54. Make sure to spend all of your travel budget
55. Free food tastes better
56. It’s never too early to start writing your thesis
57. Don’t compare yourself to others
58. Save plots as vector images
59. Don’t expect anything to work the first time
60. Find something positive to say when giving feedback
61. Simple doesn’t mean easy
62. Bodge jobs don’t save time in the long run
63. Your postdoc is your real supervisor
64. Keep up with a hobby
65. Experiments on a Friday never work, best not to bother
66. Don’t volunteer information to the safety officer about that stupid thing you did
67. Be nice to fellow PhD students, they’ll be reviewing your future papers
68. Never half-ass two things, whole-ass one thing
69. Get over your fear of asking stupid questions
70. Learn to code sooner rather than later
71. For the love of God, put useful comments in your code
72. Sometimes working on weekends is necessary
73. Writing a thesis takes longer than you think
74. “A picture is worth a thousand words” doesn’t apply to your thesis word count
75. Prioritise work that you can actually write about in your thesis
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76. Your thesis is as much for you as it is for your examiners
77. No one is going to do it for you
78. Learn when to take a break
79. "How’s writing going?" never gets less annoying
80. The stages of thesis writing are surprisingly similar to those of grief
81. Don’t work in your office if you want to get work done
82. 80% of a talk should be motivation
83. Tell ’em what you’re going to say, then tell ’em, then tell ’em what you told ’em
84. Don’t expect your supervisor to make your life easier
85. It isn’t unusual for you to know more than your supervisor
86. It only has to be ‘good enough’
87. Always write the abstract last
88. Have your viva in the afternoon so that your external has to leave to travel back
89. There is a fine line between writing a background chapter and plagiarism
90. Check your figures in black and white
91. It is quite alright to admit that you were wrong
92. Nothing will ever feel finished
93. “The best thesis defence is a good thesis offence” [199]
94. Remember to label the label maker first
95. A good way to be more productive is to lower your standards
96. Lent equipment has a tendency to disappear
97. You don’t finish a thesis, you abandon it
98. Don’t waste time writing a list of 100 tips
99. You should be writing your thesis now instead of reading this
100. Theonlyway to findout how to do aPhD is to doone. Therefore, all advice is useless [200]
168
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] P. W. Shor, “Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring,” in
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS
’94, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 124–134, IEEE Computer Society, 1994. Cited on pages
3, 17, 20, 27, 49, and 87.
[2] F. Arute, K. Arya, R. Babbush, D. Bacon, J. C. Bardin, R. Barends, R. Biswas, S. Boixo, F. G.
S. L. Brandao, D. A. Buell, B. Burkett, Y. Chen, Z. Chen, B. Chiaro, R. Collins, W. Court-
ney, A. Dunsworth, E. Farhi, B. Foxen, A. Fowler, C. Gidney, M. Giustina, R. Graff, K. Guerin,
S. Habegger, M. P. Harrigan, M. J. Hartmann, A. Ho, M. Hoffmann, T. Huang, T. S. Humble,
S. V. Isakov, E. Jeffrey, Z. Jiang, D. Kafri, K. Kechedzhi, J. Kelly, P. V. Klimov, S. Knysh,
A. Korotkov, F. Kostritsa, D. Landhuis, M. Lindmark, E. Lucero, D. Lyakh, S. Mandrà, J. R.
McClean, M. McEwen, A. Megrant, X. Mi, K. Michielsen, M. Mohseni, J. Mutus, O. Naa-
man, M. Neeley, C. Neill, M. Y. Niu, E. Ostby, A. Petukhov, J. C. Platt, C. Quintana, E. G.
Rieffel, P. Roushan, N. C. Rubin, D. Sank, K. J. Satzinger, V. Smelyanskiy, K. J. Sung, M. D.
Trevithick, A. Vainsencher, B. Villalonga, T. White, Z. J. Yao, P. Yeh, A. Zalcman, H. Neven,
and J. M. Martinis, “Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting pro-
cessor,” Nature, vol. 574, no. 7779, pp. 505–510, 2019. Cited on pages 3, 20, and 27.
[3] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin
tossing,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 560, pp. 7 – 11, 2014. Theoretical Aspects of
Quantum Cryptography – celebrating 30 years of BB84. Cited on pages 3, 29, 49, and 87.
[4] A. K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 67,
pp. 661–663, Aug 1991. Cited on pages 3, 31, 49, and 87.
[5] F. Xu, X. M. Q. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and J.-W. Pan, “Quantum cryptography with realistic
devices,” 2019. arXiv:1903.09051. Cited on pages 3 and 34.
[6] D. Mayers and A. Yao, “Quantum cryptography with imperfect apparatus,” in Proceedings
of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’98, (Wash-
ington, DC, USA), pp. 503–, IEEE Computer Society, 1998. Cited on pages 3, 34, and 88.
169
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[7] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 108, p. 130503, Mar 2012. Cited on pages 3, 35, 49, 88, and 89.
[8] J. Wang, F. Sciarrino, A. Laing, and M. G. Thompson, “Integrated photonic quantum tech-
nologies,” Nature Photonics, pp. 1–12, 2019. Cited on pages 3, 42, 119, and 127.
[9] P. Sibson, C. Erven, M. Godfrey, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, H. Terai,
M. G. Tanner, C. M. Natarajan, R. H. Hadfield, J. L. O’Brien, and M. G. Thompson, “Chip-
based quantum key distribution,” Nature Communications, vol. 8, p. 13984, Feb 2017.
Cited on pages 3, 41, 50, 60, 62, 87, 89, 116, 119, 128, and 149.
[10] S. Singh, The Code Book, vol. 7. Doubleday New York, 1999. Cited on page 9.
[11] Herodotus, Histories Terpsichore (Book V). c. 440 BC. Cited on page 10.
[12] A. of Naucratis, The Deipnosophistae (Books I-X), vol. Vol. I-IV. c. 3rd century AD. Trans-
lations provided by C. B. Gulick, Harvard University Press, 1927. Cited on page 10.
[13] A. Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire,” Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–
83, January 1883. Cited on page 10.
[14] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,”Bell system technical journal,
vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949. Cited on pages 10 and 15.
[15] G. S. Tranquillus, The Twelve Caesars. 121. Cited on page 11.
[16] G. Belaso, “La cifra del sig. Giovan Battista Bellaso, gentil’huomobresciano, nuovamente
da lui medesimo ridotta à grandissima brevità et perfettione.” Cited on page 13.
[17] B. d. Vigenère, “Traité des chiffres, ou secrètes manières d’écrire par Blaise de vigenère,
Bourbonnais,” 1586. Cited on page 13.
[18] F. Miller, Telegraphic code to insure privacy and secrecy in the transmission of telegrams.
CM Cornwell, 1882. Cited on page 14.
[19] G. S. Vernam, “Secret signaling system,” 1919. United States Patent 1310719A. Cited on
page 14.
[20] G. S. Vernam, “Cipher printing telegraph systems: For secret wire and radio telegraphic
communications,” Journal of the AIEE, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 109–115, 1926. Cited on page
14.
[21] H. Feistel, Cryptographic coding for data-bank privacy. IBM Thomas J. Watson Research
Center, 1970. Cited on page 15.
170
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[22] National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST), “Data encryption standard (DES),”
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46, 1977. Cited on page 16.
[23] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “Special feature exhaustive cryptanalysis of the NBS data
encryption standard,” Computer, vol. 10, pp. 74–84, June 1977. Cited on page 16.
[24] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Specification for the advances
encryption standard (AES),” 2001. Cited on page 16.
[25] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE transactions on Infor-
mation Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, 1976. Cited on page 17.
[26] J. H. Ellis, “The possibility of secure non-secret digital encryption,” Communications-
Electronic Security Group Research Report, January 1970. Cited on page 17.
[27] M. J. Williamson, “Non-secret encryption using a finite field,” Communications-Electronic
Security Group Research Report, January 1974. Cited on page 17.
[28] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures and
public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978.
Cited on page 18.
[29] C. C. Cocks, “A note on ‘non-secret’ encryption,” Communications-Electronic Security
Group Research Report, November 1973. Cited on page 18.
[30] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, “Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keep-
ing secret all partial information,” in Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM sym-
posium on Theory of computing, pp. 365–377, ACM, 1982. Cited on page 19.
[31] G. Alagic, J. M. Alperin-Sheriff, D. C. Apon, D. A. Cooper, Q. H. Dang, C. A. Miller, D. Moody,
R. C. Peralta, R. A. Perlner, A. Y. Robinson, D. C. Smith-Tone, and Y.-K. Liu, Status report
on the first round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. US
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019. Cited
on page 20.
[32] L. Eldar and P.W. Shor, “An efficient quantum algorithm for a variant of the closest lattice-
vector problem,” arXiv:1611.06999, 2016. Cited on page 20.
[33] A. Zimmermann, “Zimmermann telegram,” January 1917. Cited on page 21.
[34] A. Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. Random House, 2012. Cited on page 21.
[35] Y. Manin, “Computable and uncomputable,” Sovetskoye Radio, Moscow, vol. 128, 1980.
Cited on page 21.
171
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[36] R. P. Feynman, “Simulating physics with computers,” International journal of theoretical
physics, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 467–488, 1982. Cited on page 21.
[37] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, andN. Rosen, “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical
reality be considered complete?,” Physical review, vol. 47, no. 10, p. 777, 1935. Cited on
page 25.
[38] E. Schrödinger, “Discussion of probability relations between separated systems,” in
Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. 31, pp. 555–563,
Cambridge University Press, 1935. Cited on page 25.
[39] J. S. Bell, “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox,” Physics Physique Fizika, vol. 1,
pp. 195–200, Nov 1964. Cited on pages 25 and 31.
[40] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. A. Holt, “Proposed experiment to test local
hidden-variable theories,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 23, pp. 880–884, Oct 1969. Cited on pages
25 and 31.
[41] M. Giustina, M. A. M. Versteegh, S. Wengerowsky, J. Handsteiner, A. Hochrainer,
K. Phelan, F. Steinlechner, J. Kofler, J.-A. Larsson, C. Abellán, W. Amaya, V. Pruneri, M. W.
Mitchell, J. Beyer, T. Gerrits, A. E. Lita, L. K. Shalm, S. W. Nam, T. Scheidl, R. Ursin,
B. Wittmann, and A. Zeilinger, “Significant-loophole-free test of Bell’s theorem with en-
tangled photons,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 115, p. 250401, Dec 2015. Cited on pages 25, 34,
and 88.
[42] L. K. Shalm, E. Meyer-Scott, B. G. Christensen, P. Bierhorst, M. A. Wayne, M. J. Stevens,
T. Gerrits, S. Glancy, D. R. Hamel, M. S. Allman, K. J. Coakley, S. D. Dyer, C. Hodge, A. E.
Lita, V. B. Verma, C. Lambrocco, E. Tortorici, A. L. Migdall, Y. Zhang, D. R. Kumor, W. H.
Farr, F. Marsili, M. D. Shaw, J. A. Stern, C. Abellán, W. Amaya, V. Pruneri, T. Jennewein,
M. W. Mitchell, P. G. Kwiat, J. C. Bienfang, R. P. Mirin, E. Knill, and S. W. Nam, “Strong
loophole-free test of local realism,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 115, p. 250402, Dec 2015. Cited
on pages 25, 34, and 88.
[43] B. Hensen, H. Bernien, A. E. Dréau, A. Reiserer, N. Kalb, M. S. Blok, J. Ruitenberg, R. F. L.
Vermeulen, R. N. Schouten, C. Abellán, W. Amaya, V. Pruneri, M.W.Mitchell, M. Markham,
D. J. Twitchen, D. Elkouss, S. Wehner, T. H. Taminiau, and R. Hanson, “Loophole-free Bell
inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres,” Nature, vol. 526,
no. 7575, pp. 682–686, 2015. Cited on pages 25, 34, and 88.
[44] M. Mosca, “Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?,” IEEE
Security & Privacy, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 38–41, 2018. Cited on page 27.
172
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[45] A. G. Fowler, M. Mariantoni, J. M. Martinis, and A. N. Cleland, “Surface codes: Towards
practical large-scale quantum computation,” Physical Review A, vol. 86, no. 3, p. 032324,
2012. Cited on page 27.
[46] C. Gidney and M. Ekerå, “How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million
noisy qubits,” 2019. arXiv:1905.09749. Cited on page 27.
[47] N. C. Jones, R. Van Meter, A. G. Fowler, P. L. McMahon, J. Kim, T. D. Ladd, and
Y. Yamamoto, “Layered architecture for quantum computing,” Phys. Rev. X, vol. 2,
p. 031007, Jul 2012. Cited on page 27.
[48] L. K. Grover, “A fast quantummechanical algorithm for database search,” in Proceedings
of the Twenty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’96, (New
York, NY, USA), pp. 212–219, ACM, 1996. Cited on page 27.
[49] C. Bennett, E. Bernstein, G. Brassard, and U. Vazirani, “Strengths and weaknesses of
quantum computing,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1510–1523, 1997.
Cited on page 27.
[50] S. Wiesner, “Conjugate coding,” SIGACT News, vol. 15, pp. 78–88, Jan. 1983. Cited on
page 27.
[51] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin, “Experimental quantum
cryptography,” Journal of cryptology, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 3–28, 1992. Cited on page 29.
[52] S. Pirandola, U. L. Andersen, L. Banchi, M. Berta, D. Bunandar, R. Colbeck, D. Englund,
T. Gehring, C. Lupo, C. Ottaviani, J. Pereira, M. Razavi, J. S. Shaari, M. Tomamichel, V. C.
Usenko, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, and P. Wallden, “Advances in quantum cryptography,”
2019. arXiv:1906.01645. Cited on pages 29 and 34.
[53] V. Scarani, A. Acín, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin, “Quantum cryptography protocols robust
against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 92, p. 057901, Feb 2004. Cited on page 29.
[54] K. Inoue, E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, “Differential phase shift quantum key distribution,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 89, p. 037902, Jun 2002. Cited on pages 29 and 33.
[55] D. Stucki, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, V. Scarani, and H. Zbinden, “Fast and simple one-way
quantum key distribution,” Applied Physics Letters, vol. 87, no. 19, p. 194108, 2005. Cited
on pages 29 and 33.
[56] C. H. Bennett, “Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states,” Phys. Rev.
Lett., vol. 68, pp. 3121–3124, May 1992. Cited on page 29.
173
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[57] N. Lütkenhaus, “Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribu-
tion,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 61, p. 052304, Apr 2000. Cited on pages 30 and 34.
[58] G. Brassard, N. Lütkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, “Limitations on practical quantum
cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 85, pp. 1330–1333, Aug 2000. Cited on pages 30
and 34.
[59] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy state quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett.,
vol. 94, p. 230504, Jun 2005. Cited on pages 30, 50, and 93.
[60] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lutkenhaus, and J. Preskill, “Security of quantum key distri-
bution with imperfect devices,” in International Symposium onInformation Theory, 2004.
ISIT 2004. Proceedings., p. 136, IEEE, 2004. Cited on page 31.
[61] F. Laudenbach, C. Pacher, C.-H. F. Fung, A. Poppe, M. Peev, B. Schrenk, M. Hentschel,
P. Walther, and H. Hübel, “Continuous-variable quantum key distribution with Gaussian
modulation—the theory of practical implementations,”Advanced Quantum Technologies,
vol. 1, no. 1, p. 1800011, 2018. Cited on page 32.
[62] T. C. Ralph, “Continuous variable quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 61, p. 010303,
Dec 1999. Cited on pages 32 and 61.
[63] M. Hillery, “Quantum cryptography with squeezed states,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 61, p. 022309,
Jan 2000. Cited on page 32.
[64] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, A. Leverrier, P. Grangier, and E. Diamanti, “Experimental
demonstration of long-distance continuous-variable quantum key distribution,” Nature
photonics, vol. 7, no. 5, p. 378, 2013. Cited on page 32.
[65] A. Leverrier, “Composable security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribu-
tion with coherent states,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 114, p. 070501, Feb 2015. Cited on page
33.
[66] A. Leverrier, “Security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution via a Gaussian de
Finetti reduction,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 118, p. 200501, May 2017. Cited on page 33.
[67] E. Diamanti, H.-K. Lo, B. Qi, and Z. Yuan, “Practical challenges in quantum key distribu-
tion,” npj Quantum Information, vol. 2, p. 16025, 2016. Cited on page 33.
[68] D. Genkin, A. Shamir, and E. Tromer, “Rsa key extraction via low-bandwidth acoustic crypt-
analysis,” in Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014 (J. A. Garay and R. Gennaro, eds.),
(Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 444–461, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. Cited on page 33.
174
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[69] G. Brassard, “Brief history of quantum cryptography: a personal perspective,” in IEEE
Information Theory Workshop on Theory and Practice in Information-Theoretic Security,
2005., pp. 19–23, Oct 2005. Cited on page 33.
[70] K.-i. Yoshino, M. Fujiwara, K. Nakata, T. Sumiya, T. Sasaki, M. Takeoka, M. Sasaki,
A. Tajima, M. Koashi, and A. Tomita, “Quantum key distribution with an efficient coun-
termeasure against correlated intensity fluctuations in optical pulses,” npj Quantum In-
formation, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 8, 2018. Cited on page 34.
[71] N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, andG. Ribordy, “Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-
key-distribution systems,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 73, p. 022320, Feb 2006. Cited on pages 34
and 49.
[72] N. Jain, E. Anisimova, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Marquardt, and G. Leuchs, “Trojan-horse
attacks threaten the security of practical quantumcryptography,”NewJournal of Physics,
vol. 16, no. 12, p. 123030, 2014. Cited on page 34.
[73] S. Sajeed, C. Minshull, N. Jain, and V. Makarov, “Invisible trojan-horse attack,” Scientific
reports, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 8403, 2017. Cited on page 34.
[74] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X.Ma, “Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosys-
tems,” Quantum Info. Comput., vol. 7, pp. 73–82, Jan. 2007. Cited on page 34.
[75] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo, “Quantum hacking: Experimental
demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems,”
Phys. Rev. A, vol. 78, p. 042333, Oct 2008. Cited on pages 34 and 49.
[76] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Thermal blind-
ing of gated detectors in quantum cryptography,” Opt. Express, vol. 18, pp. 27938–27954,
Dec 2010. Cited on page 34.
[77] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov, “Full-field
implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nature
communications, vol. 2, p. 349, 2011. Cited on page 34.
[78] A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov, “Laser
damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 112,
p. 070503, Feb 2014. Cited on page 34.
[79] V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser,
R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, “Creation of backdoors in quantum




[80] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on se-
curity of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 74, p. 022313, Aug 2006. Cited on
pages 34 and 49.
[81] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Hacking com-
mercial quantumcryptography systemsby tailored bright illumination,”Nature photonics,
vol. 4, no. 10, p. 686, 2010. Cited on pages 34, 49, and 88.
[82] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a su-
perconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New
Journal of Physics, vol. 13, p. 113042, nov 2011. Cited on page 34.
[83] S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling an actively-
quenched single photon detector with bright light,” Opt. Express, vol. 19, pp. 23590–
23600, Nov 2011. Cited on page 34.
[84] V.Makarov, “Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light,”New
Journal of Physics, vol. 11, p. 065003, jun 2009. Cited on page 34.
[85] C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and
G. Leuchs, “After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem,” New Journal of Physics,
vol. 13, p. 013043, jan 2011. Cited on page 34.
[86] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Avoiding the
blinding attack in QKD,” Nature Photonics, vol. 4, no. 12, p. 801, 2010. Cited on page 34.
[87] Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields, “Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD,”Nature Photonics,
vol. 4, no. 12, p. 800, 2010. Cited on page 34.
[88] M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. B. Ward, J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Practical
security bounds against the trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev.
X, vol. 5, p. 031030, Sep 2015. Cited on pages 34 and 88.
[89] A. Acín, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and V. Scarani, “Device-independent
security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 98,
p. 230501, Jun 2007. Cited on page 34.
[90] J. Barrett, L. Hardy, and A. Kent, “No signaling and quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev.
Lett., vol. 95, p. 010503, Jun 2005. Cited on page 34.
[91] S. Pironio, A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, and V. Scarani, “Device-independent
quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks,” New Journal of Physics,
vol. 11, no. 4, p. 045021, 2009. Cited on page 34.
176
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[92] S. E.Miller, “Integrated optics: An introduction,”TheBell SystemTechnical Journal, vol. 48,
no. 7, pp. 2059–2069, 1969. Cited on page 35.
[93] C. Gerry, P. Knight, and P. L. Knight, Introductory Quantum Optics. Cambridge university
press, 2005. Cited on page 35.
[94] M. Fox, Quantum Optics: An Introduction, vol. 15. OUP Oxford, 2006. Cited on page 35.
[95] R. Loudon, The Quantum Theory of Light. OUP Oxford, 2000. Cited on page 35.
[96] E. Schrödinger, “Der stetige übergang von der mikro- zur makromechanik,” Naturwis-
senschaften, vol. 14, pp. 664–666, Jul 1926. Cited on page 36.
[97] M. Smit, X. Leijtens, H. Ambrosius, E. Bente, J. van der Tol, B. Smalbrugge, T. de Vries, E.-J.
Geluk, J. Bolk, R. van Veldhoven, L. Augustin, P. Thijs, D. D’Agostino, H. Rabbani, K. Lawn-
iczuk, S. Stopinski, S. Tahvili, A. Corradi, E. Kleijn, D. Dzibrou, M. Felicetti, E. Bitincka,
V. Moskalenko, J. Zhao, R. Santos, G. Gilardi, W. Yao, K. Williams, P. Stabile, P. Kuinder-
sma, J. Pello, S. Bhat, Y. Jiao, D. Heiss, G. Roelkens, M. Wale, P. Firth, F. Soares, N. Grote,
M. Schell, H. Debregeas, M. Achouche, J.-L. Gentner, A. Bakker, T. Korthorst, D. Gallagher,
A. Dabbs, A. Melloni, F. Morichetti, D. Melati, A. Wonfor, R. Penty, R. Broeke, B. Musk,
and D. Robbins, “An introduction to InP-based generic integration technology,” Semicon-
ductor Science and Technology, vol. 29, p. 083001, jun 2014. Cited on pages 37, 41, 43,
50, 63, and 65.
[98] G. Lifante, Integrated Photonics: Fundamentals. Wiley Online Library, 2003. Cited on
page 38.
[99] L. B. Soldano and E. C. Pennings, “Optical multi-mode interference devices based on
self-imaging: principles and applications,” Journal of lightwave technology, vol. 13, no. 4,
pp. 615–627, 1995. Cited on page 39.
[100] L. A. Eldada, “Advances in telecom and datacom optical components,” Optical Engineer-
ing, vol. 40, no. 7, pp. 1165 – 1178, 2001. Cited on pages 41 and 44.
[101] A. Kanno, T. Sakamoto, A. Chiba, T. Kawanishi, K. Higuma, M. Sudou, and J. Ichikawa,
“120-Gb/s NRZ-DQPSK signal generation by a thin-lithium-niobate-substrate modulator,”
IEICE Electronics Express, vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 817–822, 2010. Cited on pages 41 and 44.
[102] P. Sibson, J. E. Kennard, S. Stanisic, C. Erven, J. L. O’Brien, and M. G. Thompson, “Integ-
rated silicon photonics for high-speed quantum key distribution,” Optica, vol. 4, pp. 172–
177, Feb 2017. Cited on pages 41 and 149.
[103] H. Semenenko, P. Sibson, M. G. Thompson, and C. Erven, “Integrated photonic
devices for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” in CLEO:
177
BIBLIOGRAPHY
QELS_Fundamental Science, pp. FM4C–4, Optical Society of America, 2019. Cited on
pages 41 and 87.
[104] H. Semenenko, P. Sibson, A. Hart, M. G. Thompson, J. G. Rarity, and C. Erven, “Chip-based
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,” 2019. arXiv:1908.08745.
Cited on pages 41, 87, and 149.
[105] H. Semenenko, P. Sibson, M. G. Thompson, and C. Erven, “Interference between inde-
pendent photonic integrated devices for quantum key distribution,”Optics letters, vol. 44,
no. 2, pp. 275–278, 2019. Cited on pages 41 and 49.
[106] R. H. Hadfield, “Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information applications,”
Nature photonics, vol. 3, no. 12, p. 696, 2009. Cited on pages 42 and 107.
[107] L. C. Comandar, B. Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, M. Lucamarini, Z. Yuan, R. V. Penty,
and A. J. Shields, “Gigahertz-gated InGaAs/InP single-photon detector with detection ef-
ficiency exceeding 55% at 1550 nm,” Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 117, no. 8, p. 083109,
2015. Cited on page 42.
[108] N. J. D. Martinez, M. Gehl, C. T. Derose, A. L. Starbuck, A. T. Pomerene, A. L. Lentine,
D. C. Trotter, and P. S. Davids, “Single photon detection in a waveguide-coupled Ge-on-Si
lateral avalanche photodiode,” Opt. Express, vol. 25, pp. 16130–16139, Jul 2017. Cited on
page 42.
[109] P. Vines, K. Kuzmenko, J. Kirdoda, D. C. Dumas, M. M. Mirza, R. W. Millar, D. J. Paul, and
G. S. Buller, “High performance planar germanium-on-silicon single-photon avalanche
diode detectors,” Nature communications, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 1086, 2019. Cited on page 42.
[110] E. E. Wollman, V. B. Verma, A. D. Beyer, R. M. Briggs, B. Korzh, J. P. Allmaras, F. Marsili,
A. E. Lita, R. P. Mirin, S. W. Nam, and M. D. Shaw, “UV superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors with high efficiency, low noise, and 4 k operating temperature,” Opt.
Express, vol. 25, pp. 26792–26801, Oct 2017. Cited on pages 42 and 91.
[111] J. P. Sprengers, A. Gaggero, D. Sahin, S. Jahanmirinejad, G. Frucci, F. Mattioli, R. Leoni,
J. Beetz, M. Lermer, M. Kamp, S. Höfling, R. Sanjines, and A. Fiore, “Waveguide super-
conducting single-photon detectors for integrated quantum photonic circuits,” Applied
Physics Letters, vol. 99, no. 18, p. 181110, 2011. Cited on pages 42, 94, 97, and 118.
[112] A. Vetter, S. Ferrari, P. Rath, R. Alaee, O. Kahl, V. Kovalyuk, S. Diewald, G. N. Goltsman,
A. Korneev, C. Rockstuhl, and W. H. P. Pernice, “Cavity-enhanced and ultrafast supercon-
ducting single-photon detectors,”Nano letters, vol. 16, no. 11, pp. 7085–7092, 2016. Cited
on pages 42, 97, and 107.
178
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[113] Y. Yun, A. Vetter, R. Stegmueller, S. Ferrari, W. H. Pernice, C. Rockstuhl, and C. Lee, “Super-
conducting nanowire single-photon spectrometer exploiting cascaded photonic crystal
cavities,” arXiv:1908.01681, 2019. Cited on pages 42, 97, and 107.
[114] N. A. Tyler, J. Barreto, G. E. Villarreal-Garcia, D. Bonneau, D. Sahin, J. L. O’Brien, and M. G.
Thompson, “Modelling superconducting nanowire single photon detectors in a wave-
guide cavity,” Optics express, vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 8797–8808, 2016. Cited on page 42.
[115] M. Cazzanelli and J. Schilling, “Second order optical nonlinearity in silicon by symmetry
breaking,” Applied Physics Reviews, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 011104, 2016. Cited on page 43.
[116] C. Castellan, A. Trenti, C. Vecchi, A. Marchesini, M. Mancinelli, M. Ghulinyan, G. Pucker,
and L. Pavesi, “On the origin of second harmonic generation in silicon waveguides with
silicon nitride cladding,” Scientific reports, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 1088, 2019. Cited on page 43.
[117] J. W. Silverstone, Entangled light in silicon waveguides. PhD thesis, University of Bristol,
7 2015. Cited on page 43.
[118] Y. Fan, R. M. Oldenbeuving, C. G. Roeloffzen, M. Hoekman, D. Geskus, R. G. Heideman,
and K.-J. Boller, “290 Hz intrinsic linewidth from an integrated optical chip-based widely
tunable InP-Si3N4 hybrid laser,” in Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics, p. JTh5C.9,
Optical Society of America, 2017. Cited on page 43.
[119] C. Agnesi, B. D. Lio, D. Cozzolino, L. Cardi, B. B. Bakir, K. Hassan, A. D. Frera, A. Ruggeri,
A. Giudice, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, A. Tosi, K. Rottwitt, Y. Ding, and D. Bacco, “Hong-Ou-
Mandel interference between independent III-V on silicon waveguide integrated lasers,”
Opt. Lett., vol. 44, pp. 271–274, Jan 2019. Cited on pages 43, 59, and 80.
[120] F. Raffaelli, P. Sibson, J. E. Kennard, D. H. Mahler, M. G. Thompson, and J. C. Matthews,
“Generation of random numbers by measuring phase fluctuations from a laser diode
with a silicon-on-insulator chip,” Optics express, vol. 26, no. 16, pp. 19730–19741, 2018.
Cited on pages 43, 116, and 143.
[121] J. Notaros, F. Pavanello, M. T. Wade, C. M. Gentry, A. Atabaki, L. Alloatti, R. J. Ram, and
M. A. Popović, “Ultra-efficient cmos fiber-to-chip grating couplers,” in Optical Fiber Com-
munication Conference, p. M2I.5, Optical Society of America, 2016. Cited on pages 43
and 120.
[122] L. M. Rosenfeld, D. A. Sulway, G. F. Sinclair, V. Anant, M. G. Thompson, J. G. Rarity, and
J. W. Silverstone, “Mid-infrared quantum optics in silicon,” arXiv:1906.10158, 2019. Cited
on pages 43 and 44.
179
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[123] D. Tan, K. Ooi, and D. Ng, “Nonlinear optics on silicon-rich nitride—a high nonlinear figure
of merit CMOS platform,” Photonics Research, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. B50–B66, 2018. Cited on
page 43.
[124] X. Lu, Q. Li, D. A. Westly, G. Moille, A. Singh, V. Anant, and K. Srinivasan, “Chip-integrated
visible–telecom entangled photon pair source for quantum communication,” Nature
Physics, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 373, 2019. Cited on page 43.
[125] JePPIX, “JePPIX Roadmap 2018.” https://www.jeppix.eu/vision/. Cited on pages 43, 50,
98, and 144.
[126] J. van der Tol, Y. Jiao, and K.Williams, InP photonic integrated circuits on silicon, pp. 189–
219. Semiconductors and Semimetals, Netherlands: Elsevier, 9 2018. Cited on page 44.
[127] J. Van der Tol, R. Zhang, J. Pello, F. Bordas, G. Roelkens, H. Ambrosius, P. Thijs, F. Ka-
routa, and M. Smit, “Photonic integration in indium-phosphide membranes on silicon,”
IET optoelectronics, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 218–225, 2011. Cited on page 44.
[128] R. R. Kumar, M. Raevskaia, V. Pogoretskii, Y. Jiao, and H. K. Tsang, “Entangled photon
pair generation from an InP membrane micro-ring resonator,” Applied Physics Letters,
vol. 114, no. 2, p. 021104, 2019. Cited on pages 44 and 98.
[129] S. Tanzilli, W. Tittel, H. De Riedmatten, H. Zbinden, P. Baldi, M. DeMicheli, D. B. Ostrowsky,
and N. Gisin, “PPLN waveguide for quantum communication,” The European Physical
Journal D-Atomic,Molecular, Optical andPlasmaPhysics, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 155–160, 2002.
Cited on page 44.
[130] H. Jin, F. Liu, P. Xu, J. Xia, M. Zhong, Y. Yuan, J. Zhou, Y. Gong, W. Wang, and S. Zhu,
“On-chip generation and manipulation of entangled photons based on reconfigurable
lithium-niobate waveguide circuits,” Physical review letters, vol. 113, no. 10, p. 103601,
2014. Cited on page 44.
[131] A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, “Breaking a quantum key distribution system
through a timing side channel,” Opt. Express, vol. 15, pp. 9388–9393, Jul 2007. Cited
on page 49.
[132] C. K. Hong, Z. Y. Ou, and L. Mandel, “Measurement of subpicosecond time intervals be-
tween two photons by interference,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 59, pp. 2044–2046, Nov 1987.
Cited on pages 49, 50, and 57.
[133] F. Xu, M. Curty, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Practical aspects of measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 15, no. 11, p. 113007,
2013. Cited on page 49.
180
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[134] J. G. Rarity, P. R. Tapster, and R. Loudon, “Non-classical interference between indepen-
dent sources,” Journal of Optics B: Quantum and Semiclassical Optics, vol. 7, pp. S171–
S175, jun 2005. Cited on pages 50, 52, 56, 76, and 94.
[135] Z. L. Yuan, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, B. Fröhlich, M. B. Ward, and A. J. Shields, “Interfer-
ence of short optical pulses from independent gain-switched laser diodes for quantum
secure communications,” Phys. Rev. Applied, vol. 2, p. 064006, Dec 2014. Cited on page
50.
[136] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez, and W. Tittel, “Real-world two-photon
interference and proof-of-principle quantum key distribution immune to detector at-
tacks,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 111, p. 130501, Sep 2013. Cited on pages 50, 88, 94, and 96.
[137] L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, S. W.-B. Tam, Z. L.
Yuan, R. V. Penty, and A. J. Shields, “Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerab-
ilities using optically seeded lasers,” Nature Photonics, vol. 10, pp. 312 – 315, Apr 2016.
Cited on pages 50, 88, 96, 129, and 149.
[138] J. G. Rarity and P. R. Tapster, “Fourth-order interference in parametric downconversion,”
J. Opt. Soc. Am. B, vol. 6, pp. 1221–1226, Jun 1989. Cited on page 57.
[139] W. C. Jiang, X. Lu, J. Zhang, O. Painter, and Q. Lin, “Silicon-chip source of bright photon
pairs,” Optics express, vol. 23, no. 16, pp. 20884–20904, 2015. Cited on page 57.
[140] V. Leong, S. Kosen, B. Srivathsan, G. K. Gulati, A. Cerè, and C. Kurtsiefer, “Hong-Ou-
Mandel interference between triggered and heralded single photons from separate
atomic systems,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 91, p. 063829, Jun 2015. Cited on page 57.
[141] N. Somaschi, V. Giesz, L. De Santis, J. C. Loredo, M. P. Almeida, G. Hornecker, S. L.
Portalupi, T. Grange, C. Antón, J. Demory, C. Gómez, I. Sagnes, N. D. Lanzillotti-Kimura,
A. Lemaítre, A. Auffeves, A. G. White, L. Lanco, and P. Senellart, “Near-optimal single-
photon sources in the solid state,” Nature Photonics, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 340–345, 2016.
Cited on page 57.
[142] H. Bernien, L. Childress, L. Robledo, M. Markham, D. Twitchen, and R. Hanson, “Two-
photon quantum interference from separate nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond,”Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 108, p. 043604, Jan 2012. Cited on page 57.
[143] Y. Chen, M. Zopf, R. Keil, F. Ding, and O. G. Schmidt, “Highly-efficient extraction of en-
tangled photons from quantum dots using a broadband optical antenna,” Nature com-
munications, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 2994, 2018. Cited on page 57.
[144] S. Wehner, D. Elkouss, and R. Hanson, “Quantum internet: A vision for the road ahead,”
Science, vol. 362, no. 6412, p. eaam9288, 2018. Cited on pages 58 and 115.
181
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[145] L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields,
“Near perfect mode overlap between independently seeded, gain-switched lasers,” Opt.
Express, vol. 24, pp. 17849–17859, Aug 2016. Cited on pages 59, 128, 129, and 141.
[146] N. Ismail, C. C. Kores, D. Geskus, and M. Pollnau, “Fabry-Pérot resonator: spectral line
shapes, generic and related airy distributions, linewidths, finesses, and performance at
low or frequency-dependent reflectivity,”Opt. Express, vol. 24, pp. 16366–16389, Jul 2016.
Cited on page 61.
[147] T. Okoshi, K. Kikuchi, and A. Nakayama, “Novel method for high resolutionmeasurement
of laser output spectrum,” Electronics Letters, vol. 16, pp. 630–631, July 1980. Cited on
page 62.
[148] D. A. B. Miller, D. S. Chemla, T. C. Damen, A. C. Gossard, W. Wiegmann, T. H. Wood, and
C. A. Burrus, “Band-edge electroabsorption in quantum well structures: The quantum-
confined Stark effect,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 53, pp. 2173–2176, Nov 1984. Cited on pages
63 and 65.
[149] D. C. Hutchings, M. Sheik-Bahae, D. J. Hagan, and E. W. Van Stryland, “Kramers-Krönig
relations in nonlinear optics,” Optical and Quantum Electronics, vol. 24, pp. 1–30, Jan
1992. Cited on page 64.
[150] J. S. Weiner, D. A. Miller, and D. S. Chemla, “Quadratic electro-optic effect due to the
quantum-confined Stark effect in quantum wells,” Applied physics letters, vol. 50, no. 13,
pp. 842–844, 1987. Cited on page 64.
[151] B. C. Wadell, Transmission line design handbook. Artech House, 1991. Cited on page 69.
[152] M. Riaziat, I. Feng, R. Majidi-Ahy, and B. Auld, “Single-mode operation of coplanar wave-
guides,” Electronics letters, vol. 23, no. 24, pp. 1281–1283, 1987. Cited on page 70.
[153] A. B. Price, P. Sibson, C. Erven, J. G. Rarity, and M. G. Thompson, “High-speed quantum
key distributionwithwavelength-divisionmultiplexing on integrated photonic devices,” in
Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics, p. JTh2A.24, Optical Society of America, 2018.
Cited on pages 82 and 119.
[154] M. K. Akhlaghi, E. Schelew, and J. F. Young, “Waveguide integrated superconducting
single-photon detectors implemented as near-perfect absorbers of coherent radiation,”
Nature communications, vol. 6, p. 8233, 2015. Cited on page 82.
[155] S. Wengerowsky, S. K. Joshi, F. Steinlechner, J. R. Zichi, S. M. Dobrovolskiy, R. van der
Molen, J. W. N. Los, V. Zwiller, M. A. M. Versteegh, A. Mura, D. Calonico, M. Inguscio,
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY
H. Hübel, L. Bo, T. Scheidl, A. Zeilinger, A. Xuereb, and R. Ursin, “Entanglement distribu-
tion over a 96-km-long submarine optical fiber,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 116, no. 14, pp. 6684–6688, 2019. Cited on page 82.
[156] A. Vaquero-Stainer, R. Kirkwood, V. Burenkov, C. Chunnilall, A. Sinclair, A. Hart, H. Semen-
enko, P. Sibson, C. Erven, and M. Thompson, “Measurements towards providing secur-
ity assurance for a chip-scale qkd system,” in Quantum Technologies 2018, vol. 10674,
p. 106741A, International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2018. Cited on pages 87, 117,
and 119.
[157] M. G. Thompson, A. Politi, J. C. Matthews, and J. L. O’Brien, “Integrated waveguide cir-
cuits for optical quantumcomputing,” IET circuits, devices & systems, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 94–
102, 2011. Cited on page 87.
[158] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You, Y.-H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang,
W.-J. Zhang, H. Chen, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, F. Zhou, X. Jiang, Z. Wang, Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang,
and J.-W. Pan, “Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over a 404
km optical fiber,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 117, p. 190501, Nov 2016. Cited on pages 88, 89,
and 90.
[159] Q. Zhang, F. Xu, Y.-A. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W. Pan, “Large scale quantum key distribu-
tion: challenges and solutions,” Optics express, vol. 26, no. 18, pp. 24260–24273, 2018.
Cited on page 88.
[160] Some examples of commercial entities developingQKD systems are IDQuantique, KETS
Quantum Security, MagiQ Technologies, QuintessenceLabs and Toshiba. Cited on page
88.
[161] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, “Secure quantum key distribution,” Nature Photonics,
vol. 8, pp. 595 – 604, Jul 2014. Cited on pages 88 and 93.
[162] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Controlling a su-
perconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New
Journal of Physics, vol. 13, no. 11, p. 113042, 2011. Cited on page 88.
[163] L. Masanes, S. Pironio, and A. Acín, “Secure device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion with causally independent measurement devices,” Nature communications, vol. 2,
p. 238, 2011. Cited on page 88.
[164] Y.-H. Zhou, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, “Making the decoy-state measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution practically useful,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 93, p. 042324,
Apr 2016. Cited on pages 89, 94, and 115.
183
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[165] S. Walborn, W. Nogueira, S. Pádua, and C. Monken, “Optical Bell-state analysis in the
coincidence basis,” EPL (Europhysics Letters), vol. 62, no. 2, p. 161, 2003. Cited on pages
90, 92, and 95.
[166] K. Mattle, H.Weinfurter, P. G. Kwiat, and A. Zeilinger, “Dense coding in experimental quan-
tum communication,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 76, pp. 4656–4659, Jun 1996. Cited on pages
90, 92, and 95.
[167] A. Boaron, G. Boso, D. Rusca, C. Vulliez, C. Autebert, M. Caloz, M. Perrenoud, G. Gras,
F. Bussières, M.-J. Li, D. Nolan, A. Martin, and H. Zbinden, “Secure quantum key distribu-
tion over 421 km of optical fiber,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 121, p. 190502, Nov 2018. Cited on
page 91.
[168] W.-Y. Hwang, “Quantum key distribution with high loss: Toward global secure commu-
nication,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 91, p. 057901, Aug 2003. Cited on page 93.
[169] W.Wang, F. Xu, and H.-K. Lo, “Asymmetric protocols for scalable high-ratemeasurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution networks,” Phys. Rev. X, vol. 9, p. 041012,
Oct 2019. Cited on pages 94 and 115.
[170] Y. Tamura, H. Sakuma, K. Morita, M. Suzuki, Y. Yamamoto, K. Shimada, Y. Honma,
K. Sohma, T. Fujii, and T. Hasegawa, “The first 0.14-dB/km loss optical fiber and its im-
pact on submarine transmission,” Journal of Lightwave Technology, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 44–
49, 2018. Cited on page 95.
[171] “SMF-28® ULL optical fiber.” https://www.corning.com/worldwide/en/products/
communication-networks/products/fiber/smf-28-ull.html. Accessed: 2019/09/16.
Cited on page 95.
[172] “Polatis Series 6000.” https://www.polatis.com/polatis-series-6000-optical-matrix-
switch-192x192-sdn-enabled-industry-leading-performace-lowest-loss-switches.asp.
Accessed: 2019/09/16. Cited on page 97.
[173] F. Eltes, G. E. Villarreal-Garcia, D. Caimi, H. Siegwart, A. A. Gentile, A. Hart, P. Stark, G. D.
Marshall, M. G. Thompson, J. Barreto, J. Fompeyrine, and S. Abel, “An integrated cryo-
genic optical modulator,” arXiv:1904.10902, 2019. Cited on pages 97 and 119.
[174] A. Sugita, A. Kaneko, K. Okamoto, M. Itoh, A. Himeno, and Y. Ohmori, “Very low inser-
tion loss arrayed-waveguide grating with vertically tapered waveguides,” IEEE Photonics
Technology Letters, vol. 12, no. 9, pp. 1180–1182, 2000. Cited on pages 97 and 118.
[175] P. Chan, J. A. Slater, I. Lucio-Martinez, A. Rubenok, and W. Tittel, “Modeling a
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution system,” Opt. Express,
vol. 22, pp. 12716–12736, Jun 2014. Cited on page 102.
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[176] J.Wang, D. Bonneau,M. Villa, J.W. Silverstone, R. Santagati, S.Miki, T. Yamashita,M. Fuji-
wara, M. Sasaki, H. Terai, M. G. Tanner, C. M. Natarajan, R. H. Hadfield, J. L. O’Brien, and
M. G. Thompson, “Chip-to-chip quantum photonic interconnect by path-polarization in-
terconversion,” Optica, vol. 3, pp. 407–413, Apr 2016. Cited on page 107.
[177] C. Abellan, W. Amaya, D. Domenech, P. M. noz, J. Capmany, S. Longhi, M.W.Mitchell, and
V. Pruneri, “Quantum entropy source on an InP photonic integrated circuit for random
number generation,” Optica, vol. 3, pp. 989–994, Sep 2016. Cited on page 116.
[178] M. Herrero-Collantes and J. C. Garcia-Escartin, “Quantum random number generators,”
Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 89, p. 015004, Feb 2017. Cited on pages 116 and 143.
[179] A. Huang, Álvaro Navarrete, S.-H. Sun, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Curty, and V. Makarov, “Laser
seeding attack in quantum key distribution,” 2019. arXiv:1902.09792. Cited on page 117.
[180] “ETSI - quantum key distribution | quantum cryptography.” https://www.etsi.org/
technologies/quantum-key-distribution. Accessed: 2019/11/03. Cited on page 118.
[181] C.-Y. Wang, J. Gao, Z.-Q. Jiao, L.-F. Qiao, R.-J. Ren, Z. Feng, Y. Chen, Z.-Q. Yan, Y. Wang,
H. Tang, and X.-M. Jin, “Integrated measurement server for measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution network,” Opt. Express, vol. 27, pp. 5982–5989,
Mar 2019. Cited on page 118.
[182] Dong-Sun Seo, D. Y. Kim, and Hai-Feng Liu, “Timing jitter reduction of gain-switched DFB
laser by external injection-seeding,” Electronics Letters, vol. 32, pp. 44–45, Jan 1996.
Cited on pages 128 and 141.
[183] P. Gunning, J. K. Lucek, D. G. Moodie, K. Smith, R. P. Davey, S. V. Chernikov, M. J. Guy, J. R.
Taylor, and A. S. Siddiqui, “Gainswitched DFB laser diode pulse source using continuous
wave light injection for jitter suppression and an electroabsorption modulator for pedes-
tal suppression,” Electronics Letters, vol. 32, pp. 1010–1011, May 1996. Cited on pages
128 and 141.
[184] T. K. Paraïso, I. De Marco, T. Roger, D. G. Marangon, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, Z. Yuan,
and A. J. Shields, “Amodulator-free quantum key distribution transmitter chip,” npj Quan-
tum Information, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 42, 2019. Cited on pages 130 and 141.
[185] W.H.Haydl, “On the use of vias in conductor-backed coplanar circuits,” IEEE Transactions
on Microwave Theory and Techniques, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 1571–1577, 2002. Cited on page
132.
[186] A. Sain and K. L. Melde, “Impact of ground via placement in grounded coplanar wave-
guide interconnects,” IEEE Transactions on Components, Packaging and Manufacturing
Technology, vol. 6, pp. 136–144, Jan 2016. Cited on page 133.
185
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[187] G. Chen, Y. Yu, S. Deng, L. Liu, and X. Zhang, “Bandwidth improvement for germanium
photodetector usingwire bonding technology,”Optics express, vol. 23, no. 20, pp. 25700–
25706, 2015. Cited on page 135.
[188] S. S. Cahill, E. A. Sanjuan, and L. Levine, “Development of 100+ GHz high-frequency mi-
crocoax wire bonds,” in Proc. of the Int. Symp. OnMicroelect, p. 668, 2006. Cited on page
135.
[189] J. Bouda, M. Pivoluska, M. Plesch, and C. Wilmott, “Weak randomness seriously limits
the security of quantum key distribution,”Phys. Rev. A, vol. 86, p. 062308, Dec 2012. Cited
on page 143.
[190] H.-W. Li, Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, Y.-J. Qian, W. Chen, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, “Randomness
determines practical security of BB84 quantum key distribution,” Scientific reports, vol. 5,
p. 16200, 2015. Cited on page 143.
[191] Y.-Q. Nie, L. Huang, Y. Liu, F. Payne, J. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, “The generation of 68 Gbps
quantum random number by measuring laser phase fluctuations,” Review of Scientific
Instruments, vol. 86, no. 6, p. 063105, 2015. Cited on page 143.
[192] C. Gabriel, C. Wittmann, D. Sych, R. Dong, W. Mauerer, U. L. Andersen, C. Marquardt, and
G. Leuchs, “A generator for unique quantum random numbers based on vacuum states,”
Nature Photonics, vol. 4, no. 10, p. 711, 2010. Cited on page 143.
[193] Z. Zheng, Y. Zhang, W. Huang, S. Yu, and H. Guo, “6 Gbps real-time optical quantum ran-
dom number generator based on vacuum fluctuation,” Review of Scientific Instruments,
vol. 90, no. 4, p. 043105, 2019. Cited on page 143.
[194] F. Xu, B. Qi, X. Ma, H. Xu, H. Zheng, and H.-K. Lo, “Ultrafast quantum random number gen-
eration based on quantum phase fluctuations,” Optics express, vol. 20, no. 11, pp. 12366–
12377, 2012. Cited on page 143.
[195] G. Zhang, J. Y. Haw, H. Cai, F. Xu, S. M. Assad, J. F. Fitzsimons, X. Zhou, Y. Zhang, S. Yu,
J. Wu, W. Ser, L. C. Kwek, and A. Q. Liu, “An integrated silicon photonic chip platform for
continuous-variable quantum key distribution,”Nature Photonics, vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 839–
842, 2019. Cited on page 149.
[196] C. Ma, W. D. Sacher, Z. Tang, J. C. Mikkelsen, Y. Yang, F. Xu, T. Thiessen, H.-K. Lo, and J. K.
Poon, “Silicon photonic transmitter for polarization-encoded quantum key distribution,”
Optica, vol. 3, no. 11, pp. 1274–1278, 2016. Cited on page 149.
[197] D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach. Basic Books, 1979. Cited on page 165.
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[198] J. Langford and P. R. Clance, “The imposter phenomenon: recent research findings re-
garding dynamics, personality and family patterns and their implications for treatment.,”
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, vol. 30, no. 3, p. 495, 1993. Cited on
page 165.
[199] “Thesis Defence.” https://xkcd.com/1403/. Accessed: 2019/12/04. Cited on page 168.
[200] “I did a PhD and did NOT gomad.” http://www.richardbutterworth.co.uk/blog/13-i-did-a-
phd. Accessed: 2019-08-04. Cited on page 168.
187



